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The aim of this thesis is to examine the impact of corporate 
control on households' choice on consumption-savings and, as a result, 
on financial capital accumulation. It attempts to provide an alterna- 
tive to the managerialist and neoclassical 'orthodoxies' in theory 
(Part I) and subjects the alternative theories to empirical-econometric 
testing (Part II). The central theme of the thesis runs as follows. 
The emergence and growth of the joint-stock company has led to the 
socialization of the 'ownership' of the means of production. The 
latter has resulted in the generation of a higher level of aggregate 
saving being available for investment purposes, than could I-lave been 
the case in its absence. A preference on the part of the corporate 
'controlling group' for higher retention and net inflow to the corporate 
pension funds ratios than that of the non-controlling shareholders and 
the latters' inability and/or unwillingness to substitute for increases 
in corporate savings by sufficiently reducing their net personal savings, 
has facilitated the achievement of this result. Historical consistency 
and the existing evidence suggests that it is more plausible to interpret 
the above as the result of capitalist control of today's corporations, 
rather than managerial and/or all shareholders' control. Increases in 
corporate saving and less than perfect substitution between corporate 
and personal saving will tend to reduce the part of private income 
devoted to consumption: thus containing the seeds of a realization 
failure. The Saving Function should be extended to allow for these 
developments: a proposed 'Monopoly Capitalism Saving Function' appears, 
closer to describing saving behaviour today. The post-war U. K. 
evidence does not contradict the above propositions. Our econometric 
evidence lends support to our proposed form of the saving function, the 
idea that different forms of saving substitute imperfectly and the other 
hypotheses advanced in the thesis. 
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A GENERAL OVERVIEW 
The emergence and growth of the joint stock company marked a new 
era in the development of capitalism. The selling of shares to numerous 
shareholders has resulted in the separation of a part of the ownership 
from the unity of ownership and control of the large corporations. The 
further is shareholding diluted, the less is the proportion of ownership 
left to the original owners. Where ownership and control coexisted 
there is now partial (if at all) ownership. It can also be argued thatr 
as a result, control has been lost on the part of the original owners. 
One of the most important aspects of the growth of the joint 
stock company is the socialization of the'ownership'of the means of 
production that it brings about. In the early phases of capitalist 
development concern has been raised over the co-existence of social 
production and private appropriation. The new element introduced by the 
joint stock company is that now 'ownership'. 
L/ 
too is social. Has this 
change altered the nature of capitalism ? To answer that, one needs to 
define the 'sine qua non' of the capitalist mode of production. 
Traditional Marxists identified capitalism with the existence of 
a 'ruling class' that owns and controls the means of production See 
e. g. Miliband, (1973). Today, such a (definition of the) ruling class 
does not exist: by definition. With 33% of all equity capital in the 
U. S. owned by workers through their pension funds, (see Drucker, 1976), 
and today's extent of diluted shareholdingr talking about a class that 
owns and controls, can mean any class: or no class. One,, howevert can 
entertain the possibility of a ruling class that owns sufficient so as 
to control the means of production: and achieves with this control through 
partial only ownership. to privately appropriate the fruits of social 
2. 
production and social ownership. 
the first Chapter of this thesis. 
Such a possibility we entertain in 
The socialization of thelownershiplof the means of production has 
raised the possibility of a higher proportion of total income being 
available for expansion purposes than ever before. Is this availability 
the result of collective consensus, or does it rather reflect hierarchical 
decisions on the part of a societal group(s) and/or corporations, that 
are imposed on other groups ? How do these decisions - if any - affect 
the non-controlling groups' choice over their consumption-savings, and 
as a result aggregate financial capital accumulation ? In the early 
phases of capitalist development such were not the issues. With a 
capitalist class that owns and controls the means of productionpdecisions 
over the desired, or needed, level of capital accumulation are primarily 
the concern of this class. Non-controlling classes are assigned or 
undertake the tasks of producing and/or facilitating production, but the 
decisions over how to use their, often meagre, income, is purely their 
personal 'decision'. With socializedlownershiplof the means of production, 
the decisions of whoever is in control, however, have repercussions on 
other owners too. Obviously, no conflict needs arise if all individuals 
have and pursue common interests-views over what constitutes the desired 
level of financial capital accumulationt or if the existing societal 
institutions are such as to ensure an outcome as close to consensus as it 
can be. With less than (close to) perfect consensus, however, it becomes 
crucial to analyze the potentially conflicting aims of different societal 
groups and examine their impact on financial capital accumulation, and on 
the economy as a whole. 
Unfortunately, orthodox (neoclassical) economists are little 
concerned with such issues. Based on the implicit or explicit considera- 
3. 
tion that in modern pluralist societies competition between interest 
groups will ensure a 'consensus' outcome, they tend to view corporations 
as an extension of households and the decisions of the corporate'controlling 
groupt as the result of the agreement between all households. In 
contrast to this view, another school of thought, the managerialists, have 
given prominence to issues such as the separation of ownership and controll 
and the contrasting goals between business policies and the public at largel 
over retention of profit in the firms, and, as a result, financial capital 
accumulation. A third school of thought, Marxism, has followed a rather 
defensive and least constructive strategy. In their attempt to show that 
a ruling class still exists and controls the means of productionp or that 
managerial control does not alter the essence of capitalism, (i. e. private 
appropriation and the striving for profits) they did not proceed to examine 
the issues that the socialization of the 'ownership' of the means of 
production has raised: thus leaving to managerialists this important task. 
The managerialist investigations begin with an assumption: that 
managers control the firms. This assumption is based on the factual 
observation that ownership and control are not a unity any more. They 
then proceed to examine what can arguably be considered as the most 
important issues of advanced capitalism 
21 
: dispersion of ownership, 
savings and financial capital accumulation being just two. Their findings 
are then attributed to their assumption: managers' control. This however, 
is a non sequitur. 
2-/ 
An example of that is given by their treatment of the 
issue of the impact of managerial control on social choice over consumption- 
savings and financial capital accumulation. Managerialists suggest that 
managers and stockholders maximize utility functions with different arguments. 
Managers favour retentions, stockholders favour consumption. Subject to 
constraints, the formers' control ensures that their decisions are realized: 
therefore, hierarchical (managerial) control ensures the continuation cf 
capital accumulation. But does hierarchical control imply managerial 
4. 
control ? What managerialists should have examined, is the sensitivity 
of their conclusions to alternative assumptions of control structures. 
If, for example, the same conclusions can be derived from two different 
assumptions, then it is the realism of the assumptions that matters: 
which assumptions then become empirical questions. The above possibility 
is entertained in the second Chapter of this thesis. 
In general, the aim of this thesis is to provide a microfoundation 
for, and an integration of, some issues of long standing interest in 
economics such as the separation of ownership and control in the theory of 
the firm, the appropriate form of the saving function, and the possibility 
that capitalism may fail to realize potential profits due to a lack of 
effective demand: as well as issues of recent concern, such as the 
validity of alternative theories of consumption - saving behaviour, and the 
impact of 'contractual' savings, - corporate retentions and pension funds - 
on other savings and therefore, financial capital accumulation. Our 
perspective can best be described as post-Kaleckian.. 
i/ 
The thesis is 
divided in two parts: a theoretical and an empirical-econometric. 
In the first Chapter of the first part, an attempt is made to re- 
appraise the issue of the 'separation of ownership and control' in the 
theory of the firm. We suggest that despite their effort to analyze the 
evolution of the modern corporation and its accompanying stock ownership 
dispersion, managerialists failed to adopt a historically consistent treat- 
ment of the control of the firms issue. Historically ownership was 
separated from the unity of ownership and control, as a result of the 
dilution of shareholding. Observing the latter, managerialists inferred 
a separation of ownership from control. Such an inference may be correct 
or wrong but it does not necessarily follow from the fact of ownership 
dispersion. In contrastj we suggest, a historically consistent approach 
5. 
to the control of the firms issue, leads 'naturally' to the conclusion 
that the assumption of capitalist control - i. e. control by large scale 
shareholders and big managers - isa much more plausible one, to begin 
with, that its alternatives. Because historicallythe separation of 
ownership from the unity ownership and control, has been the conscious 
strategy of those in control - capitalists - to expand their firms and 
further their interests. To the extent that expansion and control are 
not mutually exclusive, assuming loss of control on the part of the 
original owners contrasts with managerialists' own emphasis on individual 
utility maximization. Assuming that the loss of control was more beneficial 
to the original owners than the keeping of it, is not self evident and needs 
to be demonstrated. Assuming finally that control has been lost and to 
managers is implausible, to say the least: since it disregards the possibi- 
lity of control having passed to other owners - financial institutions, and, 
some would argue, workers too ! 
We conclude, that the direction of causality in the managerialist 
reasoning, should be reversed: i. e. instead of inferring control from ad-hoc 
shareholding percentages, we should begin from controlf and translate observed 
shareholding percentages, as sufficient to ensure control for a collusive 
subset of the shareholders and high level managers, in every specific case. 
Despite the fact that such a conclusion is a very difficult one to sub- 
stantiate empirically, all existing evidence is not against it. Further, 
the implications of the approach appear to be much more powerful in 
explaining phenomena such as changes in the organizational structure of the 
firms, and particularly the spread of the M-form organization, which for 
managerialists we will argue, is nothing short of a puzzle. 
5/ 
Assuming capitalist control-; ýý, in the second Chapter we attempt to 
examine the link between such control and households' choice over their 
6. 
consumption-savings. The neoclassical approach to this question is best 
described as 'ultrarationality's see David and Scadding, (1974) or house- 
holds I ability to 'pierce the corporate veil I, see Feldstein, (1973) . Both 
these ideas are taken to imply that households take into account corporate 
decisions and react to them so as to compensate any undesired (on their 
part) change in business policies. The ultimate result then reflects 
the collective agreement of all households. The managerialist conclusion 
that the above is not the case, and that managerial behaviour results in 
achieving a higher level of aggregate savings available for production 
purposes, is shared by radical authors toop see e. g. Marglin,, (1975): while 
in the Marxist tradition Baran and Sweezy (1967) have a cursory, but perhaps 
the only serious, attempt to approach the issue. Unfortunately they go 
little further than the managerialists, in that they derive their conclusions 
in terms of managerial utility maximization and 'tax advantages' considera- 
tions: issues which, we will argue. are unnecessary and/or of secondary 
importance. 
We suggest that a preference for internal finance on the part of the 
I controlling group'of firms# goes at least as far back as in Kalecki's 
early writings 
6/ 
, and it is by no means specifically related tolmanagerial 
capitalism'. -! 
/ 
The preference on the part of the non-controlling share- 
holders for a smaller proportion of retained earnings than the one favoured 
by the'controlling group',, should be looked for in corporate policies' 
attempts to realize potential profits: by pursuing advertising and other 
selling promotion activities, which induce a preference for consumption 
often resulting in the so called 'demonstration effect'. See e. g. 
Duesenberry, (1967). The 'demonstration effect' fails to explain, however, 
why smail scale shareholders still carry on buying shares. The answer to 
that we suggest# goes back to Hilferding's (1981) observation that in their 
attempt to control the highest possible proportion of other people's 
7. 
money (OPM) j, the 'controlling group, will generally pay a higher 
dividend to each sharet then the prevailing rate of interest. Despite the 
fact that the 'demonstration effect' did not render saving through share- 
holding obsolete, it rright have had a depressing impact on it. Coupled 
with shareholders' dislike for new share issuing, the above might have 
been one of the reasons for the introduction of what we consider to be 
the second important stage in the socialization of the 'ownership' of 
the means of production: corporate pension funds. 
Regarding the internal finance policies of the firmst pension 
fund schemes have two very important characteristics. First, unlike 
direct shareownership which in an ex-ante sense is voluntary, participa- 
tion to pension funds schemes tends to be compulsory: i. e. a condition 
of employment. Second# the possibility that wage earners will compensate 
for these involuntary savings by decreasing their personal savings and/or 
borrowing is doubted even by the most prominent neoclassicals. See e. g. 
Feldstein# (1978) . Thus, on the aggregate level pension funds 
'savings' 
help to sustain or increase the aggregate level of financial capital 
accumulation. Further, the shareownership achieved on behalf of the 
workers by the use of their money - normally by the financial institutions 
which control theml(see e. g. Minns, 1981), - help in exposing the naivetg 
of the managerialist reliance on ad-hoc shareholding percentages. Since 
wage earners today both in the U. S. and the U. K. 'own' through their 
pension funds a high proportion of total capital equity# one could argue 
that they actually control today's giant corporations. Indeed Drucker 
(1976) has done just that ! 
A well articulated theme of political economy, is that what is 
good for the part, may not necessarily be good for the whole too. Do the 
internal finance policies of the corporations have a beneficial impact for 
8. 
the economy as a whole ? We examine this issue in the third Chapter 
of this thesis. it is suggested that the retention and pension funds 
policies of the corporate sector's 'controlling group' may result in an 
increasingly lower proportion of private income going for consumption 
purposes: that is, a fall in effective demando ceteris paribus. Under 
conditions of excess capacity, characteristic of most advanced capitalist 
countries today? this may have a depressing impact on the profit rate, 
the. rate of capacity utilization, and the realization prospects of the 
corporations: as a consequence,, on investmentj and via a vicious circle 
of contraction,, on the economy as a whole. The post-war U. K. 
experience is found not to contradict the above scenario. 
Suggesting the anarchy of the capitalist mode of production as 
the explanation for the above result may be insufficient: at least in 
this case. What explains the continuation of corporate policies on 
pension funds in the presence of prolonged recession ? Vie consider 
the possibility that 'imperialism' rather than 'irrationality' may be 
the explanation. That is to say the potential existence of profitable 
outlets abroad for the finance of which savings are obtained via 
retention and pension funds policies at home. In this view imperialism 
becomes the cause of underconsumptionist tendencies within the home 
economy# rather than the other way around. our version of under- 
consumptionism is compared with Baran and Sweezy's (1967) version. In 
particular it is stressed that in our case underconsumption does not 
require increasing profit margins - the 'surplus I in Baran and Sweezy 
terminology. It can arise with a constant or even falling surplus, 
provided that the ratio of corporate saving to private incomep rises 
sufficiently. We conclude that corporate retention and pension funds 
policies may constitute part of the explanation of the recent recession. 
9. 
The socialization of the'ownership'of the means of production and 
corporate retentions policies, has revived interest in what constitutes 
the most appropriate form of the saving function under conditions of 
advanced capitalism: unquestionably one of the most thoroughly ploughed 
issues in economics. This, we attempt to examine in the fourth Chapter. 
Surprisingly, with the exception of neoclassical writers, theory and 
evidence on this issue have been kept well apart. What is most notable, 
however, is that in recent years an amazing and never recognized 
convergence has been achieved between four schools of thought, over the 
appropriate form of the saving function. The so called 'Managerialist 
Saving Function'f which posits differential propensities to save between 
households on the one hand and corporations on the other, appears, with 
slight variations, to be consistent with neo-post Keynesians, managerial- 
ists and authors in the radical tradition. 
we suggest that the 'Managerialist Saving Function' (MSF) and in 
particular its focus on households and corporationsp is not necessarily 
a bad working hypothesis. It does not however, imply managerialism: 
since it is at least equally consistent with capitalist control as with 
managerial control. Further, in its present form the MSF is confined 
to only the first stage in the socialization of the 'ownership' of the 
means of production and needs to be extended towards the incorporation of 
the second stage: the Pension Funds Revolution. The result of our re- 
formulation is an extended MSF which suggests that the corporations' 
#controlling group' save for workers via pension fundsp and for share- 
holders via retentions. Retentions and pension funds constitute total 
corporate savings. Households (workers and small shareholders) do not 
save out of their remaining incomet but only for transaction purposes and 
disequilibrium reasons such as the increase in their incomes. Thus, 
the propensity to save household income is zero, and in equilibrium savings 
lo. 
are only corporate savings. This is not to suggest that the 
proportion of savings out of profit income earners and wage earners is 
the same; since pension funds can be imputed to wage income and 
corporate retentions to profit income. The result of this imputation 
will give us the aggregate proportion of income saved by profit income 
and wage income earners respectively. The extent however to which 
obtained percentages can be considered as propensities is doubted. 
Emphasis on propensities is misleading, since actual propensities are 
hypothesized to be zero. The obtained percentages sirqply reflect 
corporate savings on behalf of households and disequilibrium savinqs on 
the part of each group. We further suggest that the extended MSF 
can best be described as the Monopoly Capitalism Saving Function (MCSF): 
since it reflects the result of the socialization of the 'ownership' of 
the means of production, associated with the monopolistic stage of 
advanced capitalism. 
The second part of the thesis is concerned with testing empirically 
the hypotheses advanced in the first part: in particular we test the 
substitution hypothesis of savings, that is, the idea that households can 
'pierce the corporate veil', for the case of corporate retentions and 
pension funds on the one hand, and other savings on the other. We will see 
that these tests constitute at the same time tests of the MSF# the Neo- 
classical Saving Function (NSF), and the MCSF, as well as other versions 
of the saving function, proposed in the literature. We also test the 
idea of zero propensities to save on the part of the household sector as 
a whole - small shareholders and workers alike - or what we call the 
Galbraith-Marglin hypothesis. 
Empirical work on these issues goes as far back as in the work of 
Kalecki in the 1930's. It can be broadly divided into two categories. 
Empirical tests of the idea of differential propensities out of different 
1. 
types of income: and tests of the substitution hypothesis of savings, for 
retentions and pension funds. There has been a revival of interest 
in the first category in recent years# while the second is now the focus 
of substantial and growing interest. The principal problem of the existing 
empirical work in the first category, is that it focuses on testing for 
differential propensities out of personal sector income shares only, that 
is, it disregards corporate retentions. This contrasts Kalecki's 
original treatment, and also it is inconsistent with the Kaldorian re- 
formulation of Kalecki's proposition, which is often claimed to be tested. 
Further, the focus on income saved out of personal sector shares only will 
tend to impose equal 'propensities' to save profit and wage income, in the 
case profit income earners save part of their total income in the form of 
retentions. In the second category empirical work is undertaken in a 
rather ad-hoc manner, with little emphasis being paid to the consistency 
of the data used, with the hypotheses under examination. Most notable is 
that in their concern to test the substitution hypothesis of saving, or 
the effects of retentions and/or pension funds on capital formation, authors 
in this category rarely seem to realize that their results have implications 
for the issue of differential propensities tooY It hardly needs saying 
that no attempt at integration has been made so far; which ist the testing 
of the hypotheses involved in a common data framework and with the 
theoretically consistent definition and use of the data in every specific 
case: the attempt undertaken in this thesis. 
In the fifth Chapter, we test the MSF versus the NSFI or alternatively, 
the impact of corporate retentions on other (personal) savings, and aggregate 
capital formation. In the sixth Chapter,, we test the extended MSF versus 
the original MSF and versus the NSF, or alternativelyr the effects of 
pension funds and corporate retentions (contractual or corporate savings) 
on other personal discretionary savings, and aggregate financial capital 
formation. We also test the Galbraith-Marglin hypothesis. In the seventh 
12. 
Chapter we test for differential propensities out of profit and wage 
income shares, in three stages. First, as implied by the extended MSF 
or the MCSF. Second, as implied by the traditional focus on personal 
sector shares only, and third, as implied by the original Kaldorian form: 
i. e. after having imputed pension funds to wage income and corporate 
retentions to profit income. Needless to say, that in doing so, all our 
previous hypotheses are tested simultaneously, in a common framework. 
An important consideration at that stage of our research was the 
existence of a host of consumption-saving hypotheses-estimated forms, 
proposed to explain consumption-saving behaviour. Focusing on the one 
or the other may be subject to criticism for lack of generality, to say 
the least. To account for that in the fifth Chapter we estimate a 
S imple L inear (SL) model,, aD istributed L ag (DL) model , the Lif e Cycle 
Hypothesis (LCH) and the Houthakker-Taylor (H-T) model. 
9/ 
The LCH and 
the H-T models are found to lead to the same estimated form with no further 
assumptions, and therefore investigation in the sixth and seventh Chapters 
focuses on the first three models. With simple assumptions all three models 
are shown to lead to a general estimated form in which they can be nested 
as special cases. This we also do and then test down to obtain the equation 
that best explains our data generation process. 
A brief su=ary of the results is as follows. The extended MSF 
(or the MCSF) is supported by the data against the original MSF which in 
turn is supported against the NSF. The original Kaldorian saving function 
is shown to obtain from imposing invalid restrictions to the MCSF. Little 
support is found for the substitution hypothesis of savings. Instead, 
corporate retentions and pension funds are found to nearly add-on, on a one 
to one basis on other savings. Support is found for the Galbraith-Marglin 
hypothesis. Together the last two observations imply that an increase 
13. 
in contractual (corporate) savings of El; will increase financial 
capital accumulation by nearly as much. The proportion of profit 
income saved is found to be of the order of 70%. Wage income is saved 
in a much lower proportion: around 30%. This is in line with the 
Kaleckian and neo-Keynesian theorising. It is, however, worth stressing 
once more that such savings do not reflect any psychological 'propensities' 
of the consumers 
10/ 
, but rather disequilibrium personal savings and 
households' contractual saving through corporate retentions and pension 
funds. 
major finding of this part of the thesis is the verification of 
the idea that the majority of households do not derive their consumption- 
saving plans in terms of their aggregate (disposable and contractual) 
income, but rather in terms of their disposable income and their realizable 
claims on their contractual income. This would suggest that the house- 
hold sector consumption-saving function should be specified in terms of 
household disposable income only, and then be appropriately augmented to 
account for contractual (corporate) income and the potential substitution 
between the latter and the former. 
Along these lines# a 'generalized' saving function is derived 
for the household sectort consistent in its estimated form,, with most 
consumption-saving hypotheses proposed to date. In its framework we 
then test again all the hypotheses advanced and tested in the thesis, 
and find largely the same results. 
The above treatment leaves explicitly the specification of corporate 
saving unexplained. Since the latter can be viewed as being determined 
by a set of explanatory and predetermined variablesp the thus resulting 
corporate saving function along with the personal saving function gives 
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rise to a recursive system that can be estimated with ordinary Least 
Squares without the problem of simultaneous equation bias. Further, 
it is suggested, the private saving function may be viewed as an 
incomplete attempt to aggregate the personal and corporate savings 
functions. This explains the similarity of the findings, but highlights 
the need to separately account for the determination of corporate saving. 
The above concludes the eighth Chapter of this thesis. This is 
followed by a concluding Chapter, which briefly surveys our main suggestions- 
findings and examines potential limitations at the analysis-methods used, 
as well as potential future extensions. 
15. 
NOTES 
We use the term 'ownership' throughout to de 
the purchase of a share does not imply real 
physical capital of the firm, but rather an 
owners of a share to a part of any potential 
in the firm from putting its assets to work. 
(1977). 
note the f act that 
ownership of the 
entitlement to the 
surplus' generated 
See e. g. Thomson, 
2/ See Aaronovitch and Sawyer (1975) for a similar view. 
3/ A similar argument is advanced by Wood (1975). 
4/ For the 'differentiae specificae' of the post Kaleckian perspective from 
the Keynesian-monetarist orthodoxy, the interested reader may refer 
to Sawyer (1982a# 1983) .' 
5/ A substantial body of the existing literature on these issues is 
based on the explicit or implicit assumption that managers and/or 
all owners control the firms. We could just as well assume 
capitalist control and pursue our analysis accordingly. In this 
light our attempt in the first Chapter, simply reflects the fact 
that we consider the issue of control valuable on its own right, 
and also our belief that the choice of the assumptions does 
matter and needs justifying: especially since it is possible 
that different assumptions may lead to similar, or the same, 
implications. 
6/ Robinson (1980) traces the preference for internal finance idea 
back to Marshall. 'In Marshall's world ... successful firms 
retain part of their profits to invest in expanding their activities, 
and the more capital they own the easier it is to horrow outside 
finance'. (P. 12). 
7/ An observation stressed by Lambrinides (1972). 
8/ See also Cowling (1982) and Sawyer (1982). 
9/ Throughout, familiarity will be assumed for these and the other 
theories of consumption-saving# on the part of the reader. Ferber 
(1973) and more recently Wallis (1979) have interesting surveys. 
10/ This we think, casts grave 
'fundamental psychological 
increase their consumption 
as much as the increase of 
which effectively assumes 
own money. 
doubt on the Keynesian idea of the 
law ... that men are disposed ... to 
as their income increases, but not by 
their incomelf (Keynes, 1973p p. 96); 
that 'men' do have control over their 
16. 
PART I 
CORPORATE CONTROL#, SOCIAL CHOICE AND 
FINANCIAL CAPITAL ACCUMULATION : THEORY 
17. 
CHAPTER I 
The Separation of Ownership and Control in 
the Theory of the Firm :A Reappraisal* 
This Chapter relies on, and extends? ideas that first 
appeared in Pitelis and Sugden (1983). Earlier versions 
of this paper were presented at: an Industrial Economics 
Workshop at Warwick, a Staff Seminar at the International 
Institute of Managementr Berlin, and 
' 
at the SSRC Summer 
Workshop on Work Organization (Warwick, July, 1983). 
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INTRODUCTION 
Existing managerial literature on the separation of ownership and 
control in the theory of the firm has followed a static and historically 
inconsistent treatment of the control issue. It tends to view modern 
firms as different, both quantitatively and qualitativelyt from their 
predecessors. Whereas the latter are seen as under the control of 
their owners, the large corporations of today are classified as either 
owner or manager controlled. This classification is based upon an ex 
post analysis of share ownership : if no cohesive group of shareholders 
- i. e. owners - is found to possess more than a fixed percentage of shares, 
the conclusion is that owners do not have control, which is assumed to 
pass to managers. 
In contrastr the aim of this Chapter is to argue for a historically 
consistent approach to the issue of control in the theory of the firm. 
Section 1. has a brief historical overview of the ownership 
versus control debate. Section 2 explores the theoretical framework, 
attempting to establish an alternative perspective on the control problem, 
and presenting a diagrammatic exposition of the argument. Beginning 
from the position where an owner has control and recognizing that control 
is inherently beneficial, it is argued that owners will assess the per- 
centage of shares others can obtain before control is lost. That is, it 
is suggested that causality in reality runs from control to share distribu- 
tion. In general, the observed distribution of shares will suffice to give 
a subset of owners - "capitalists" - control. 
The view taken is that this approach is more plausible than 
alternatives, and as such the burden of empirical proof must lie with those 
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favouring these alternatives. -L/ Section 3 considers the existing 
evidence, both direct and indirect. The hypothesis that capitalists 
control firms performs at least as well as its alternatives. 
1. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
The 'separation of ownership from control' and its entailed 
'managerial revolution' has a long history. Its fatherhood has been 
attributed to Marx (see Aaronovitchl 1961, Miliband, 1973, and De Vroey, 
1974). Marx's central argument was that the development of the joint 
stock company tends to separate the management function from the ownership 
of capital. The non-owner manager# Marx (1959) suggests, Iperforms the 
real functions pertaining to the functioning capitalist as such, only the 
functionary remains and the capitalist disappears as superfluous from the 
production process" (Vol. III,, p. 3880, emphasis added). As already observed, 
the above does not imply that the capitalist disappears from the society 
too, (see Aaronovitch, 1961)p something that becomes clear when Marx 
describes the process of the socialization of the 'ownership' of the means 
of production as 'the abolition of capital as private property within the 
framework of capitalist production itself' (ibid., p. 436). 
Perhaps the most important development on this issue along Marxist 
lines is by Hilferding (1981). In his 'Finance Capital't first published 
in 1910, Hilferding focused on the impact of stock dispersion in joint 
stock companies, on what is in modern usage termed control of 'other 
people's money', (OPM). The distinctive feature in Hilferding's 
approach is that he views the process of the socialization of the 'owner- 
ship' of the means of production explicitly as a conscious strategy on 
the part of the controlling capitalists, to pursue their interests. He 
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talks in terms of the emergence of a 'distinctive financial technique 
the aim of which is to ensure control over the largest possible amount 
of outside capital with the smallest possible amount of one's own capital' 
(Hilferding, 1981, p. 119), and suggests that the 'capitalists form an 
association in the direction of which most of them have no say. The real 
control of capital rests with people who have actually contributed only 
a part of it I (ibid., P. 127) . 
There appears to be no sign of 'managerial revolution' in Marx 
and Hilferding, although both recognized the possibility that the separation 
of the ownership of capital from the unity ownership and control of capital, 
might lead to a different attitude on the part of the 'new' capitalists 
(partial owners-controllers) than the one of the 'old' capitalists (full 
owners-controllers): -! 
/ 
an issue taken up later and further elaborated 
by managerialists. 
The idea that the socialization of thelownershiplof the means of 
production will also result in the managerial control of the means of 
production, has been advanced most forcefully by Berle and Means (1967)l 
in a book originally published in 1932. on the theoretical level the 
Berle and Means argument was no more than an assumption: based on the 
factual observation of widely dispersed shareholding. What, however, 
was more important in their work, is the fact that under assumptions on 
shareholding percentages necessary for alternative control structures, 
Berle and Means concluded that in 1929,65 per cent of the 200 largest 
U. S. non-financial corporations, or 80 per cent of their total assets# 
were controlled by management. Based on their findingst Burnham (1962) 
elevated the idea of managerial control to a theory of 'social transition ... 
from the type of society which we have called capitalist or bourgeois to 
a type of society which we shall call managerial' (p. 73), in a book first 
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published in 1942. The most important elements in Burnham's ideas are that: 
managers are a 'new class' which controls without ownership but via its 
control of the state mechanism that itself (will) own(s) and control(s) 
the means of production and that this managerial revolution was common 
to capitalist U. S. A., communist U. S. S. R. and fascist Germany. 
Despite the fact that Burnham's ideas appear to be little more 
than the logical extension of the Berle and Means argumentsj, the two 
studies received totally different reception and met with different 
success. Burnham's influence has been minimal - if any: partly because 
of his unsuccessful prophecies (see Sweezy, 1953) and the concerted 
criticism of his book (see e. g. Gerth and Mills# 1952, and Sweezy, 1953), 
as soon as it appeared. In contrast the widespread acceptance of the 
Berle and Means thesis resulted in what one can characterize as a Ineo- 
orthodoxy' in modern economics. 
The immediate manifestation of the Berle and Means thesis' impact 
followed from the idea that managers control. If this is accepted, it is 
also possible to suggest that managerial behaviour differs from owners' 
behaviour and similarly the aims of managerial corporations differ from 
those of the corporations controlled by the owners. This possibility 
was explicitly recognized by Berle and Means, and it was further elaborated 
in the work of Gordon (1952). Emphasis along these lines was given to the 
question of whether managers will be interested in maximizing profits, or 
pursue different aims. Both Berle and Means and Gordon considered it a 
distinct possibility that the latter may be the caseY The natural 
extension of that was an outflow of 'managerial theories' of the firm that 
attributed to corporate managers and today's corporations motives different 
than the maximization of profits: prominent among them are Baumol (1959), 
Williamson (1970), and Marris (1963,1967). All are based on the explicit 
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assumption that managers control the firms. 
On the empirical level, neoclassicals never disputed the 'simple 
facts Ithatl only a handful of the largest American corporations can be 
said to be managed by a coherent group with a major ownership interest. 
... What is in dispute is their implicatiOns' (Solow, 1967, po 103). 
Regarding, in particular, profit maximization, the capital market discipline 
will ensure that managers will never significantly diverge from the profit 
maximization aim. If they dot the stock market will put a low valuation 
to the firm's assets that may tempt another management to take the firms 
over: 'a definite threat to the autonomy of the management taken over' 
(Solow, 1967, p. 107) . 
The profit versus growth of sales maximization debate has given 
rise to a host of empirical work that attempted to distinguish between the 
two. See e. g. Herman (1979) for a recent survey. This, however, has 
proved to be a rather unsuccessful task. As Sawyer (1979) observes 
'the ways of comparing these theories ... do not enable any basic dis- 
tinction to be made between growth of sales and growth of profits' (p. 154). 
Solow (1967) shares this view too. The main reason for that is that 
alternative control structures may result in similar or the same behavioural 
implications and there are no compelling reasons for example, to suggest 
that managers will tend to disregard profit maximization. See e. g. 
Cowling (1982). Similar considerations, moreover, apply for the so- 
called unprofitability of mergers and the idea that observed high retention 
ratios are only consistent with managerial control. 
i/ 
For these reasons 
we give no further consideration to these issues in this Chapter. 
The idea that managerialism#even if accepted, has no implications 
for the normal functioning of the capitalist systemp is shared by authors 
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in the Marxist tradition too. See e. g. Baran and Sweezy, (1967). 
Others have attempted to show that profit maximization is in fact a 
necessary prerequisite for the achievement of other objectives. See e. g. 
Cowling (1982). A significant part of theoretical and empirical worki 
however, has also been devoted to the questioning of the very idea that 
managers do control. Important contributions along these lines are, 
among others, Mills (1959), Aaronovitch (1961) and Miliband (1973). Part 
of the empirical work along these lines is examined in Section 3 of this 
Chapterp in the light of our analysis. Our argument is that the attempts 
to challenge fundamentally the managerialist perspective are few and 
incomplete: and this is our aim in this Chapter. 
Two issues are worth stressing. Throughout this Chapter we refer 
to capitalist control# today and yesterday. This does not imply that the 
same capitalists (i. e. the heirs of a founder tycoon) are still in control 
of their corporations: which would be naive and a far cry from the 
existing evidence. See e. g. Hermanp(1979). It rather implies control 
by a capitalist class that comprises individuals (large scale shareholders 
and big managers) or institutions# in particular financial institutions, 
that are themselves controlled by large scale shareholders and big managers. 
This class is defined as one that owns sufficient so as to control the 
means of productionY Alternativelyl the argument is that, the dynamics 
of the system are such that managers or even workers can obtain control 
by acquiring shares, in which case they become capitalists, while failed 
capitalists can become managers or even workers. See e. g. Marx, (1959) 
for examples along these linee. For the purposes of the managers versus 
capitalists debate the essence of the above is the same: i. e. capitalist 
control. 
The second issue refers to the treatment of the financial 
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institutions. In recent years the shareownership on the part of such 
institutions has increased dramatically. See e. g. Minns, (1982). In 
the light of that, concern has been raised over the type of control such 
institutions are seeking. See in particular Minnsj, (1981) for a summary 
of the arguments. Such concern is perfectly legitimate and it would be 
least surprising if financial institutions are pursuing different interests 
than the ones of corporationsp (i. e. industrial capitalists). These, 
however, are intercapitalist differences: i. e. they do not bear directly 
on the managers versus capitalists issue. For the purposes of the rest 
of this Chapter, the analysis of control followed applies equally to 
industrial corporations and financial institutions. In contrast, the 
managerialist argument to this point would be that managers have taken 
over the financial institutions too, say because the ultimate beneficiaries 
of the money-shares that these institutions control (e. g. pensioners etc. ) 
are numerous and have no say whatever for the running of such institutions. 
Although this latter argument is a perfectly legitimate one, it does not 
imply managerial control: simply, because the control of OPM is the 
historic function of the financial institutions and by no means associated 
only with the era of 'managerial capitalism'. With the above in mind we 
can proceed to examine the meaning of control, in the next Section. 
2. 
2.1 
CONTROL OF THE FIRM: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
What Does Control Mean ? 
To avoid semantic misunderstandings, it is initially essential 
to consider the question: what does control mean ? 
L/ 
Throughout this Chapter control implies the ability to determine 
broad corporate objectives, despite resistance from others. By broad 
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corporate objectivest we refer to decisions taken over strategic issues, 
such as "the rules of the game" (i. e. a firm's relationship with rivals), 
the national or international orientation of the firm, and its relation- 
shiP with the state, foreign governments, workers (and other non-control- 
ling groups in the firm), sources of raw materials, etc. See Zeitlin, 
(1974). Control does not imply the making of day-to-day decisions over 
tactical issues, such as promotional activities, the choice of particular 
projects from a set of alternatives, etc. 
_ 
Whereas these issues are 
significant for the short run smooth functioning of the firm, it is our 
assumption thato subject to rare exceptionst-1/ it is the long run 
strategic decisions which determine the success or failure of the firm. 
Although the remainder of this Chapter simply refers to control,, 
it should be noted that such control can in fact be "actual" or 
"potential". Thus, from the time a strategic decision is taken, the 
problem of the best way of implementing it arises. This is not 
necessarily the concern of those taking the decision; it may be left to 
others specifically employed and/or trained for such a purpose. These 
individuals may be left with discretion as to the exact means of 
implementation, but this only implies control if two conditions are met: 
(i) the exercise of discretion replaces the strategic 
decision with another, and 
(ii) it succeeds in implementing this decision despite 
resistance from the original decision takers. 
This would essentially be a transfer of control, a possibility analysed 
later in this Chapter. 
If neither (i) nor (ii) is satisfied, control is with the 
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original decision takers. However, if condition (i) is satisfied but 
(ii) is not,, the situation is one of actual control; i. e. a strategic 
decision is altered but resistance from the original decision takers 
results in the original decision being implemented. Moreover, it is 
also possible that these day-to-day decision takers challenging the 
strategic decision will be punished, for example sacked# or not promoted. 
However, in practice prospective challengers to a strategic 
decision can often be expected to realise the futility of a challenger or 
to appreciate that a challenge would merely lead to their punishment. 
Therefore, they will not attempt to change a strategic decision. That 
is, control is more likely to be potential rather than actual, albeit this 
is equally as real. 
L/ 
See also Zeitlin, (1974), Scott and Hughes (1976), 
Nyman and Silberston (1978), and Herman,, (1979). 
Finally as regards definitions# note that throughout this Chapter 
control exercised via a holding of shares is defined as owner control, 
whether or not those owners also play a role in the day-to-day decision 
making of a firm. In particular, we make no attempt to analyse the 
consequences of control exercised by those who also make day-to-day 
decisions as against control exercised by those who do not make such 
decisions. 
Z/ 
2.2 An Analytical Framework 
Consider now the following situation. Firm F-a typical firm 
in nineteenth century capitalism - is a small enterprise owned entirely 
by individual(s) C- where C represents "capitalist (s) ". Workers are 
employed to perform certain tasks, but C is in total control of the firm. 
Thus, firm F is indisputably an owner controlled firm. 
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Suppose now that the firm expands. Will control be lost by C? 
If so, to whom ? The answer to these questions can be sought in an 
exploration of the two critical needs of an expansion, namely: 
finance e. g. a new factory must be paid for - and 
managers to administrate the now more complex and 
bulky firm organization. 
Lo-/ 
The prevailing view amongst economists appears to be that C does 
lose control, and to management. See, for example, Marris and Mueller, 
(1980). for a survey. This is based upon the observation that finance 
is obtained by the issue of shares in the firm to (often) numerous share- 
holders. The latter bwe the firm, possessing the right to hire and fire 
management, and receiving a dividend on each share. However# because 
there are (often) so many shareholders, it is argued that, save in 
exceptional circumstance-,, 
11 
-/ the power to hire and fire is to all intents 
and purposes non-existent. Managers therefore have discretion in follow- 
ing their own objectives. See also Scott (1979). 
This managerial approach is deficient on at least three closely 
related counts: 
it is unclear where the notion that exceptional 
circumstances results in owners' intervention fits 
within the overall concept of control; or what 
exactly does this power of intervention entail. 
(ii) even if it is accepted that owners lose control, 
managerialists only assume that managers have control, 
see Zeitlin (1974). But why not workers, for example 
(iii) in their largely static and historically inconsistent 
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analysis, managerialists have never adequately 
explained why the original owner(s) should be 
expected to lose control to managers. Put another 
way, the critical issue is: given that C. initially 
controls the firm# why should C, in choosing that the 
firm expands, choose to give away control ? 
(iii) is the fundamental issue that will now be addressed. 
The first point to note follows from the definition of control. 
The ability to determine broad corporate objectives despite resistance 
from others implies something inherently beneficial in possessing 
control. 
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That is, whoever possesses control can make the firm 
follow a strategy that best suits his (or their) interests,, rather than 
one preferred by others. The essence of the issue is consequently 
distributional, 
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namely: who is to benefit and who lose as a consequence 
of the alternative strategies for deploying the often vast resources 
available to a firm ? Moreover# it should also be recognised that control 
may be desired in its own right, not simply because it enables its possessor 
to pursue other desirable ends# but because the power to make 
decisions confers utility; seep for examplep Rothschild (1971), and 
Herman (1979) . 
Thus, there is an a priori expectation that C will not be willing 
to give away his (their) control. It would be surprising, assuming C has 
any option,, if he (they) chose expansion and as a result lost control, 
thereby losing the benefits it confers. 
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More likely is the prospect 
that expansion and the maintenance of control are chosen and pursued for 
as far as they are not mutually exclusive. The above accommodates two 
related ideas. Firstj that expansion may not be undertaken in certain 
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cases (at least voluntarily) for fear of losing control. Secondr if 
expansion is undertaken owners will try to keep control too. The former# 
is a plausible hypothesis and is backed by ample historical evidence, 
see e. g. Hannah (1976), who considers the 'widespread preference for 
smallt family controlled enterprises ... a considerable brake on 
mergers' (p. 6, emphasis added)t in the early nineteenth century. The 
subcases of the latter possibility are analyzed in some detail in the 
next Section. 
It is worth stressing that the above behaviour is well in line 
with individual utility maximization analysis favoured by the managerialists. 
It merely requires a weak non-satiation assumption: i. e. assuming the 
consumer - in this instance C- is not satiated in either of two non- 
mutually exclusive goods - in this case expansion and control - then one 
would expect both goods to be consumed. 
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Neverthelessr it must be asked whether or not this a priori 
expectation can withstand closer scrutiny. The possibilities can be 
explored by considering an expanding firm's need for finance and managers. 
2.3 An EManding Firm's Need for Finance and managers 
First of all, consider the issue of shares. 
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Broad corporate 
objectives can be voted upon and therefore determined at shareholders' 
meetings. The ability to win such votes can thereby determine who 
controls a firm. Thust possession of sufficient votes can imply control. 
Moreover, it is generally accepted that it is not necessary to 
have 51% of the shares to win a vote. For example, using a probability 
model Cubbin and Leech (1983) suggest that well under 10% may be more 
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than sufficient, 2% or even 1% being enough in some cases. In practice, 
thereforep it could well be that in obtaining finance for the expansion 
of firm F, C retains a sufficient shareholding to maintain control. This 
is crucial: since it demonstrates that under the utility maximization 
assumption favoured by the managerialistsl on the part of the original 
owners, one should not expect causality to run from ex-post observed 
shareholding percentages to control, but rather the other way around. 
That is, it is more plausible and historically consistent to assume that 
C will obtain finance from shareholders, but also keep enough shares so 
as to ensure their control. 
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In reality, however, C may not have access to the financial 
reserves that allow the holding of a controlling interest. One of two 
outcomes can be expected in this situation. 
Given the benefits of control, C's first reaction will be to 
attempt to collude with another shareholder to form a controlling 
interest. It seems reasonable to assume that the costs of such collusion 




a few well-timed business lunches, for example, may suffice. 
Following, for instance, Cubbin and Leech (1983), the exact number of 
shareholders needed in the controlling group depends upon the share distribu- 
tion and the voting behaviour of shareholders. However, the only case where 
collusion amongst more than a few shareholders will be necessary is where 
there is another group of shareholders competing for control. There would 
then be a struggle between these groups, one of which would emerge as in 
control - or, indeedl the groups may join forces. In any event, a group of 
shareholders - capitalists - will control the f irm. 
Neither of these expected outcomes will be realized if owners mis- 
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judge the critical percentage of shares necessary for control. This is 
a feasible possibility in exceptional cases but, if managerialism is to 
be accepted as realistic, it implies acceptance not only of the assumption 
that, in default of owners control, managers control, but also of the 
view that all owners in all firms misjudge the critical percentage. Can 
it really be believed that all owners are incompetent ? Surely not. 
Moreoverf even where an exceptional mistake is made, recognising this 
owners can be expected to form a new cohesive group and regain control. 
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The conclusion to be reached thus far is therefore that it is reasonable 
to hypothesise that a subset of owners - i. e. capitalists - control firms. 
A further argument advanced by managerialists focuses upon 
information, LO-/ namely: the many small shareholders in a firm do not 
have the information to monitor managers - i. e. they do not have the 
information to determine whether or not their interests are being served - 
and therefore do not control the firm. This directly contrasts with the 
neoclassical approach, in which all shareholders are taken to have, and 
to act upon, this information. Seep for exampler the exposition in 
Lambrinides (1973). What can be said of these two views ? 
Firstly, they reveal that our hypothesis of capitalist control 
implies that capitalists: 
can win a vote amongst shareholderst and 
(ii) have the information upon which to vote. 
That is, (i) and (ii) are both implicit in the statement that, for 
instance, 1% of shares suffices to control a firm. This is a plausible 
hypothesis. It seems reasonable to suggest that capitalisi, - will assess 
and obtain the information they need for control. Why ? Although 
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obtaining information is not costless, the reward is the power to 
determine a firm's strategy. The benefits of the latter can be expected 
to warrant the acquisition of information. 
This is not to say that managers have no discretion in their 
behaviour. In a world of uncertaintyp there will always be discretion. 
But the crucial factor to realise is that this discretion is analytically 
parallel to that of workers. Similarly to the way in which the controller 
of a firm may be unsure what the worker can dot there may be uncertainty 
surrounding managers. 
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Capitalists will not base their strategic 
decisions on perfect information, either as regards workers or managers. 
Nevertheless, imperfect information does not constitute failure to make 
the decisions. 
The reason that less than 51% of shares is needed to control a 
firm - and thus a reason that the neoclassical approach is incorrect - 
is that many, indeed the vast majority of shareholderstobtain their shares 
to receive dividends or capital gains, content in the knowledge that other 
shareholders are concerned with these issues. One possibility is that 
this vast majority is not interested in monitoring a firm's activities - 
perhaps, for examplep they have complete trust in the minority controlling 
shareholders. Or it could be that each small shareholder considers 
futile an attempt to win a vote against a large shareholder. Then againt 
perhaps the vast majority cannot acquire information about the firm - for 
instance, they may have no "contacts" in the firm or industry. 
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But are we to believe this of C? More generally, are we to 
believe that larger shareholders will simply ignore corporate strategy 
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and give managers, for example, a free hand ? Surely not. - Whilst 
their information may not be perfect, it is most unlikely that they get 
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themselves into a position where it is non-existent# given the benefits 
of control. This view is supported by the fact that high level managers 
are normally recruited from the ranks of owners, or at least their close 
. 
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environment. ' That is, they are owners themselves, and/or owners 
functionaries. Seep for example, Nichols (1969)p Nyman and Silberston 
(1978),, and Francis (1980a). From this, it should be expected that 
high level managers have interests closely connected with owners rather 
than low level managers, and therefore will assist capitalistsin their 
control of the firm. 
2-51 
However, it should not be expected that 
capitalists only acquire their information from high level managers; 
rather, they will use outside sources, and indeed, their own wits in 
reaching their decisions. 
Consider now another possible argument for manager control, albeit 
one apparently absent in the existing literature. This is the view that 
managers are in such short supply that they can demand control of the 
firm as the price of their services. C would pay this price if he (they) 
believed he would be better off as a shareholder in a manager controlled 
firm rather than himself controlling the enterprise. 
Note firstly that this is a bargaining problem again analytically 
parallel to the owner/worker relationship. For examplep when a skilled 
craftsman is employed by a firm, a price is negotiated. It is theoretically 
possible that skilled craftsmen can demand control of the firm as the price 
of their services. Similarly, owners negotiate with managers. 
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moreover, in reality this theoretical possibility of manager 
control is at most likely to be no more than a passing phenomenon. In 
the first place,, the supply of managers is endogenous to the system, and 




needed to administrate. As with all "talents", the abilitY tO 
administrate varies across the population, but at least to a large extent 
it is something that can be learnt. It is no coincidence that numerous 
schools of management have emerged simultaneously with expanding firms. 
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It is clearly in the interests of capitalists to encourage such schools. 
moreover, firms can introduce internal training schemes, thereby producing 
their own administrators. Secondly, if the price of a manager is control, 
it is by no means clear it will be paid; after all, the consequence of 
transferring control is the inability of the capitalist to protect his/her 
interests: for the individual capitalist this is a heavy price indeed. 
29/ 
There is also a thirde more important comment to be made. Suppose 
managers could demand control. Would they leave it at this ? By 
definition of their position, capitalist could, if the supply of managers 
subsequently increased, sack their existing management and reclaim control. 
That is, capitalist control is at least only dormant. If managers act as 
if they have control, it is because it is allowed by capitalists. Thus, 
if managers have such a strong bargaining position, they should be expected 
to require shares as part of their payment. By becoming ownerst they 
safeguard their control. But this is then capitalist control of the firm, 
not manager control. 
The notion that capitalist control is at least only dormant is 
important. It was seen earlier when it was argued that capitalists 
could regroup to regain control if they misjudged their position. 
crucial conceptual difference between capitalists and managers is that 
the former can choose whether or not they determine a firm's strategy. 
In this sense, managers always take a back seat. 
Thus,, the conclusion to be reached from the analysis in this and 
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the previous Subsections is that it is reasonable to hypothesize 
that a subset of owners - capitalists - control firms. An aspect of 
the analysis deserving particular emphasis is the inversion of causality 
as compared to managerialism. Rather than examining ex post what 
percentage of shares capitalists need for control - as managerialists 
have done - it is better# bearing in mind the benefits of control to 
examine what percentage a subset of owners will allow others to obtain 
before control is lost. The share distribution observed in reality 
will then be one which suffices to give control to a subset of owners. 
Such an approach accommodates two related ideas: 
the concept of fixed shareholding percentages 
as used by managerialists is artificiall and 
(ii) the percentage of shares required for control 
may vary across firms - in one, for exampler it 
may be 1%,, in another 5%. The outcome depends 
upon the distribution of ownership# groupings 
amongst shareholders and on whether control is 
internally or externally exercised. See Heman,, 
(1979). 
The approach to control we suggested starts from the historically 
undisputable and generally recognized fact that originally ownership and 
control were a unity: and that historically part of the ownership has 
been divorced from this unity, leaving in our view partial ownership and 
control where formerly absolute ownership and control existed. 
30/ 
Managerialists; start from inversing the historical process: i. e. by 
observing partial ownership and inferring non control. Thus managerialism 
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has a historically inconsistent perspective. It is this difference 
in perspective that makes managerialism less appealing than our 
approach. 
A further criterion for choice between the approaches is the 
empirical evidence th6t can be marshalled - either direct evidence, or 
indirect evidence that examines implications of the approaches. This 
is the concern of the next Section. 
Beforep it is worth stressing a similarity between the 
managerialist and the neoclassical approach. That is, they both share 
the belief that there is no dominant capitalist subset of the owners 
that control the firms. This perhaps explains why managerialism was so 
easily accepted and assimilated by orthodox economists. See also 
Chapter 2. 
In Figure 1. the approach advanced in this Chapter is summarized 
in a diagrammatic framework. In beginning with firm F owned and 
controlled entirely by individual(s) C, expansion implies a need for 
finance and management. The former results in the issue of shares. The 
original and/or new owners assess the percentage of shares required for 
control. If their assessment is correctr shareholders are divided 
into capitalists and others, capitalists having control. if it is 
wrong,, control passes to non-shareholders, but there will be a re- 
assessment of the critical percentage needed for control. As regards 
managersF if they are in short supply they may become owners and thus 
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CONTROL OF THE FIRM : THE EXISTING EVIDENCE 
3.1 Direct Evidence in the Light of the 'Inverse Causality' Approach 
Existing direct evidence can be classified into three basic 
categories. The firstt criticises managerialists' reliance on ad-hoc 
shareholding percentages for ignoring the fact that the higher the 
disPersion is, the lower shareholding percentage will be needed for 
control to be exercised on the part of an individual-group. See e. g. 
Cubbin and Leech, (1983). Evidence along these lines by Leech (1984), 
involved formalizing the Berle and Means assumptions in a probabilistic- 
voting model, and reinterpreting their data taking into account share- 
holding dispersion. Assuming collusive behaviour on the part of the 
twenty larger shareholders, an assumption well in line with Berle and 
Means' definition of control, Leech assigned eleven out of sixteen Berle 
and Means' management controlled firms to the minority controlled category. 
A second type of direct evidence is obtained either by accepting 
the managerialist ad-hoc percentage criterion or by rejecting it in 
favour of a more plausible (lower) one, and then proceeding to show that 
this criterion is satisfied more often than suggested by managerialists: 
by identifying kinship networks I interlocking directores , secrecy based 
methods of control etc. An example along these lines is given by Scott 
and Hughes (1976). 
1-11 
The authors analyzed 220 Scottish registered 
firms with stock exchange quotations p and initially concluded that in 
77% of cases an individualp institution or cohesive group owned at least 
5% of shares. These were classified as owner controlled firms. Then 
some of the residual 23% were examined in more detail. Sure enough, 
owner control was found to be more widespread than initially concluded. 
For example, the Scottish and Continental Investment Trust was included 
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in the 23%, but closer study revealed that nearly 20% of its shares were 
held by various members of the Murray Johnstone group of investment trusts. 
The evidence along these lines is huger and it is far beyond the 
scope of this Chapter to survey it. A detailed summary is given in Scott 
(1979). Suffice it to say that all such evidence suggests that emphasis 
on the presumed managerial dominance is misplacedj, to say the least. 
Both types of evidence surveyed above are very important: in that 
they question managerialism in its own framework. They do not however, 
question the managerialist perspective, and in this sense they do not take 
the analysis much further. 
third type of direct evidence constitutes a departure from share- 
holding distribution analysis. It attempts to examine the policies actually 
pursued by companies and tries to assess whether or not they appear to be 
determined by owners or managers. Evidence along these lines has been 
given by Francis (1980). Francis argued that, within a firm,, the Chairman 
of the Board plays a vital role: apparently a clear result of the Oxford 
Growth of Firms Project upon which the analysis was based: 
"From observationt from interviewing and from administering 
a questionnaire in the companies in our study it was clear 
that the Chairman of the company was in a very dominant 
position. His role was viewed# both by the incumbent and 
by senior managers, as the peak of the firm's organizational 
hierarchy and not merely a primus; inter pares at Board 
meetings. His influence in decisi; 
-nmaking was acknowledged 
by all to be powerful. " (p. 12). 
Thus, Francis concludes that a detailed examination of who the chairman 
is - for example - an owner ?- or how he came to be appointed - e. g. by 
4o. 
owners ?- will reveal the centre of control. 
Time constraints restricted his study to a mere 17 firms. 
Nevertheless, the result is very illuminating: (at least) 15 of the firms 
were classified as owner controlled? and (at most) only 2 as controlled 
by their own professional management. These 17 firms were randomly drawn 
from a sample of 227 of the "top 250" U. K. companies in the "Times 1000" 
(1975-1976). of these 227, in 110 - i. e. 48% - at least 5% of shares 
were owned by an individual, institution, or cohesive group. Admittedly 
17 is a very small sample, but the proportion of owner controlled firms 
in the more detailed study was classified as 88% ! 
Such results are consistent with the analysis of Section 2. 
However, the implication of the latter would be that the two management 
controlled firms found by Francis are either exceptional cases or, in a 
still more detailed examinationj would be revealed as owner controlled. 
Unfortunately, such evidence is not easily acquired. Although 
Francis' approach is very useful in highlighting the inadequacy of the 
fixed percentages type of criteriat and indicating that a more elaborate 
analysis is far from supporting the managerial approach, it is not 
conclusive. 
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Other direct evidence consistent with the analysis of Section 
2 reported cases of owners in fact replacing managers. For instance, 
Nyman and Silberston (1978) discuss the case of a group of dissatisfied 
owners bringing about the replacement of senior managers in two U. K. 
companies, Vickers and Debenhams. Similar cases are reported in Herman 
(1979). Note# however, that such evidence is not entirely inconsistent 
with managerialism which recognizes the existence of such Possibilities, 
41. 
but considers them as exceptional cases. 
The conclusion of this Subsection is that all existing direct 
evidence is never inconsistent with our approach# while it is often 
inconsistent with managerialism. The same is true with the indirect 
evidence we are examining in the next Subsection. 
. 
3.2 Indirect Evidence 
Indirect evidence involves focusing on presumably different 
implications of two (or more) different approaches. Emphasis on this 
front was given to the issues of profit versus sales growth maximization, 
the unprofitability of mergers and the 'excessive' retention ratios. 
The dialogue was largely between managerialists and neoclassicals: i. e. 
either managers control the firmst or all stockholders control the firms, 
and its results were inconclusive. See Section 1. 
In this Subsection we focus on two issues: the transition to 
the M-form organization, and the differential propensity to save house- 
hold income and corporate retentions. We suggest that the former is 
consistent with our approach and neoclassicism# but inconsistent with 
managerialism: while the latter is consistent with our approach and 
managerialism, but inconsistent with neoclassicism. Together the two 
may be taken to imply support for our approach. 
As already emphasised, the idea that owners control does not 
deny the possibility of managers having discretion in the day-to-day 
decisions of a firm. Although such discretion does not constitute 
control, it does imply the possibility of managers attempting to change a 
strategic decision - see again Section 2.1. However, the original 
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controllers can be expected to resist such a change, if it is attempted, 
and indeed to preempt the possibility of an attempt. Within this frame- 
work, p the phenomenon of the transition of most firms in the U. S., U. K. 
and Europe from a so-called U-form organization to an M-form organization 
can be explained. 
The U-form organization is characterised by a board of directors 
and various divisions each responsible for a specific function - such as 
production# marketing? etc. - throughout the firm. Williamson (1970) 
has suggested thatt as a U-form expands, there is a tendency for decisions 
over broad corporate objectives and the day-to-day operations of the firm 
to become entangled. In contrastp an M-form, organization is characterized 
by a board of directors responsible solely for determining strategic 
decisionsp and a series of operating divisions - each responsible for its 
own production, marketing, etc. - making day-to-day decisions. Thusp 
the transition from U-form to M-form can be explained in terms of control. 
In the M-form firm,, broad corporate objectives are determined by the 
board,, which is only concerned with such issues. This allows the 
I controlling group'to focus upon the relevant control issues more easily 
than in the U-form organization. 
An interpretation along similar lines is given in Herman (1979). 
By reducing interdependence and establishing each division as a profit 
centre, he observes, the M-form 'enlarged the possibilities for centralized 
evaluation and control. I (p. 104) . 
The existing evidence on this issue is of the indirect form 
examined early in this Section. It involves testing for superior 
profitability on the part of the M-form as compared to other forms. All 
existing empirical work in the U. S. and the U. K. have made clear that 
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the M-form is more profitable. See, for example, for the U. K. Steer 
and Cable (1978) and Thomson (1981),, and references therein. Under the 
assumption that managers are not profit maximizers while owners are (but 
see Section 1), the above evidence is consistent with our approach and 
neoclassicism but not with managerialism. 
In particular, in our theoretical frameworkr the transition to 
M-form can be seen as a response by capitalists to the possibility that the 
continuously increasing 'control loss' (see Williamson, 1967), that results 
in large organizations due to the multiplicity of decision layers, becomes 
'loss of control ,. . 
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Besides the evidence on profitabilityl there is a more important 
reason why the transition to the M-form is inconsistent with traditional 
managerialism: the resultant constraint of low level managers to nothing 
but day-to-day decisions. The only way managerialists could offer a 
sound explanation for that, would be by arguing that a conflict arose 
over, say, their respective degree of control between low level managers 
and high level managers (i. e. those having contact with the board). But 
this would merely undermine the very foundations of managerialism. 
Evidence referred to in the previous Section on the class origin of high 
level managers and their connections/relationships with owners takes on 
great importance. If, as posited, high level managers are owners them- 
selves, or owners functionariesp the observed conflict would in fact be 
one of owners versus managers, not an endo-managerial conflict. 
The above are supported by Herman (1979). He observes that 
'Oliver Williamson notes the irony of the almost simultaneous appearance 
in the 1930's of concern with separation of ownership and control and 
potentially large management discretion and the rapid spread of divisionali- 
44. 
zation with its effects of restoring integrity to the goal-specification 
and policing processes' (p. 106). We only differ from Williamson in 
that we see capitalist control where he sees 'ironY'. 
In fact Williamson's more recent views on the ownership versus 
control issuer further support our idea that the transition to M-form 
is only consistent with our views, or neoclassicism. After noting the 
confusion between strategic and operational decisions in the U-form 
structurep that the M-form served to rectify, Williamson (1981) suggests, 
that by activating the market for corporate control management was 
brought under the scrutiny of the general office, which 'can be regarded 
as an agent of the stockholders whose purpose is to monitor the operations 
of the constituent parts' (p. 1559). The Berle and Means findings are 
attributed by Williamson to the then prevalence of the U-form. and the 
conclusion is that the dilemma of corporate control posed by Berle and 
Means has since been alleviated more by internal organizational reforms 
than by regulatory or external ones. 
By accepting the Berle and Means findings and suggesting their 
'alleviation' because of the M-form, Williamson effectively implies a 
counterrevolution on the part of the stockholders. We will hold to our 
more moderate position that the M-form might have been an attempt to 
preempt rather than rectify a potential loss of control on the part of 
the owners, and remind the reader that we regard the 'general office' 
as the agent of a subset of the stockholders only: i. e. capitalists. 
Still our points of agreement with Williamson as well as all the existing 
evidence demonstratel we think, that the transition to M-form is 
consistent with our views and neoclassicism but not with managerialism. 
A second important implication of our approach is consistent 
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with our views and managerialism but not with neoclassicism. It regards 
the issue of the impact of capitalist (or managerial) control of firms 
on other individuals' choice over their consumption and savings and as a 
result on financial capital accumulation. This issue is analyzed 
extensively in the next Chapter and empirical results are given in Part 
IIj Chapters 5 and 6. In briefp the existence of a 'controlling group' 
(capitalists or managers) that exhibits a stronger preference for 
internal finance (retained earnings) than the rest of shareholdersp 
coupled with the inability on the part of the latter to compensate for 
the controlling group's decisions by appropriately manipulating their 
personal savings# will establish a differential 'propensity' to save 
personal income and corporate retentions: i. e. a higher 'propensity' 
to save retentions. This view is shares by both managerialism and our 
approach but not by neoclassicals, see e. g. Ando and Modigliani, (1963)p 
who suggest that the 'propensity' to save personal income and retentions 
will be the same due to households' lultrarationalityl or their 
ability to 'pierce the corporate veil'. 
The evidence along these lines is substantial, see next Chapter 
for a survey, and conclusively rejects the neoclassical implication of 
equal 'propensities': which demonstrates that this implication is 
consistent with our view and managerialism but not with neoclassicism. 
From the above, we infer that all existing direct and indirect 
evidence is consistent with our approach. The hypothesis that 
capitalists control performs at least as well as the existing alterna- 




By following a historically consistent approach to the theory 
of the firm, it has been argued that a subset of owners - capitalists - 
can plausibly be expected to control firms. Particularly important 
is the inversion of causality that leads to this result: rather than 
examining ex post the percentage of shares needed for control, it is 
better, bearing in mind the benefits of control, to examine the 
percentage capitalists will allow others to obtain before control is 
lost. 
Moreover, although the plausibility of this capitalist control 
hypothesis implies that the burden of proof lies with those favouring 
its alternativesl the hypothesis performs at least as well as alterna- 
tive approaches when confronted with existing empirical evidence# 
direct and indirect. 
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NOTES 
l/ See also Fitch (1972). 
2/ The idea in Marx is that the new 'capitalist' may be more 
risk prone, as what s/he endangers is only partly his/her 
own money. Hilferdingr on the other hand, entertained the 
possibility that the interests of the non-controlling 
shareholders will act as a constraint to the 'capitalist' 
greediness for profitj and thus, it will increase the 
degree of rationalization in the corporation, and as a 
result profits. 
3/ Berle and Means suggest that the controlling group, even if 
owners themselves, can serve their pockets better by making 
profits at the expense of the company rather than for the 
company. Gordonj suggested that the emphasis on profit 
maximization may be less under managerial control, than 
under owners control. 
According to both arguments unprofitable mergers and/or high 
retention ratios imply managerial dominance, as being 
incompatible with the shareholders preferences. Both views, 
however, have little evidence to support them. Aaronovitch 
and Sawyer's (1975) detailed analysis of the former question 
led them to conclude that 'in as far as between firms' 
differences are important for merger activity, they are consistent 
with a varied 'mixture' of ownership/controll and therefore firms 
with very varied characteristics may be involved in merger 
activity' (p. 189). High retention ratios, on the other hand, 
are at least as compatible with capitalist control as with 
managerialist. See e. g. Kaleckit(1971) and next Chapter. 
5/ This definition diverges from the orthodox Marxist emphasis on 
ownership and control# as the'differentia specifical of the 
capitalist class. It is howeverp well in line with Hilferding's 
insight and it is, we think, indispensable if one wants to 
reasonably retain the term 'capitalist class' today. 
A discussion largely absent in other work by economists. 
Such as, a totally incapable management. 
8/ In an interesting analogy Miliband (1973) quotes Kautsky : 
, the capitalist class rules but does not govern ... it contents 
itself with ruling the government' (p. 51). one could be 
willing to substitute 'government' for 'management' to obtain 
the essence of our arguments. 
9/ One needs also distinguish between external and internal control. 
See e. g. Cubbin and Leech, (1983) for a discussion. It is often 
suggested that control of the firms today is exercised 'internallys. 
See e. g. Baran and Sweezy, (1967). The existing evidence, on 
the other hand, suggests that the same shareholding percentage 
may be sufficient for an 'insider' or 'founder' to retain control, 
but insufficient for an outsider to gain control. See Herman,, 







support: since capitalists are by definition the 'insiders' 
f rom the very beginning. 
In this sense only can one talk of a managerialist revolution: 
i. e. the increased need for supervisory staff. Thus,, Sawyer 
(1979) distinguishes between two managerialist revolutions. 
The above is the one, while the managerial control argument 
is the second. 
Particularly, if profits are exceptionally unsatisfactory. 
See, e. g. Gordon (1952). 
See also Herman (1979) 
See the discussion of firms' organizational form - an issue taken 
up in Section 3- in Cowling (1982) . 
Historical evidence along these lines is given in Hannah (1976). 
15/ Evidently this may not be true in individual cases. That is, 
an individual capitalist may decide to part with control for 
reasons associated with the quest of an entrepreneurial familyt 
for higher profitsp through superior management# (see Hermanp 
1979),, or for reasons associated with his/her age, need for 
security# empire building considerations etc. It is also 
conceivable that heirs do not exist and/or the need for finance 
introduces in the picture financial institutions and/or other 
industrial firms. Death duties may also break some estates, 
although at least for the U. K. the historical evidence would not 
appear to support this view. See Hannahl(1976). In all these 
cases it does not follow that managers will gain control. 
'Naturallylp control will pass to capitalist's heirs and/or 
other industrial firms and financial institutions. It is also 
conceivable that the capitalist has expressed his/her explicit 
preference over his/her potential successors. See also Nyman 
and Silberstonl(1978). That control will pass to managers is 
just one of the possibilities: to us the least plausible too. 
Some historical evidence that support the idea that owners 
will prevent managers from gaining control is reported in 
Marglin (1974). 
16/ Although finance can also be obtained by borrowingr e. g. from 
financial institutionst one would expect that the original 
controllers will not be indifferent regarding the two ways of 
obtaining capital. In particular, capital possessed by financial 
institutions is normally more concentrated than that possessed by 
the vast majority of households. See Zeitlin (1974) for evidence. 
Such concentration facilitates the possibility of financial 
institutions asking a higher price for capital. They could, for 
example, require that a certain strategy be followed, i. e. they 
could demand control as the price of their funds. Such an outcome, 
does not change the picture of capitalist control, on the aggregate: 
it may, however, be undesirable on the part of the individual 
capitalist who incurs the loss. 
17/ Similar arguments are made in Aaronovitch (1961)p Aaronovitch and 
Sawyer (1975) and Francis (1980). However their implications 
(i. e. the reverse causality argument) are not explored. 
49. 
18/ This is a widely accepted idea among managerialist writers too. 
In particular, it is consistent with Berle and mean's definition 
of 'minority control' albeit its logical implications are not 
examined by Berle and Means. See Leechl(1984). 
19/ Evidently,, this need not include the original controllers. 
20/ 'What the chief executive approves depends in good part on what 
filters up to him for approval' (Gordon, 1952, p. 160). 
21/ That is to say, uncertainty will have efficiency and/or distributional 
effects: not control effects. As a consequence of this# capitalists 
will try to persuade and cajole workers and managers into adopting 
their objectives. 
22/ Another means of ensuring shareholders' 'apathy' is for the 
controlling group to make use of preference and debenture shares, 
as well as to divide shares to voting and non-voting ones. See 
e. g. Herman,, (19 79) . 
23/ Marx (1959) quotes Aristotle: 'Whenever the masters are not 
compelled to plague themselves with supervision, the managers 
assume this honour, while the masters attend to affairs of state 
or study philosophy'. (Vol. III, p. 385, emphasis in the original). 
24/ This is not to say that middle and working class people are 
precluded from gaining high managerial posts. It is to say that 
such mobility to the top - whenever possible - does not imply that 
the middle or working classes seized control. More plausible it 
is that managers who have risen to the top were paid part of their 
salaries in shares or share options, thus becoming themselves 
capitalists. See Sawyerp(1979). The other possibility is 
ideological assimilation. See e. g. Miliband, (1973) and Gerth 
and Mills, (1952). 
25/ on aggregate the problem of managerial control does not exist in 
the sense that a failed capitalist who lost control to his/her 
workers and/or managers, is substituted by workers and/or managers 
who have been transformed into capitalists. For the individual 
capitalist, however, failure does matter: which justifies his/her 
concern for control. 
26/ moreover, a technical indispensability, does not necessarily 
represent a prospective claim for control. See Gerth and Mills, 
(1952). 
27/ See also Reagan (1971). 
28/ What is more# the cost of this to firms has been minimal as such 
firms are often state financed. 
29/ Albeit, as we explained# not for the capitalist class as a whole. 
30/ In this framework the takeover phenomenon can be viewed as a 
process where historically Big Capital (norr-unitary) takes control 
over Small Capital (unitary) . Control, that isp is lost to Big 
Capitalp not to managers: a possibility conceivable only in 
exceptional circumstances and as a transitory phenomenon. See also 
note 25. 
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31/ See also Zeitlin (1974)t Nyman and Silberston, (1978), Scott 
(1979) and Francis (1980). 
32/ One could suggest that the chairman of the board criterion, 
albeit an advancement over the ad-hoc percentages criterionj, 
is still ad-hoc. 
33, / Note that the 'control loss' idea as expounded e. g. in Williamson 
(1967) is a result of the existence of a multiplicity of decision 
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INTRODUCTION 
In this Chapter we examine the impact of the process of the 
socialization of thelownershipPof the means of production through the 
joint stock company, on social choice and financial capital accumulation. 
We identify two stages in the above process: the first is shareownership 
through which part of shareholderslincome is retained in the corporations 
in the form of retained earnings: the second is the introduction of 
corporate (private or occupational) pension funds schemes through which 
part of wage earners' potential income is retained at source: i. e. 
'deferred'. Both result in bringing tremendous financial resources to 
the disposal of the corporate sector. Corporate retention policies 
received substantial interestparticularly on the part of managerialist 
writers and their neoclassical critics. Corporate pension funds are 
currently the focus of debate and controversy. 
The general question we attempt to answer is as follows. Is 
there a link between the corporatelcontrolling group's'policies on 
retentions and pension funds, and non-controlling shareholders' and/or 
wage earners' choice over their consumption-saving patterns ? How does 
this link affect financial capital accumulation ? 
Theoretical work explicitly focusing on the above questions exists 
only for the case of retentions. In the case of pension funds emphasis 
has been given to the empirical testing of the neoclassical predictions. 
Analysis on retentions, however# can fairly smoothly be extended for the 
case of pension funds too. 
In Section 1 we focus on retentions. In 1.1 we analyze the 
arguments of the neoclassicals, managerialists and radical writers on 
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the issue. We suggest that they all rely on a classless, or classes 
do not matter framework. In 1.2 we propose an asymmetrical choice 
approach which pursues a different analysis for the controlling and non- 
controlling shareholders of corporations. We suggest that the neo- 
classical arguments may be correct for thelcontrolling groupbut they 
fail to explain the behaviour of non-controlling shareholders. 
In Section 2 we focus on pension funds. In 2.1 we examine some 
economic aspects of the pension funds growth. In 2.2 we criticise the 
neoclassical arguments on the issue# by pursuing a similar approach as 
in the case of retentions. We suggest that the neoclassical arguments 
fail to explain wage earners' behaviour. 
In Section 3 we survey all existing empirical evidence on this 
questiong and conclude that it rejects the neoclassical hypothesis. 
Finally, Section 4 expounds our views on the role of capitalist control 
and the joint stock company on financial capital accumulation. 
1* 
1.1 
CORPORATE FINANCEp SOCIAL CHOICE AND FINANCIAL CAPITAL ACCUMULATION 
THE CASE OF CORPORATE RETENTIONS 
The Contestants 
Attempts to analyze the impact of the corporate'controlling group's' 
decisions on shareholders' choices on consumption-savings and financial 
capital accumulation, can be classified in three different schools: the 
neoclassical, the managerialist and the radical. 
In the neoclassical school three variations can be identified. For 
Solow (1967) the capital market discipline ensures that in effect all 
54. 
stockholders are in control of firms. Corporate retention policies, 
therefore, will be the reflection of the collective consensus of all 
shareholders. No link exists therefore between a'controlling group's' 
decisions on retentions and financial capital accumulation: since 
there is no'controlling group. ' Both the retention ratio2/ and the 
private saving ratio3/ reflect all stockholders' choices. 
For Modigliani (1970), the possibility that firms are management 
controlled - or otherwise - is allowed, albeit implicitly: by allowing 
the retention ratio not to reflect all individuals' preferences. It is 
argued however, that individuals consciously following a strategy of 
intertemporal utility maximisation over their consumption-saving patternst 
will, realising that their total (corporate plus personal) savings, exceed 
the level they would have chosen, if in control of firms, try to compensate 
for corporate retentions' increases by sufficiently reducing their personal 
savings. Under certain assumptions# perfect substitutability between 
corporate and personal savings will be possible, which will result in the 
private saving ratio being the reflection of all shareholders' preferences. 
For Harrod (1948) finally, it is 'conceivable that corporate savings 
might exceed the total that all individuals would be disposed to save 
(p. 48). As a result increases in corporate retentions will increase 
private savings by a proportion bigger than zero but lower than one, 
implying imperfect substitution between corporate retentions and personal 
savings. Thus Harrod allows both the retention ratio and the private 
saving ratio to diverge from (some of the) shareholders'preferences. 
Harrod gave no explanation for the reasons underlying his suggestion 
that imperfect substitution is possible. Perhaps partly because of that, 
the predominant neoclassical view is that of perfect substitution. Harrod's 
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idea of imperfect substitution, however, has been revived in the work 
of managerialists: albeit the underlying reasoning differs. 
The managerialist implication of imperfect substitution is based 
on two requirements: first that managers control the firms and maximize 
a utility function that differs from that of the shareholders. Second, 
that managers exhibit a stronger preference for corporate retentions than 
the rest of shareholders. This is based on the idea that, for corporate 
retentions to increase# shareholders should abstain from current 
consumption. In our consuming society - another major premise of 
managerialists - such an abstention will constrain shareholders from 
exhibiting a strong preference for retentions; (although some preference 
is to be expected, due to expected capital gains and tax advantages). 
Since managers are assumed not to own shares, such an abstention is 
not required on their part. Given their control on corporations, observed 
corporate retentions are expected to be higher than the ones desired from 
the ordinary shareholders: of course, under the proviso that corporate 
retentions are either an independent argument of managers' utility function 
or that they act through one or more of its arguments. 
The satisfaction of this proviso is the missing link in managerialism. 
When found the loop is closed. Managers control, impose their preferences 
over shareholders and corporate retentions increase. Moreover private 
savings - financial capital accumulation - increase, provided that there 
is not perfect substitutability between corporate retentions on the one 
hand and personal savings on the other; that is provided that increases 
in the former are not exactly compensated by reductions in the latter. 
For managerialistsp finding the missing link was not too difficult 
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a task. As far back as 19371 Kalecki (see e. g. his 1971 collection) 
was strongly arguing for the existence of a preference on the part of 
thelcontrolling group'of the firmsp for internal finance; chiefly due 
to the risks associated with external borrowing. We only have to 
substitute managers - the new controllers - for Kalecki's'controlling 
groupf- capitalists -, and here we are. Indeed both Marris (1967, p. 199) 
and Galbraith (1967) did it. The latter in a very rhetorical manner too. 
"Control of the supply of savings is strategic for industrial 
planning Apart from the normal disadvantages of an 
uncertain price, there is a danger that under some circumstances 
supply will not be forthcoming at an acceptable price. This will 
be at the precise moment when misfortune or miscalculation has 
made the need more urgent ... . Money carries with it the 
special right to know and even to suggest, how it is used. This 
dilutes the authority of the planning unit. " (pp. 55-56). 
There are other reasons why managers will be expected to express a 
preference for corporate retentions. As Marris (1967) observes, the 
latter have an accelerating impact on the growth rate of managers' bonuses 
(ibid p. 69). In addition there are tax advantages associated with 
retained earnings. See e. g. Hay and Mo. rris, (1979). 
On the substitutability issue the managerialist preference for 
imperfect substitution has been expounded by Marris (1967). In its simplest 
form the Marris argument is as follows. Suppose all profits are distributed 
to shareholders as dividends. Thent Marris suggests, some shareholders 
will definitely increase their consumptionp while some others will keep it 
constant. The very existence of retentions implies that consumption is 
reduced by the exact amount by which some individuals would have increased 
their consumptionj in the absence of retentions. Thus increased retentions, 
increase the private saving ratio. For perfect substitution to be true 
some individuals would have to reduce their consumption in case they were 
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given all profits as dividents: 
Thus his conclusion is: 
"that under the 
yesterday, long 
must cause long 
to save (in the 
magnitude),, eve: 
(P. 295). 
which Marris finds difficult to believe. 
actual circumstances of both today and 
run variations in the retention ratio 
run variations in the national propensity 
same direction, of course, but smaller in 
a when distributive shares are held constant. " 
Given managerial control, the above can be taken to imply that 
managers' policies induce a flexibility on the private propensity to save, 
i. e. give managers an ability to increase it,, subject,, of course, to 
constraints associated with the market valuation of shares and the related 
risk of takeover raids. 
In itself, however, this ability does not imply that a crucial role 
is played by managers with regard to the capital accumulation issue. To 
say so, what is required is the further proposition that in their absence 
no other societal group exists which would be willing to uncbrtake such a 
role - save enough, for the maintenance of the capitalist mode of production 
to be warranted. Why is that ? Managerialists answer by another attack 
on the neoclassical orthodoxy. What for traditional microeconomic text- 
books on consumer theory,, see, e. g. Green(1971) is taken to be a curiosum - 
that is to say advertising and the selling strategies of the firms - finds 
in managerialists its apotheosis. Consumers preferences are effectively 
controlled by Madison Avenue: meaningithey are too malleable to be relied 
upon for such important issues as capital accumulation. As Galbraith 
(1967) puts it: 
"it would be highly inconsistent for a society which so values 
consumption, and so relentlessly presses its claims, to rely on 
consumers, through their savings, for its capital ... . In a 
society which so emphasises consumption and so needs capital the 
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decision to save should obviously be removed from the 
consumer and exercised by other authority: " (ibid. p. 55): 
which in modern capitalist societies is done "In the main by the manage- 
ment of a few hundred corporations. " (p. 57). 
On the face of it the managerialists' alternative appears to bear 
hardly any similarity to neoclassicism. Where the latter see perfect 
harmony, managerialists see hierarchical control: instead of the neo- 
classicists' assumption of perfect knowledge on the part of all 
consumers they see the malleability of the latters' preferences. 
However, r if one wants to go a bit deepere the managerialists' differences 
from the neoclassical orthodoxy become less obvious: since they both 
reject the idea that a subset of the shareholders exists# whose 
ownership stake can warrant their control# over the means of production. 
See also Chapter 1. 
This question is simply assumed away by managerialists. They 
firstly subsume the capitalist class in the dubious terms "share-holders". 
Then,, they proceed to analyze the issue of control by use of ad-hoc 
measures. Thus the possibility of a capitalist class exhibiting a 
stronger preference for retentions then managers disappears, simply 
because such a class no longer exists. Also the reason why capitalists 
have stopped performing the function of capital accumulation and - they 
too - consume all their incomep does not have to be examined# for the 
same reason. 
The assuming away of a capitalist class, gives rise to the next 
managerialist assumption; i. e. that managers control the corporations. 
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Both these assumptions, however, are implausible and inconsistent 
with the existing empirical evidence - See Chapter 1. Further a 
preference for internal finance hardly requires managerial control, as 
we will be arguing in the next Sections. Before doing this# we examine 
the radical approach to the issue, and in particular the work of Marglin 
(1975,1975a). 
Marglin's sharp difference from the managerialistsp stems from the 
explicit recognition on his part of the existence of classes and 'class 
interests' (1975, p. 22). Moreover he explicitly attacks the question 
in hand - the impact of the location of control on firms, on social 
choice and financial capital accumulationt and particularly the sub- 
stitutability issue. His attack on the neoclassical approach is 
powerful too, since he is able to show its ill-based foundation, not 
only on theoretical grounds# but also by succeeding in indicating 
econometrically that a rather simple 'growth of incomes' model of the 
consumption function can perform at least equally well as the most 
elaborate of the orthodox models-i/ - Friedman's (1957) Permanent Income 
Hypothesis and the Life Cycle Hypothesis of Brumbergi Ando and 
Modigliani: (see Mayerr 1972& for an interesting exposition, and 
econometric testing and comparisons of the two models). 
A more detailed analysis of Marglin's views, howeverp shows that 
he fails to break away from the managerialist neo-orthodoxy 
5/ 
: as 
for every idea of substance advanced by the managerialists, Marglin 
has a similar view. Let us examine this proposition in some detail. 
The crucial elements of managerialism, to which we have already 
referred can be surnmarised as follows. Firstly there is a separation 
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of ownership from control in todays large corporations and control 
is with managers. Secondly# managers' utility is strongly correlated 
with corporate retentions. Thirdly, we are living in a "consuming 
society" where all consumers tend to consume all their income. As a 
result# fourthlyp the rest of the shareholders-owners do not have a 
preference for corporate retentions as strong as the one managers have. 
It follows, fifthly# that no perfect substitutability exists between 
corporate retentions on the one hand and personal savings on the other; 
which results in the crucial role managers are assumed to play in 
financial capital accumulation. 
What has Marglin to say on this ? On the first question he 
says : 
"the rate of capital formation remains reasonably high 
in capitalist societies because hierarchical organisa- 
tion permits a relatively small number of individuals 
to decide how much the rest of us will save. If, by 
contrast, savings decisions were left to individuals - 
whether capitalists or workers - accumulation of prod- 
uctive capital ... would come to a virtual standstill". 
(1975, p. 20). "Modern corporate management 
obliges workers as well as nominal owners of capital 
to provide for their collective future ... "Ubid. 
p. 22). 
It appears, therefore, that on the ownership-control issue Marglin is 
with managerialists in arguing that managers and not (other group(s) 
of) shareholders control firms. 
But is it managers who have a strong preference for corporate 
retentions ? For Marglint 
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"It is Lindoubtedly more realistic to interpret 
corporate savings decisions in terms of managers' 
perceptions of their own interest: managerial 
powerp prestige, and income are all furthered 
by plowing back earnings". (ibid. P. 23). 
As regards the consuming society idea# furthermore, Marglin 
suggests that: 
"households tend to spend whatever income they 
can lay their hands on. Households do not save, 
by and large and on the average, except in- 
advertently - when their incomes are rising 
faster than they can adjust their spending". 
(ibid. p. 22). 
With near zero 'disequilibrium' personal savings# it follows that 
households will be hardly capable of achieving any compensation at all 
for increases in corporate retentions. That is: 
"there is no systematic relationship (specifically no 
inverse relationship) between corporate savings 
and personal savings". (Marglin# 1975a, p. 10). 
With the above - rather strong - statement,, we see that Marglin 
effectively advances a new hypothesis - the independence (add-on) 
hypothesis. This way he differentiates himself from the managerialist 
position, but not without cost. Since such a position effectively 
assumes that individuals are either constrained or unwilling to borrow 
and/or exhaust their possibilities in borrowing -a position very 
difficult to substantiate indeed. And Marglin's, 
"casual empiricism 1whichl suggests ... that the over- 
whelming majority limit their borrowing to the expenses 
of their education and the basic necessities of life"t 
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(Marglin, 1975, p. 35)l in his graduate students' behaviour# example# 
could hardly be generalised to encompass the richest strata of the 
society# as he, himselft recognises elsewhere. (Marglint 1975a, 
10) . 
The conclusion is that Marglin's attempt to provide a radical 
alternative to the question in hand is hardly an advancement of the 
managerialist neo-orthodoxy. ýýen the existence of classes and 'class 
interests' (see Marglin, 1975# note 81 p. 22), is recognized, this is 
only done to immediately disappear under the weight of the classless, 
overwhelming and irresistable consumption mania. The independence 
hypothesis, moreover# appears as an integration of Galbraith's idea 
of a 'consuming society' and Marris' views on substitution: one could also 
suggest that it is an undue generalization of behaviour which could 
only be meaningfully attributed to individuals of the lowest income 
strata. Still Marglin's views have gained widespread acceptance in 
radical circles, albeit. not always an unqualified one. See Chapter 4. 
The above analysis justifies# we believe# our suggestion that all 
neoclassical, managerialist and radical analysis of the substitution issue 
rely on a classless or classes do not matter analysis. Regarding, in 
particular the managerialists and Marglint one could suggest that their 
attempt to view saving decisions in terms of all households on the one 
hand and corporations - run by impartial, impersonal and neutral techno- 
crats - on the other, may be unable to provide an adequate analysis of the 
substitution issue. Our belief is that for a more fruitful analysis one 
has to recognise the obvious: that corporations and other legal entities 
of this type did not, do not and are never going to have an independent 
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existence. They (appear to) live, only through, and for, those who have 
created them. Anything else than that can only find its place in the 
realm of metaphysics. 
It is a great virtue of Baran and Sweezy's (1967) analysis, that 
although they have essentially submittedf to the then seemingly conclusive 
6/ 
evidence provided by the managerialists I they have never gone as far as 
positing that firmstrather than (groups of) individuals. do the savings. 
Thus although: 
"the special managerial interest in a low pay-out rate does 
exist and is undoubtedly important# ... this makes managers 
the allies of the very largest stockholders for whom a 
minimum pay-out rate is also a desideratum. The reason of 
course is that the very rich save a large part of their 
incomes in any case, and it is to their advantage for the 
corporations in which they own stock to do the savings for 
them rather than pay out dividends from which to do their 
own savings". (ibid., p. 47, emphasis added). 
Thus,, capitalists save via their corporations in pursuit of their 
interestst and not corporations on behalf of households - capitalists and 
workers alike. From that it follows that a comprehensive approach to 
the existing link between the location of control on firms and social 
choice, should explicitly recognize the existence of different classes, 
and examine the effects of their - potentially different - behaviour on 
the issue in hand. 
Such an attempt we make in the next Subsection. We examine the 
behaviour of the'controllling group- capitalists - and then that of non- 
controlling shareholders. The analysis is called one of 'asymmetrical 
choice'Z/ to highlight the asymmetry in households' choices over their 
consumption-saving, as shaped by their (degree of) control, or lack there- 
of p over corporations. 
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1.2 'Co orate R(ýtentiofts At 'Agyn=P-tri Cal 'Choice 
ApprOach 
The idea that thelcontrolling grouplof the firms - capitalists - take 
the strategic decisionshas- this obvious implication: that, excluding 
exceptional casespL/ and on the aggregate, 
i/ 
this group's decisions with 
regard to their consumption-savings patterns are not constrained by the 
retention policies of the firms: since it is they who take them. 
To make the above cleart consider the following scenario. In every 
specific period, say t-11 the 'controlling group' will control the profits 
of the firms, defined in the aggregate to be distributed (dividends)p plus 
undistributed (retentions) profits# plus rent and interest. In the same 
period the group in question decide on their consumption-savings patterns, 
that is they decide on the part of the income they own (i. e. a proportion 
of aggregate profits) which they prefer to consume and/or save. Let us 
suppose that this decision is completed in the same period. 
In period t we observe the effects of the completed decision, 
namely a part of the 'controlling group's' income in the form of savings 
and the other in the form of consumption. The partp however, saved will 
have taken either of two forms: 
personal savings, and/or 
(ii) corporate retentions (i. e. business savings). 
The implication is that, by definition, a part of the observed corporate 
retentions in every specific period tj is this part of the 'controlling 
group's, income that this group has decided to save within the corporation: 
i. e. simply a form of the controlling group's savings. The other part of 
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retentions, however, represents the savings within the corporation that 
the 'controlling group' has decided to make for the rest of non-controlling 
shareholders, and it does not necessarily reflect their choice. This 
important phenomenon arises from the fact that 'capitalists' own a 
proportion only of shares, but control all corporate income. 
The implication of the above is that regarding the 'controlling 
group', actuality is just the realization of their past decisions. Orr in 
terms of the substitutability issue, the perfect substitution hypothesis 
is true by definition. See also Sugden (1981). This is independent of 
whether capitalists exhibit a preference for corporate retentions or not. 
Savings may be mostly done in the form of personal savings rather than 
corporate retentions and this will have no effect on the posited perfect 
substitution between the two. Alternativelyp if capitalists do exhibit 
a preference for retentions# in the limit we may have a situation where 
all their savings are made within the firms, and personal savings do not 
exist on their part, but only for transaction purposes and/or in a 
'disequilibriuml form, due say to the change in their income. Again the 
perfect substitution hypothesis will be true. The crux of the matter is 
that, the part of their income that capitalists save within the corporation, 
is the part of their income that they have decided not to consume and/or 
save in the form of personal savings. 
We conclude, that corporate decisions, far from being a constraint 
on the'controlling group's'preferences are only a reflection of these 
preferences. For this groupt the neoclassical proposition that corporate 
decisions are a reflection of individuals' preferences, is correct. Not 
surprisingly either; 
10/ 
since it is this group that control the corporations. 
The problem with the neoclassical analysis arises from the fact that 
capitalists do not control only the income they own, but other people's 
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income oo. The behaviour of the non-controlling households, however, 
may be different: an issue to which we now turn. 
Generally speaking, non-controlling groups comprise the vast 
majority of people: that is, people of the lower middle and middle 
classes such as small shopkeepers and other self employedf as well as 
wage earners. 
ii/ 
To the extent that such people do not own sharesp the 
corporatelcontrolling group's'policies on retentions have no direct impact 
on their consumption-saving patterns. 
Ll/ 
If they do own sharesp however, 
corporate retention policies may# or may not, be desirable on their part. 
To facilitate the exposition, we assume that the latter is the case, and 
relegate our reasons for that in the last section of this Chapter. 
Let us then assume that in a certain period t, the retention ratio 
is set to a higher level than the one desired on the part of small scale 
shareholders. As a result the latter find themselves with a total level 
of savings higher than the one they would have chosen, if they had made 
the decision with regard to the retention ratio. How do they react ? 
Assuming they have sufficient personal savings and/or they are able and/ 
or willing to exhaust their possibilities with regard to borrowingp they 
can either reduce their personal savings by a sufficient amount, or borrow 
in order to reach their desired level of consumption. 
A third course of action often believed to be open to small scale 
shareholders, is to attempt to 'declare their own dividenas' by selling 
(part of) their shares and thus realising the cash they need to restore 
their desired consumption levels. If any (combination) of the above options 
is available to, and is used by, the non-controlling shareholders, then 
the perfect substitution hypothesis will be correct. Although the specific 
retention ratio will not reflect all shareholders preferencest the aggregate 
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(private) saving ratio will. This outcome, however, is based on the 
extent to which the above possibilities exist and can be realized. In 
practice it is not obvious that they can. 
To start with, a non zero equilibrium level of personal saving may 
not exist at all on the part of the non-controlling shareholders. This 
proposition is well in accord with the existing empirical evidencer (see 
Section 3 of this Chapter and Chapters 6 and 7), and it is plausible to 
suggest it on theoretical grounds, (see Section 4 of this Chapter), too. 
This leaves the possibility of borrowing. The latter, however, is never 
costless. It involves interest and often other paymentse and perhaps 
'psychic' costs to the borrower(s). Further, borrowing may not be 
available in some cases, or for some individuals, depending on the extent 
of imperfection of the capital market(s) and/or the creditworthiness 
of the borrower. See also, Tobinl(1980). 
The above considerations leave us with the possibility that share- 
holders will be able to declare their own dividends. The following 
reasons make such a possibility improbable. Firstr transaction costs 
involved in selling shares: in case of small lots, these costs may be 
very important thus rendering the above strategy too expensive. Second, 
tax disadvantages. Income realized from selling shares will be taxed to 
a higher rate than retained income. Thirdj, the uncertainty and volatility 
of the share markets. Shareholders will have to bear substantial costsp 
in case they are obliged to sell when the market is low. 
L3/ 
Perhaps,, more important is the 'information effect' of dividends, 
emphasised by Wood (1975). The ex-ante decision of small shareholders to 
buy shares depends partly on the pay-out ratio that a specific firm has 
at the time of the purchase. Thusp shareholders have some expectations 
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that this pay-out ratio will not vary substantially in the futurej 
and sop they tend not to react, but only when substantial variation in 
the dividend payments are observed. In the latter case shareholders wish 
to sell their shares. A cut, however, in dividends tend to decrease 
share pricesp thus making it a bad time to sell. Thust the information 
effects of dividends make it particularly costly to the shareholders to 
react to the'controlling group'sIdecisions, by declaring their own 
dividends. 
The above tend to result in the so-called 'clientele' phenomenon, 
a situation where : 
"not only do particular shareholders favour particular 
companies at a moment of time, but they persist in their 
favours over considerable periods sticking to particular 
shares through thick and thin". (Wood, 1975# p. 37). 14/ 
On balance the above considerations would suggest that increases in 
the retention ratiol will not be expected to be followed by decreases in 
personal savings, borrowing and/or selling of shares, on the part of the 
non-controlling shareholders: implying less than perfect substitutability 
between retentions and personal savings for this group. Coupled with our 
analysis of the controllling shareholders' behaviour, the above suggest 
imperfect substitution on aggregate, its degree depending upon: the 
proportion of shares held by the controlling shareholders to total share- 
holding: and the extent to which non-controlling shareholders (attempt to) 
substitute, by decreasing their personal savings# borrowing and/or trying 
to declare their own dividends. 
We conclude that, the neoclassical idea that the location of control 
on firms, is not a binding constraint to individuals' choices, is correct 
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only for those who exercise this control - i. e. the'controlling groujý. 
It is incorrect for non controlling groups (small shareholders), Regarding 
these groups, Marglin's and managerialists' analyses, appear to be closer 
to reality. All three approaches, however, are wrong in attempting to 
generalize their conclusions for all societal groups. Our analysis 
results in a similar implication to managerialists but from a totally 
different route: i. e. by pointing out the limitations of each approach 
and then integrating the implications of the two. 
In the next Section we pursue a similar analysis for the case of 
pension funds. 
CORPORATE FINANCE,, SOCIAL CHOICE AND FINANCIAL CAPITAL ACCUMULATION 
THE CASE OF PENSION FUNDS 
2.1 Economic Aspects of Pension Funds 
The introduction of corporate pension funds schemes represents the 
second major step in the process of the socialization of the 'ownership' 
of the means of production. The introduction and growth of these schemes 
has, through the intermediation of the financial institutions# resulted 
in a situation where a significant part of equity capital in the U. S. and 
the U. K. is 'owned' by wage earners: in the form of shares that the 
financial institutions buy for them. It is therefore least surprising 
that in recent years research on the economic role of corporate pension 
funds has proliferated. In a prophetic article Garvy (1950) anticipated 
things to come, but it was the meteoric growth of the funds in the last 
fifteen years that triggered economists' interest. In the U. K. participa- 
tion in corporate pension funds schemes was rising steadily after the 
second world wart reaching its peak in 1967 with around half of the work- 
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force belonging to such schemes. 
' 15/ See Green, (1982). 
Uhe halt in the rise of the participation rate did not stop contribu- 
tions to the funds from growing. The net inflow 
16/ 
in Life Assurance and 
Pension Funds(TLAPF) rose from 4.87% of personal sector disposable income 
(PSDI) in 1967 to 7.47% in 1981, with its peak in 1979 when it reached 
just over 7.50% of PSDI. 
L7-/ 
In the late 1970's corporate pension funds 
owned 1/5 of equity of all ordinary shares in the U. K. See Minns, (1982). 
18/ 
In the U. S. the relevant figure was higher. See Drucker, (1976). 
Two closely related aspects of the pension funds growth received the 
lion's share of economists' interest: first the issue of whether pension 
funds can generate a higher level of private saving than could be possible 
in their absence: secondp the implications of the ownership and control 
of the funds on capital markets, real investment and the institutions of 
the macroeconomy. 
Drucker (1976) in the U. S. paid particular emphasis to the last 
question. He observed that in the mid 1970's workers in the U. S. owned 
more than 25% of business equity through their pension funds. Adding the 
ownership of self employedt public employees and school and college 
teachers' funds, the figure went up to more than 1/3 of equity capital. 
Considering this more than enough for control of the means of production, 
Drucker concluded that an 'unseen revolution' transformed the U. S. to the 
first truly socialist country. This was the pension funds revolution 
whose agent was ... General Motors 
! (p. 5. ) 
Not everybody would go as far as Drucker. In the U. K. for example 
Minns (1981) concentrated on the control rather than the ownership of the 
funds: his substantive finding being that just over 2/3 of the funds are 
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in fact controlled by banks and other financial institutions. ýL9/ Such 
control might have had a distorting impact on capital markets 
20/ 
, see 
Rose, (1983) and adverse effects on real investmentAl/ See Minnsl(1982). 
Stillj, Drucker's views help emphasise the far reaching implications of 
the pensions funds question. 
What reasons underly the growth of the funds ? One suggestion is 
tax advantages# see e. g, Feldstein, (1978). Indeed both in the U. K. and 
the U. S. pension funds income is treated favourably by the tax authorities. 
See Threadgoldp(1978) and Roset(1983) for the U. K. and Feldstein, (1978) 
4 . or the U. S.. Still one could question the direction of causality in 
the above reasoning. 
22/ 
second argument refers to a Ilabour turnover' or a 'loyalty- 
control of the workforce' effect. For the former effect employers are 
taken to incur informationt training and other costs as a result of early 
leavingr which they can reduce simply by discouraging early leavers. This 
can be effected if vesting, 
23/ 
and leaving conditions are such that leaving 
before retirement implies a loss of pension rights. Less than full 
transferability 
24/ 
and incomplete preservation of pension rights may result 
in a 'loyalty-control of the workforce' effect, see Green, (1982), which can 
be further accentuated as 'final salary schemes' spread. 
25/ 
It is necessary for the above argument to hold that participation 
in the schemes is compulsory (i. e. a condition of employment) and strong 
disincentives to early leavers exist. Further, that employers have 
played a very significant role in the introduction of the schemes. Green 
(1982) has arguments for both. 
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Still it is not clear whether the 
above conditions are sufficient too. Rose (1983) questioned the relative 
advantages of incomplete vesting and final salary schemes in reducing 
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labour mobility and inducing workforce loyaltyl in comparison to 
potential alternatives. For Drucker (1976) and Minns (1981) it was 
both the employers and employees that initiated the introduction of the 
schemes. Furtherf the compulsory membership in the schemes is not in- 
consistent with the third reason advanced for the growth of the funds: 
the 'saving instrument' effect. 
In this argument pension funds, being deferred wages, result in a 
part of the workforce's 'life cycle' income being saved before it actually 
gets in to the wage earners' hands. This reduces the obvious 'risk' of 
this income being consumed rather than saved. Further# it may have the 
beneficial - for the company sector - effect of putting part of company 
finance outside the banking system. See Rosep (1983). To the extent 
that such policies result in a higher level of saving on the part of 
the wage earners than they would have otherwise chosen to have, we are 
faced with a 'forced saving' effect, see Feldsteinl(1978), similar to 
the case of corporate retentions. 
The 'forced saving' argument and its underlying implications of 
constrained households choice# see e. g. Rose(1983), are closely related 
to the other important aspect of the pension funds' growth: its impact 
on other savings. Before looking at thatj we briefly refer to some 
other economic aspects of the pension funds growth of some interest, from 
which our analysis will be aided or for which it will have some observa- 
tions and/or implications. First, their effects on the 'propensity to 
save' and the 'paradox of saving', see e. g. Pearce and Thomasl(1981), and 
Cuthberston,, (1983). Second, their impact on inducing early retirement, 
see Zabalza et. al. (1978) and Munnell, (1976). 
The first two issues basically refer to measurement and definitional 
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problems of the offical statistics, but their implications are far 
reaching since they cast doubts on long existing Or strongly believed 
economic dogmas. 
27/ 
The induced retirement issue is very closely 
related to the substitutability issue, and it is not obvious that they 
can be examined separately at all, 
28/ 
see e. g. Rose, (1983). Perhaps 
this interconnection is one of the reasons why the substitution issue 
has been tested so extensively. Another reason may be the multiplicity 
of factors affecting the analysis of pension funds. This makes it 
virtually impossible to obtain a conclusive answer for our queries with- 
out resorting to econometric estimation. This we do in Chapter 6. In 
the next Section we analyze the substitution issue. 
2.2 Corporate Pension Funds and Social Choice : Substitution or Add-on ? 
As already suggestedl contrary to the case of corporate retentions, 
the question of the impact of corporate pension funds on social choice and 
financial capital accumulation has not been examined theoretically on the 
part of managerialists and/or radical writers. Insteadt a host of empirical 
studies appeared that attempted to test the neoclassical hypothesis. In 
its simplest version the latter is associated in particular with the Life 
Cycle Hypothesis of Ando and Modigliani (1963) and suggests that 
substitution will be perfect. However, the complexity of factors that 
affect pension funds makes it difficult to accept such a simplistic view, 
even to the most prominent neoclassicals. Feldstein (1978), for example, 
finds that the conditions which should be satisfied in order that this 
hypothesis is true, are rather extreme. 
29/ 
In general the degree of substitution would seem to depend on two 
basic factors: the extent to which wage earners are aware of, and want 
to substitute for increases in pension funds by decreasing personal 
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voluntary savings and/or by borrowing: and the extent to which they 
can. In practice, it seems doubtful that any of these conditions 
will be satisfied. If pension funds provide annuities on more favourable 
terms than wage earners could buy themselves, pension funds might tend 
to reduce voluntary savings. 
30/ 
The awareness of their pension funds 
rights by wage earners, however, may be incomplete or tend to be under- 
estimated due to uncertainty and illiquidity of pension funds equity. 
In such a case a low valuation will be put on pensions funds rights and 
31/ 
wage earners will end up with a higher level of total assets than desired. 
Even with full knowledge on the part of the wage earners, it is not 
obvious that they will be willing to substitute for different types of 
savings. An alternative could be to choose earlier retirement. This 
could explain non-substitution in an extended Life Cycle framework (but 
see note 28). Assuming that wage earners have perfect knowledge and 
want to substitute# it does not follow that they can. This# Feldstein 
(1978) observesj, is particularly true for employees with low earnings 
whose public social security programs provide them with what they might 
consider as sufficient retirement income. 
32/ 
"Since these individuals would generally find it impossible 
to borrow against future pension benefits, they are forced 
to accumulate more for their retirement than they would 
otherwise prefer". (Feldstein, 1978, p. 282). 
Further the 'forced saving' effectf Feldstein argues, is the only one 
whose impact on total asset accumulation is unambiguously positive. 
The previous discussion accounts for two deficiencies of the simple 
Life Cycle framework over which recent concern has been raised. See 
particularly, Kingi, (1984). That is, imperfect capital markets and the 
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Possibility of some individuals' behaviour being closer to the 
requirements of the Life Cycle model than of others. See also the 
previous section. As regards the latter it may be fruitful to further 
extend the (implied from the previous discussion but never explicitly 
spelled out) distinction between employees and employers' behaviourp and 
analyze its implications for the substitution issue. 
In general, employers will be expected to better conform to the 
requirements of the simple Life Cycle model: i. e. be better informed and 
face less binding constraints in the capital marketsp at least as far as 
substitution for pension funds increases is concerned. Thust non- 
substitution on their part will, as a rule, only be expected if it is so 
desired on their part. Two reasons suggest that employers would not 
desire substitution. First, pension funds are in principle 'deferred 
wages' and not employers' savings, i. e. by definition they cannot act 
as 'forced savings' in their case. Second, even if employers tend to 
regard pension funds as their saving and consider their level excessivel 
microeconomic theory would suggest that substitution should be expected 
between pension funds on the one hand and corporate retained earnings on 
the other, 
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rather than between pension funds and employers' voluntary 
savings. The above reasoning may be fruitful in the face of some 
apparently perverse empirical findings of no substitution on the part of 
employers. See below . 
With employers not being willing, and low level employees not being 
able to substitute, the use of aggregate data would be expected to provide 
support for the add-on or independence hypothesis, (the idea that pension 
funds will add-on# on a one to one basisl to other personal saving): or 
some imperfect substitutability reflecting basically the behaviour of 
highly paid white collar workers whose voluntary personal savings and/or 
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access to borrowing may be such as to allow them to substitute, if 
they want to. The possibility Of some substitution between corporate 
pension funds and corporate retained earnings could not be excluded 
either. See also Garvy, (1950) but murray, (1968). 
THE EXISTING EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
The conclusion from the analysis of Sections 1 and 2 of this Chapter, 
is that for both corporate retentions and corporate pension funds less 
than perfect substitution should be expected in aggregate between each of 
them, on the one hand, and personal savings on the other: implying the 
possibility on the part of the'controlling group'of the firms to influence 
financial capital accumulation via their decisions on the retention ratio 
and the ratio of the benefits paid to wage earners from the pension funds 
to the aggregate pension funds income: i. e. total contributions to the 
f unds . 
In general there are two types of evidence that can be used to test 
the above proposition. First, indirect evidence, such as trying to Or 
assess and/or show that non-controlling shareholders and wage earners do 
not savet by and large, and that they are wholly or partly constrained in 
borrowing. Also# for the case of retentionst that non-controlling share- 
holders do not find it preferable to attempt to declare their own dividends. 
Second, direct evidence, that is the undertaking of direct econometric 
testing of the alternative hypotheses. 
In the first category the existing empirical evidence is minimal: 
partly because of the complexity of the issues involved. In particular, 
Marglin (1975), attempted to support his views on the independence between 
corporate retentions and personal savings, by testing for a short run 
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propensity to consume net personal disposable income equal to one: i. e. 
zero equilibrium saving on the part of all households. He used U. S. 
time series data and defined household disposable income to exclude 
contractual savings: corporate retentions and pension funds. He found 
support for his hypothesis. For the U. K. a similar exercise has been 
attempted by Pearce and Thomas (1981). With a definition of personal 
disposable income similar to Marglin's, they found an aggregate propensity 
to save very close to zero. Although none of these studies has taken 
account of different types of incomes, their finding of a zero aggregate 
propensity to save may be taken to hold true for each type of income 
recipients too. 
From the host of other studies on the propensity to consume and 
save (different types of) incomet a survey of which is given in the fourth 
Chapter, none is particularly useful since they all use the official 
definition of personal disposable income, which includes the net inflow 
to pension funds and thus biases the propensity to save upwards. See 
Part II for discussion , 
The usefulness of the above findings? in our framework, is that 
they highlight the difficulties associated with the argument that wage 
earners and small shareholders attempt to achieve substitutability by 
manipulating their personal savings. They leave open, however, the 
possibilities of borrowing and, for the case of small shareholders, of 
declaring their own dividends. 
These possibilities received less than adequate attention in the 
existing literature. More important, howeverr we think, is the fact 
that even if a detailed analysis of the above possibilities is undertaken, 
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and if more evidence was available to support the zero aggregate 
propensity to save propositiont this would only be indicative of the 
extent of aggregate substitutability. It would by no means reveal the 
exact degree of substitutability. The latter can only be revealed if 
one goes beyond the indirect type of evidence analyzed above, i. e. if one 
undertakes direct econometric testing of the hypotheses involved. 
Such direct evidence involves estimating consumption or saving 
(personal or private) functions, that include retentions and/or pension 
funds as explanatory variables. Depending on the obtained coefficient 
of the relevant variable, support may be obtained for the perfect substitution# 
the imperfect substitution, or the add-on hypothesis. 
Research along these lines has increased dramatically in recent 
years: motivated by a host of reasons referred to in Chapter 4. 
For the case of corporate retentions originally no direct support was 
given to any of the hypotheses. Proponents of the perfect substitution 
hypothesis have relied on the work of Denison (1958) on the apparent 
constancy of the private saving ratio in the U. S. economy. The latter's 
evidence however, has been criticised severelyr see Marglinp CL975) and 
Lambrinides, (1972), so that, the question was left open. Further support 
for Denison's findings was more recently given by David and Scadding (1974). 
Deducing, however, lultrarationalityl and perfect substitution from the 
apparent constancy of the private saving rate is a non-sequitur, see 
also Boskinp(1978), and in any case does not constitute direct evidence, 
for the substitutability issue. Marglin, on the other hand# sought support 
for his hypothesis in the work of Cagan (1965), on the responses of personal 
savings to movements in committed savings through households' participation 
in pension plans. Cagan's findings rejected the substitution hypothesis, 
but it is not clear that his findings constitute direct evidence of no 
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substitution in the case of corporate retentions too. 
34/ 
The first direct attack on the problem was made in an international 
cross section study by Modigliani (1970)p but his tests were inconclusive. 
Cross section evidence for the add-on was offered by Lambrinides (1972). 
From the time series studies available, Feldstein (1973) found a high 
degree - 50% approximately - of substitution. These results contrast 
with his own findings in a subsequent study (Feldstein, 1978) where a 
bigger data sample was used and a more complete specification examined. 
In this study the degree of substitutability falls to an average of around 
22%. Similar results to the latter, are given in Lambrinides (1974). 
Howrey and Hymans (1978) have mixed findings. From five equations 
reportedoone supportsý perfect substitutiont two imperfect substitution 
and two add-on, depending on the definition of the dependent variable 
(personal savings) and the data period used. The authors conclude that 
'the results are not in conflict with the proposition that business saving 
I (ibid. p. 683). is a nearly perfect substitute for personal saving' . 
Bhatia (1979) re-examines Feldstein's (1973) evidence and finds support 
for the add-on. This supports earlier findings by Burmeister and Taubman 
(1969) in a different context. Furstenberg (1981) has support for the 
imperfect substitution hypothesis (of the order of 42 to 45% in eight 
out of nine cases# and of 67% in one case). The author undertakes the 
interesting task of estimating personal saving and corporate saving 
functions and then of a combined run (i. e. a private saving function) 
which includes all the explanatory variables present in the two previous 
functions. One would be interested to see the performance of the 
corporate saving variable in exactly this complete specification. However 
this variable is (the only one) excluded from the private saving function ! 
This may render his results doubtful. 
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More recently, Auerbach (1982) has support for the add-on hypothesis 
in one case, and for imperfect substitution of 30% in another, depending 
on the specification adopted. Koskela and Viren (1984) finallyi, use 
international cross section data and find support for imperfect 
substitution: of the order of 35%. 
All the above time series studies used U. S. data. For the U. K. F 
there is, to our knowledger only one published study, by Feldstein and 
Fane (1973): it has support for the imperfect substitution hypothesis# 
the substitution being of the order of 25%. This finding is supported 
by our results in Part II, Chapters 5 and 6. 
For the case of pension funds, early work in the U. S. by Cagan 
(1965) and Katona (1965) gave apparently perverse results. Cagan, found 
cross section evidence for no substitution and possible complementarity: 
that is, increased pension funds were resulting in increasing other personal 
savings too. He attributed this finding to a 'recognition effect':. 
i. e. the view that a (subjectively perceived) 'adequate' retirement income 
previously out of reach, is now attainable. Garvy (1950) anticipated 
this idea fifteen years earlier. Cagan's sample was not representative, 
see Murray, (1968). Katona, however# used a representative sample of 
households in the continental U. S. and supported the complementarity 
hypothesis. His explanation was the 'goal gradient' effect, which 
assumes that effort is intensified the closer is one to one's goal. 
Munnell (1976) attributed the Cagan-Katona findings to the 'induced 
retirement' effect. She had U. S. cross-section evidence for the imperfect 
substitution hypothesis. Canadian cross section evidence by Dicks-Mireaux 
and King (1983) resulted in similar findings. Schoeplein (1970) 
examined the effects of pension funds on other retirement saving. He 
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found evidence of substitution in lower and middle classes but supported 
the Cagan-Katona findings for higher income classes. Daly (1983) 
supported the add-on and limited complementarity. 
U. K. cross section evidence for the add-on hypothesis was found 
by Zabalza et. al. (1978). Green (1981) had support for the comple- 
mentarity hypothesis. Hemming and Harvey (1983) used a more elaborate 
approximation of the pension funds variable to Green's, and a similar 
data series. They found support for Green Is earlier findings but concluded 
that the add-on was equally sustainable to the complementarity hypothesis. 
On the time series front# Feldstein (1978) estimated private 
(personal plus corporate) saving functions for the 1929-74 U. S. period. 
He found perfect substitution. Threadgold (1978) estimated consumption 
functions with 1963-77 U. K. quarterly data. He found add-on for employers 
and imperfect substitution for employees. Browning (1982) used a 
similar series (1962-1979), He found limited substitution between gross 
pension wealth (i. e. state plus corporate pension wealth) and saving# by 
use of an extended'Error Correction'type of the consumption function. 
15/ 
On balance, and despite some apparent divergence in the findings, 
the general picture obtained from the above evidence is rarely inconsistent 
with our theoretical analysis in Section 1 and 2. The perfect substitution 
hypothesis, in particular, can be rejected fairly conclusively. Obviously, 
part of the observed differences can be explained in terms of differences 
in the type of data-data periods used, models and/or specifications adopted, 
differences in the country under examinationp in the choice and/or 
definition of the dependent variable, andl perhaps surprisingly, differences 
in the interpretation of the empirical findings. More important is that, 
most of the above studies are subject to serious limitations which may cast 
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doubt on their results. These problems are discussed in detail in 
Part III Chapter 5 and 6 of this thesis, where fresh evidence free - 
to the extent possible - from these problems is also provided. For the 
purposes of this Chapter suffice it to say# that our evidence too, is 
consistent with limited substitution and/or add-on. 
Throughout, the analysis was carried out under the assumption of 
capitalist control. The fact that we reached the same implication as 
the managerialistsphighlights the idea advanced in Chapter 1, that the 
existence of an induced flexibility on the private saving ratio through 
retention and pension funds policies does not necessarily require 
managerial control. It is at least equally consistent with capitalist 
control. What is needed is for the'controlling grouV to control more 
capital than it owns,, or alternatively,, a joint stock company. These 
ideas are further explained in the next Section. 
4. 
FINANCIAL CAPITAL ACCUMULATION 
CAPITALIST CONTROL AND THE ROLE OF THE JOINT STOCK'COMPANY IN 
We suggested that the ability of corporate leaders to influence 
financial capital accumulation by exhibiting a preference for a higher 
retention ratio and the net inflow in pension funds ratiop than the rest 
of the shareholders - wage earners# can be explained in terms of capitalist 
control of today's giant corporations. To establish this proposition 
what is required is to justify such a difference in preferences. Further, 
if such a difference exists and small scale shareholders and/or wage 
earners fail to achieve perfect substitution ex-post, the question should 
be asked why do they buy shares and/or participate in corporate pension 
funds schemes at all. Finally, what - if anything - explains the observed 
zero propensity to save on the part of the non-controlling households 
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The differential preference for retentions and pension funds 
between capitalists and non-controlling groups can be explained in terms 
of the contradiction between capitalists' motive to accumulate - produce, 
on the one hand, and their need to realize their profits by selling the 
new products, on the other. 
Regarding the motive to accumulate, we saw in Section 1j, that 
Baran and Sweezy, effectively assumed an 'urge' to accumulate on the 
part of capitalists. A comprehensive analysis of the various explanations 
given for this 'urge' under conditions of competitive capitalism is given 
in Lambrinides (1973). Whether the Marxian imperative to accumulate, 
that is competition, should be abandoned, modified and/or substituted 
by another, as a result of the transition to the monopolistic stage of 
capitalism, is a question that gave rise to interesting discussions. 
Thust Mandel (1967) for example, suggested that both under monopoly 
capitalism and competitive capitalism, two fundamental forces can explain 
capital accumulation: the competition between capitalistsf on the one 
hand,, and workers on the other, in order to increase the rate of surplus 
value: and inter-capitalist differences, in order to appropriate a 
higher share of surplus value. For Cowling (1982) on the other hand, 
monopoly removes the requirement to accumulate, only in an individual 
sense,, i. e. for the individual capitalist. Given, however# the tendency 
to monopolization, in the global sense, the need to accumulate in order 
to realize profits is maintained, or even enhanced. In this sense, 
accumulation is also required in the long run, in order to sustain the 
system. 
The above also help us to answer our previous queries. Inter- 
capitalist differences, for example, can explain the preference for 
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internal finance on the part of industrial capitalists. This explana- 
tion is consistent with Hilferding (1981) and Kalecki (1971). 
For Hilferding there were two important changes that the joint 
stock company introduced to the system: the ability on the part of the 
tontrolling group'of the firms to administrate other people's income, i. e. 
the shareholders I income; which they do by giving away part of their 
ownership - i. e. sell shares - while retaining control: and the access 
this control gives to external borrowing, from banks. We see from the 
last mentioned reason, a rationale for the preference of a high retention 
ratio. Indeed, as already noticed# this was the explanation that Mlecki 
advanced, and justified in terms of a posited risk avoidance on the part 
of the 'controlling grouple as regards external borrowing. 
36/ 
That the preference for internal finance entails a preference for a 
high retention ratio seems undisputable. 
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That this preference should 
be higher than the one of other societal groups is however less clear. 
This can be explained in terms of the need for realization. 
The problem that the joint stock company solved in its early phase 
was the need for more finance on the part of capitalists, either without 
turning to banks for this finance or by doing so but from a better 
position, therefore with better terms. Expansion, however, requires the 
need to sell the previously produced goods. With growing incomes of the 
wage earners and small shareholders, the further the gap between the 
physical level of subsistence and actual income opens, the more it is 
possible for people to save in shareholding and/or in bankst and the 
more aggregate finance becomes available. Further expansionj however, 
requires again the sale of the new goods. The need to bolster effective 
demand gives rise to advertising and other selling-promotion activities 
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of the firms: new 'needs' are created and the socially defined 
subsistence level tends to diverge significantly from the physical one. 
An advertising inducedt see e. g. Cowlingt(1981), 'demonstration effect'r 
see Duesenberry, (1967) ensures that consumption will tend to catch up 
with net disposable income. See Part II . 
The above analysis is consistent with the Galbraith-Marglin 
emphasis on our 'consuming society' and justifies both their view on zero 
household personal saving and the preference of the non-controlling share- 
3 holders for high pay-out ratios. 
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Inter-capitalist differences can 
also explain the question of why small shareholders buy shares at allp 
an issue apparently unexplained in the managerialist literature. That 
isp in their attempt to attract other people's money - i. e. sell sharesp 
capitalists will tend to provide some incentives. One may be the 
paying of a dividend just higher than the prevailing rate of interest. 
See Hilferding,, (198 1, )? Ch. 7 .. Another may be by trying to obtain a 
preferential tax treatment of retained earnings on the part of the State. 
39/ 
Provided the appropriate links exist between corporate leaders and State 
officials this can always be a possibility. As we have seen a 
preferential tax treatment for retained earnings today exists in most 
advanced capitalist countries. In our analysis the new element is that 
causality runs from capitalists' preference for a high retention ratio to 
a preferential tax treatment of retentions, than the other way around. 
In the light of the above, the non-controlling shareholders' 
behaviour is consistent with the following scenario. Ex-antej, they buy 
shares because industrial capitalists offer to them a better 'investment' 
of their money than financial capitalists, e. g. banks. Shareholding, 
that is,, represents to them the best of the two worlds available. Ex-post, 
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they fail to realize their preferred retention ratio level, itself 
induced partly by the advertising policies of the firmsp for the reasons 
analyzed in Section 2. 
Important, we think, in the abover is the idea that tax advantages 
can help explain only the non-controlling shareholders' behaviour, but by 
no means capitalists behaviour too - as managerialists but also Baran and 
Sweezy suggest - which can best be explained in terms of less superfluous 
factors, such as the motive to accumulate and the risk avoidance induced 
preference for internal finance. 
An advertising induced high preference for consumption, however, 
may tend to depress the proportion of shares held by the household sector: 
which undermines the sources of further finance for expansion. Indeed, 
in recent years the tendency of personal sector holdings to fall, has 
already manifested itself. See note 20. 
In the light of the above, the introduction of the second stage 
in the socialization of the'ownershiplof the means of production: i. e. 
corporate pensions fundst appears as the easy way out of the problem. 
The retention within the corporation of a part of the wage earners income, 
is used through the intermediation of the financial institutions, 'see e. g. 
Minns, (1982) for the buying of corporate shares. Thus wage earners 
money is used in order to maintain or enhance the aggregate amount of 
finance available for expansion: but with a difference. While 
originally the buying of shares was at least in an ex-ante sense voluntary, 
participation in pension funds is compulsory. Where the system fails to 
persuade, hierarchical control takes over. 
40/ 
87. 
The pension funds revolution appears to be the completion of the 
process of the socialization of the ownership' of the means of production, 
as it renders 'owners' virtually all members of the society. Appropriation# 
however# remains private. The potential problems of that to the system 
are analyzed in Chapter 3. 
Regarding the managerialist revolution we can statep in the light of 
the above, that it was not managers who saved capitalismp but rather 
capitalistst who by means of the joint stock company managed not only to 
retain a 'reasonably high' level of accumulation but also to become able 
to increase it almost at will. 
SUMMARY 
We have analyzed the link between corporate control, social choice 
and financial capital accumulation. We advanced the simple idea that 
corporate decisions do not constrain the possibilities of choice of those 
who take the decisions - the corporations''controlling group'. However, 
they do constrain non-controlling groups' choices. Thus the level of 
financial capital accumulation depends on the decisions of the'controlling 
grouplon retentions and pension fundsi, subject to the lack of perfect 
substitution between retentions and small shareholders' personal savings, 
and pension funds and wage earners' personal savings, respectively. Under 
present day conditions the idea that substitutability - if any - will be 
less tlýan perfect, is more than probable: this is supported by all 
existing evidence. The'controlling group's'preference for high retention 
ratios may be explained in tbrms of risks associated withp and more access 
to, external borrowing and also, in terms of their attempts to solve the 
emerging contradiction between their needs for finance and the all-income- 
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consuming households. It would appear that the joint stock company 
furthered the possibilities of achieving high levels of capital accumula- 
tion,, not only by passing to the 'controlling group' other people's savings, 
but also by allowing it to increase the level of savings other would 
otherwise have chosen to do. 
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NOTES 
These should be viewed flexibly thought since the boundaries 
are often vague, as the analysis to follow will reveal. 
2/ The ratio of retained earnings to total profits. 
3/ The ratio of private (personal plus corporate) savings, to 
private income. 
4/ Incidentally, this 'rather simple model' introduced for the 
first time in the consumption function what came later to be 
termed the 'error correction mechanism'; used in the well 
known Davidson et. al. (1978) model of the consumption function. 
See also Hendry and von UngernSternberg (1980), and Davidson 
(1983). 
5/ We use this term to denote the widespread acceptance that the 
managerialist ideas have gained: perhaps the most prominent 
manifestation of that being the form of saving function. See 
Chapter 4. 
6/ That is the idea that managers do control firms: for Baran and 
Sweezy (1967) in particularp managers are the "leading echelon" 
of the capitalist class; an idea which has (wrongly to us) resulted 
in the term "Marxist-managerialists" as descriptive of the ideas 
advanced in particular by Sweezy and O'Connor. See e. g. Fitch, (1972). 
7/ Obviously asymmetry in choice is to be found in the managerialist 
and the Marglinian views too. The particular feature of our 
approach is the asymmetry in (groups of) individuals' choices and 
not corporations (or their managers) on the one handp and all 
other (groups of) individuals on the other. 
8/ E. g. when constraints imposed on the 'controlling group' from 
the market valuation of shares and the associated risk of take- 
over raids, become binding. 
9/ It is obvious that not every single capitalist will exhibit the 
same degree of preference for the level of retention ratior to 
other capitalists. The following behaviour should be expected 
in such a case. Those who find the retention ratio 'excessive' 
will try to compensate for it by reducing their personal savings 
- if any - and/or by borrowing. Those who find it smaller than 
desired will attempt to buy either other firms' shares and/or 
they will put theirr thus resulting# 'excessive income' in the 
form of personal savings. 
10/ The idea is consistent with the Marxist political analysis of 
capitalist democracies, that is the idea that such democracies 
are indeed democratic to capitalists but essentially dictatorial 
to other societal classes - wage earners in particular. 
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This does not imply that these groups have no say whatever to 
the running of the firms. See e. g. Baran and Sweezy, (1967) 
and Wood, (1975). It just means that any constraints they put 
on the corporate leaders act through the latter's behaviour- 
actions. That is, their impact is exhausted in the observed 
retention ratio, etc. 
12/ Obviously in the long run increased retentions invested in new 
capital outlets will increase their income (assuming constant 
distribution of income). This, however, does not affect 
directly our analysis. 
13/ What shareholders can obviously do, is to choose not to add to 
their holdings# as their income grows. This does not bear on 
our analysis on short run substitutability, but it may affect 
adversely the extent of personal sector shareholding. As 
explained later in this Chapter, institutional shareholding, 
through e. g. the introduction of compulsory pension funds schemes 
may be the answer to this problem. See Section 4. 
14/ Note, that this also results in the small shareholders' favour 
to high pay-out ratios: which neatly complements our analysis 
in Section 4. 
15/ As compared to ý in the mid thirties. 
16/ Defined as Employers plus Employees contributions to the funds 
plus rent, interest and dividends earned by the funds minus 
their administrative costs and the benefits paid to the house- 
holds. 
17/ The relevant figures as a proportion of Net Personal Disposable 
Income (NPDI) i. e. PSDI minus contributions top plus benefits from, TLAPF, 
were 5.13%, 8.07% and 8.14% for 1967,1981 and 1979 respectively. 
18/ This rises to 38% if insurance companies holdings are added. 
19/ As noted in Chapter 11 this fact does not contradict our arguments 
in there, and in no case implies managerial control. 
20/ In particular the growth of the funds is held responsible for the 
increase of the institutional shareholding of U. K. listed securities# 
from 21% in 1959 to 50% in 1978: during which period personal sector 
holdings fell from 66% to 32%. 
21/ An argument based on the international character of the London City 
and its 'relative autonomy' from production at home, for its share 
in profits: which results in a short term view of investment. See 
Chapter 3. 
22/ If e. g. the 'saving instrument' (see below) is the underlying 
fnr tiio cyrowth of the funds in a narliamentarv western 
democracy one might observe tax concessions arising, as corporate 
leaders advance such demands to state officials so that their aims 
are not thwarted by adverse taxation. 
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23/ The term refers to the idea that a participating employee 
acquires a 'vested interest' in a pension only after a number 
of years. S/he cannot until then, draw out the money, borrow 
against it or assign or sell her/his interest. Full vesting 
exists only if there is entitlement to full preservation rights 
on change of employer. 
24/ Full transferability exists if an early leaver receives her/his 
own plus her/his employer's contributions and indexation (i. e. 
inf lation proofing) . 
25/ That isp when pension benefits are measured as a fraction of 
the last (number of) year's salary. 
26/ In the late 70's the membership in compulsory schemes was 80% 
for the private sector and nearly 100% for the public sector. 
For disincentives to early leavers see also Rose (1983). 
27/ I. e. that the propensity to save net personal disposable income 
may not differ from zero. See also Marglin,, (1975): that the 
'paradoxical' increase in the saving ratio in the 70's becomes 
even more paradoxical if the discretionary saving ratio (i. e. 
NPDI minus consumers expenditure divided by NPDI) is considered, 
in that the rate of increase in the latter case is even higher. 
See Pearce and Thomas, (1981): and that inflation effects on 
saving are sensitive to the definition of saving adopted; the 
impact on inflation on discretionary saving being much smaller 
than on personal sector saving (PSS)., See Cuthbertsonl(1983). 
28/ Munnell (1976) argued that induced retirement may result in non 
substitution. zabalza et. al. (1978) that non-substitution is 
a prerequisite for induced earlier retirement. 
29/ That is, correct employee perceptions constant employee total 
asset accumulation and full funding. I. e. the maintenance on 
the part of the company of a pension fund which assets equal 
the present actuarial value of its employees anticipated pension 
benefits. 
30/ Even so, this will only hold true unless the higher rate of 
return encourages more saving. See Threadgoldp(1978). 
31/ Feldstein (1978),, for example notes that U. S. household surveys 
have shown that individuals do not know the money value of their 
future pensions - albeit he considers emphasis on money values 
misplaced. 
32/ For many employees in this category Feldstein observes, 85% or 
even more of lost income is replaced by such benefits. See 
also, Murray, (1968). For the U. K. the situation is similar. 
See Zabalza et. al., (1978) . 
33/ Since they both serve the same purpose: i. e. business financing. 
34/ Given the multiplicity Of factors entering the analysis in the 
case of pension funds. See e. g. Rose (1983) and Feldstein (1978). 
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35/ See e. g. Davidson et. al. (1978), but also note 4. 
36/ See also Wood (1975) and note 6 of the 'General Overview'. 
37/ Aaronovitch (1961) quotes the Chairman of Unilevers to have said, 
I... we think it most important to have large funds of our own, 
because we cannot always be certain of being able to raise money 
on the market when opportunities present themselves'. (p. 159). The 
benefits of retained earnings are also referred to in Aaronovitch 
and Smith (1981) . 
38/ See note 14. 
39/ Which evidently increases their own potential for saving too: 
by increasing their total disposable income. 
40/ It should be stressed that the state did little to hinder the 
introduction and growth of the schemes. Ratherlby continuously 
providing a favourable tax environment, it might have facilitated 
this process. See also Green (1982). 
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CHAPTER 
Corporate Financial Capital Accumulation and 
the Realization of Profits* 
This Chapter relies on,, and extends ideas that first appeared in 
Pitelis (1983c). An earlier version of this paper was presented 
at the author's thesis proposal at Warwick, and at a Research 
Students Workshop,, at Warwick. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The process of the socialization of the 'ownership' of the means 
of production and thelcontrolling group'slability to influence via their 
decisions the aggregate level of financial capital accumulationt may not 
necessarily have a beneficial impact on the economy as a whole: or even 
the corporate sector itself ! 
In particular# we suggest# in this Chapter, it is conceivable 
that corporate decisions on retentions and pension funds, coupled with 
the observed inability and/or unwillingness of the non-controlling 
groups to achieve perfect substitutability, between corporate saving 
and their personal disposable saving# may tend to result in a situation 
where an increasingly lower proportion of private income is devoted to 
the purpose of consumption. Under certain conditions this may generate 
a tendency for a realization failure: i. e. a situation where potential 
corporate profits cannot be realized due to insufficient effective 
demand. 
In Section 1 we focus on savings and examine some relevant post- 
war historical statistics for the U. K. In Section 2 we propose a 
(version of a) theory of underconsumption based on the analysis-results 
of the previous Chapters, and relevant assumptions. This is compared 
with Baran and Sweezy's version of underconsumptionism. In Section 3 
finally, we examine two alternative interpretations of# and explanations 
to, the apparently 'irrational' behaviour of the corporate 'controlling 
group I. 
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1. SAVINGS: DEFINITIONS AND HISTORICAL'TRENDS 
Savings play the crucial role in our analysis. Viewed on the 
part of the household sectort we may distinguish ex-post between 
'contractual' savings and 'discretionary' savings. 
l/ 
The former are 
defined as savings that are not subject to the direct influence of the 
households and consist basically of corporate retentions.! 
/ 
and pension 
funds. The latter are the net personal savings of the households. 
The above three series are summarised in Table 11 as proportions 
of private income. The focus is the postwar U. K. A simple inspection 
of Table 1 reveals that all three series have been rising from the early 
50's up to the late 70's. In 1980-1981 there is a reversal of the trend 
in the case of the corporate retentions ratio, which is also the case 
for net personal savings in 1981. What is most important, howeverl is 
the picture emerging when the sum of the three series, i. e. private 
savings, is examined, as a proportion of private income: or alternatively, 
its respective consumption to private income ratio. 
As it turns out from Table lp the latter fell from an average of 
80.8% of private income in the 1961-1971 decadet to an average of 74.4% 
in the 1971-1980 period, and started rising again in 1980-1981 reflecting 
basically the dramatic fall in the retentions to income ratior in these 
two years. 
It is evident from Table lpthat despite the rising trend of the 
net personal savings ratio, the major part of private savings is 
accounted by 'contractual' (or corporate) savings. The rising tendency 
of all series on the other hand is in itself suggestive of the possibility 




Net Inflow in Consumer 








1951 2.65 85.6 -1.37 13.1 
2 2.82 85.8 0.20 11.2 
3 2.94 85.3 0.46 11.3 
4 3.08 85.2 -0.39 12.1 
5 3.07 83.8 0.01 13.1 
6 3.10 82.8 1.40 12.7 
7 3.32 83.2 0.82 12.7 
8 3.57 84.2 -0.03 12.2 
9 3.70 83.3 0.51 12.5 
1960 3.90 81.0 2.35 12.7 
1 3.91 80.4 3.75 12.0 
2 4. o3 81.6 2.56 11.8 
3 4.31 80.8 2.25 12.7 
4 4.31 80.0 2.70 13.0 
5 4. oo 78.9 3.65 13.4 
6 4.10 81.1 3.96 10.8 
7 4.36 82.0 3.11 10.5 
8 4.49 82.2 2.02 11.2 
9 4.16 81.1 2.70 12.0 
1970 4.30 79.6 3.64 12.5 
1 4.78 80.4 1.71 13.1 
2 5.83 78.2 2.76 13.2 
3 5.55 74.4 4.24 15.8 
4 5.11 72.3 4.96 17.1 
5 5.01 74.6 5.74 14.6 
6 5.48 73.6 4.45 16.4 
7 5.47 73.4 3.37 17.8 
8 5.85 72.6 4.83 16.7 
9 6.26 71.2 5.74 16.7 
1980 6.37 73.5 7.21 12.9 
1 6.54 75.8 5.22 12.4 
Source: National Income and Expenditure (Blue Book), 1982. 
Central Statistical Office. 
Estimations by the author. 
I 
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well in line with the direct empirical evidence reported in Chapters 
2 and 3. This suggests that increases in corporate saving are the 
major cause for the falling tendency of the consumption to income ratio. 
Regarding the latter, finally# the figures involved appear to be high 
enough to raise concern over the impact of such decreases (ceteris 
paribus) in effective demand, on the aggregate economy: which raises 
the possibility of a realization failure. 
CONTRACTUAL SAVINGS AND UNDERCONSUMPTION 
2.1 The Institutional Setting 
Throughout we will follow Kalecki (1971) and recent contributions 
by Cowling (1981),, Rowthorn (1981) and Sawyer (1982al 1983) and will 
assume a monopolistic economy operating well below its full capacity 
level. This may be taken to characterize most modern advanced capitalist 
countries: although for our purposes here, the empirical fact that such 
is the case for the U. K. j (see Cowlingl 1982), is sufficient. In this 
framework, firms will respond to changes in effective demand largely by 
varying the level of their productionj while prices will tend to be 
inflexible. 
In this systemp the Lerner/Kalecki 
marginal costs, will determine prices: 
p= e(m) mc, where 
'degree of monopoly' and 
mc = marginal cost, M is a vector of factors that determine the 'degree 
Of monopoly'l and 6 is the mark-up of price over marginal cost. In price- 
cost margins form the above equation givest 
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MC/P = em - i/em , 
meaning that the margin will depend on the factors entering M. In terms 
of the 'surplus' (S), i. e. profits plus overheads, the last equation gives, 
S/pq = 6M - 1/0m. 
Summing finally over lp..., N industries we can derive the weighted 
average degree of monopoly A, as ES/Epq = S*/T* : i. e. the ratio of 
gross capitalist income plus salaries (defined as overheads) to 
aggregate turnover. 
Given excess capacity, increases in saving 'propensities' that 
induce a fall in effective demand, will be followed by reductions in 
output and as a result capacity utilization and the rate of profit. This 
3 in turn, may depress investment! 
/ 
as firms are faced with lower profits 
and(due to)excess capacity. See Rowthorn, (1981). Increased 
'thriftiness' may also affect investment directly, by rendering slim the 
possibility of realization of potential profits, an issue taken up later. 
The assumptions just outlined and the empirical facts of U. K. 
excess capacity and rising proportions of income saved, basically in the 
form of 'contractual' savings, are sufficient to provide us with the 
building blocks of a (version of a) theory of underconsumption. This 
can be viewed as an extension-alternative to Baran and Sweezy's (1967) 
version. 
2.2 Underconsumptionin Baran and Sweezy 
Underconsumption has a very long history. Early contributions to 
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such a theory include thinkers such as Malthus? Sismondi and Hobson. 
Bleaney (1976) gives a comprehensive survey. A long controversy emerged 
with regard to whether Marx himself was (would be) an underconsumptionist 
or not (Sweezy, 1942t Bleaney, 1976), an issue we do not intend to examine 
though. The theory of underconsumption ha-s experienced a revival in the 
work of Sweezy (1942). Building on this work and further contributions 
by Steindl (1952), Baran and Sweezy (1967) have advanced in more recent 
years , what is arguably the most elaborate up-to-date version of under- 
consumptionism. 
The essence of their theory can, briefly, be given as follows. 
As capitalism advances, the 'controlling group' will attempt to cut 
marginal costs. This, assuming an inability on the part of the unions 
to overcome the power of monopolies, will result in wages lagging behind 
increases in productivity. Assuming the downwards stickiness of prices 
(the 'kinked' demand curve), a decline in marginal cost will increase 
profit margins; what Baran and Sweezy call the 'surplus'* see also 
Baran, (1962). The latter is both actual and potential. Actual surplus 
includes reported profits of firms plus rent and interest, plus all 
wasteful expenditure undertaken by firmst such as advertising and other 
selling expenses. Potential surplus is what could be produced under 
full capacity - full employment conditions. Monopolistic pricing and 
historically falling marginal costs will result in the 'rising tendency 
of the surplus'. Increasing profit marginst however, do not warrant 
the selling of the products produced - the realization of profits. The 
surplus can be consumed, invested or wasted. In face of increasing profitsp 
lags of adjustment of dividends to the (otherwise constant) pay-out ratio, 
will result in a higher proportion of profits being retained, and a lower 
proportion being distributed. Thus, consumption will tend to be an 
increasingly lower proportion of the surplus. 
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Investment, too, will tend to be an increasingly lower proportion 
of the surplus. Risk averse monopolists will tend to suppress inventions, 
since it pays them to keep old plants as long as they are still profitable. 
The only way, therefore, for the surplus to be absorbed is wasteful 
expenditure by the firms (advertising and other selling expenses) and 
the government (particularly armaments expenditures). Both,, Baran and 
Sweezy observed, had increased dramatically in the post war U. S. economy. 
In the absence of such counteracting forces, capitalism would have been 
led to a profound depression. 
Baran and Sweezy's analysis is, we think, an important contribution 
to the understanding of the workings of advanced capitalist economies. 
However, it lacks generality in some respects: it may also be questioned 
in some others too. Their treatment of retentions, for example, is 
incomplete. The aggregate retention to income ratio can increase, even 
in the absence of lags of adjustment of dividends, as shareholding is 
further diluted: since the tendency of the socialization of the 
'ownership' of the means of production to increase, brings a higher 
proportion of private income under the control of the 'controlling group'. 
This is further facilitated by the introduction and growth of the 
corporate pension funds schemes: an issue not considered by Baran and 
Sweezy. Their argument regarding innovations and investment is not 
generally accepted either 
4/ 
, and no emphasis is given to the potential 
links between consumption and investment. 
The above problems refer to the absorbsion of the surplus. Its 
generation, howeverr can be questioned too. In terms# for example, of 
the degree of monopoly the rising tendency of the surplus can only be 
true if the reduction in marginal costs is accompanied by accommodating 
shifts in the determinants of the degree of monopoly: i. e. a fall in 
101. 
the elasticity of demand, and/or a rise in the degree of collusion, and/ 
or a rise in the level of concentration. See Cowling (1982). That such 
accommodating shifts did occur in the period under consideration, needs 
to be demonstrated empirically. 
With no conclusive answer to these questions the rising tendency 
of the surplus remains a possibility to be demonstrated; Baran and Sweezy's 
evidence on this regard, however, appears to be very sensitive to their 
ad-hoc assumptions (see e. g. Bleaney, 1976, and Mandel, 1967a, for 
discussion along these lines). 
2.3 An Alternative Version 
The rising tendency of the surplus is not necessary for an under- 
consumptionist tendency to operate in advanced capitalist societies. 
Corporate policies on retentions and pension funds coupled with less than 
perfect substitution between corporate and net personal saving, may lead 
to the same result. To illustrate this proposition we make use of the 
idea of the profits curve (PC) and the realization curve (RC) exposited 
in Rowthorn (1981) . 
The profits curve is shown in Figure 1. It shows the amount of 
net profits created at any level of capacity utilization, by using 
existing methods of production and with real wages at their current level. 
The profits curve has a positive slope of M/k below full capacity, where 
k is the capital-output ratio. It is vertical at the full capacity 
level. It defines a relationship between 7 and u. where 7r is the profit 
rate (profit to fixed capital stock ratio), and u is an index of capacity 
utilization (the actual to potential output ratio). Given our assumptions 
only the sloping part of the curve is of consequence here. 
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The realization curve (RC) shows the net rate of profits exactly 
realized at any given level of u. without either excess demand or excess 
supply. The realization curve establishes a linear relationship between 
7T and u. Its slope is positive if u has a positive impact on invest- 
menJ/ and the aggregate propensity to save (only out of profits in 
Rowthorn) is greater than the propensity to invest. 
i/ 
This case is 
shown in Figure 
The economy always lies on the profit curve: as the latter simply 
indicates the relation between cost and output at any given level of u. 
For 'equilibrium' to be attained, however, the economy must also lie on 
the realization curve. 'Equilibrium' will be stable if displacements 
along the profit curve generate forces that pull the economy back to its 
original position. For this to happen, savings must be more sensitive 
than investment to such displacements. A high propensity to save gives 
rise to a realization curve with positive slope but less steep than the 
profits curve. 
7/ 
The slope and position of the profits curve is 
determined by the cost structure of the firms, while saving and invest- 
ment behaviour determine the slope and position of the realization curve. 
Increases in investment? consumption and government expenditure will shift 
the realization curve upwards, and vice versa. Increases in M, lower 
taxes,, slower depreciation and reductions in the amount of fixed capital 
or overhead labour required to produce a given level of output, will shift 
the profits curve upwards, and vice versa. 
Given the abovel and approximating the 'surplus' with the profits 
curve,, the underconsumptionist tendency in Baran and Sweezy is shown in 
Figure 3. See Rowthorn, (1981). Our alternative version is shown in 
Figure 4. It can be seen that our version does not require a rising 















due to rising 'surplus'p with 
constant realization curve. 
FIGURE 4 
Underconsumptionist tendency due 
to 'excessive savings' with 
constant 'surplus'. 
from the original 'equilibrium' level a# a fall in the realization curve 
resulting from increased saving, will lead to b: i. e. a lower level of 
7T and u. 
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It follows from the above that the alternative version we 
propose here meets the critique regarding the generation of the 'surplus'. 
A rising 'surplus' can render the deflationary tendency stronger but it 
is not essential for the argument. 
Given our suggested source of the problem, policy measures should 
obviously be directed towards a reduction of corporate savings. The 
observed dramatic fall in the private saving to private income ratio in 
1980-1981, might, in the light of our analysis, be a sign of an in- 
coming upturn. This however, may be thwarted by adverse policies, such 
as the recent proposal by the U. K. Conservative government to increase 
workers contributions to pension funds. 
The last observation addresses the more general issue of the off- 
setting factors which might potentially counteract an underconsumptionist 
tendency. In our case examined here# the fact that the deflationary 
tendency has been observed already and been given a 'post festum' 
explanation, would suggest that if any role is to be attributed to 
offsetting factors, this should be in terms of attempting to explain why 
they did not succeed in preventing the underconsumptionist tendency. 
Evident explanations along these lines may be the non identification of 
the source of the problem, e. g. by the state authorities and/or the 
latter's inability and/or unwillingness to solve it, e. g. for fear of 
enhancing the power of the working classes: a possibility originally 
emphasized by Kalecki (1971). It could be also suggested that in the 
absence of offsetting factors, the underconsumptionist tendency would 
be stronger. 
Factors that are usually considered to have a countervailing 
9/ 
impact on realization failure problems are: advertising-0 technological 
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10/ 11/ change j exports and state expenditures- Detailed analysis of 
the role of such factors abound in the relevant literature, see e. g. 
Baran and Sweezy,, (1967)p Rowthornp (1981), and Cowling,, (1982)p and it 
will not be repeated here. Suffice it to note that all the above 
factors rarely operate in a mono-causal, straightforward manner: 
12/ 
an 
observation which, assuming the correctness of our suggestionsp is high- 
lighted by their ex-post observed 'failure'. 
To summarize, the only crucial requirement upon which our analysis 
hinges is: an increase in contractual savings that lowers the consumption 
to private income ratio due to lack of perfect substitution between 
contractual and discretionary savings. This requirement,, as we saw in 
Section 1 of this Chapter and in Chapter 2, was satisfied in the post war 
U. K. history,, thus accounting,, partly at least, for the recent recessionp 
ceteris paribus. 
Our alternative version is obviously, of further value, if a link 
exists between consumption and investment: either direct or indirect 
through capacity utilisation and the rate of profits. With regard to 
.0 
that, although the direct link idea has been critisized for its naivete, 
see e. g. Sherman, (1979) and Devineo, (1983),, to assume an indirect link 
appears plausible: as many versions of the Investment Function today 
include the profit rate and/or capacity utilization as explanatory 
variables. See Sherman (1979)t Rowthornt (1981), Cowling# (1982) and 
Sawyer, (1982). It should be stressed though, that even if a link does 
not exist between consumption and investmentl this will not adversely 
affect our analysis. This would only be the case if consumption and 
investment were inversely related below the full capacity level: a 
rather implausible hypothesis. See also Rowthorn,, (1981). 
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It should be clear that our analysis does not intend to 
invalidate Baran and Sweezy's theory; rather it can be seen as 
complementary to it in the sense that it identifies a different route by 
which an underconsumptionist tendency could operate. Moreover both 
versions could operate simultaneously if, say, profit margins increase 
in depression, i. e. the 'surplus' increases, as a result of increases in 
the degree of collusion between firms; (see e. g. Cowling, 1983). The 
real difference instead is to be found in the scope of the two versions. 
It is an advantage of the previous analysis that under the 
assumption-empirical factl(see note 6), of excess capacity, it has 
probably been in operation in the time and place under examination: but 
we require from it no more than that. Neither we intend to present this 
version as a theory of crisis, nor as a causal mechanism which leads to a 
crisis. It could be that a realization failure of the type described 
above is just one of the potential mechanisms by which a crisis manifests 
itselfj along with other mechanisms such as the Rising Organic Composition 
of Capital and/or the Rising Militancy of Labourl see e. g. Weisskopf, 
(1-079), Glyn and Sutcliffe,, (1972)p and Botty and Crotty,, (1975). 
Alternatively,, realization problems could be linked to other problems such 
as falling profit rates as described e. g. in Wolff (1978). Unless all 
these features can be taken into account no pretence, we think# for the 
theory of crisis may (should) be made. We hope to have contributed 
towards the identification of one of the missing links. 
As we do not regard our version of underconsumptionism as an 
alternative theory, but rather as a specific alternative version to Baran 
and Sweezy's, we make no attempt here to examine the similarities and 
differences of our approach to alternative underconsumption theories. The 
interested reader is addressed to comprehensive surveys such as in Wright, 
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(1977)p and Shaikh, (1978). 
IRRATIONALITYp ANARCHY,, ANDVEO--ýIMPERIALISM 
The question asked in this Section is what can explain the 
corporate controlling group's policies on retentions and pension funds on 
the face of prolonged recession. In particular# can collective 
'irrationality' explain capitalist behaviour ?, 
An important aspect in Marx's theory of crisis is the 'anarchy' 
of the capitalist mode of production,, anarchy meaning not 
'incoherence, but that what is rational for the individual 
may be irrational for the system as a whole' (Eatwell, 1979, 
p. 37). 
In the framework of the analysis in the previous Sectionse the notion 
of 'anarchy' acquires a very specific meaning. Namely, increased 
internal finance through retentions ande to a lesser extent for the 
individual firm, through pension funds, is beneficial for the individual 
capitalist. See also Chapter 2. For capitalists as a whole, however? 
the induced deflationary tendencies may have a deleterious impact. 
Causality in this reasoning runs from capitalist behaviour at home, to 
domestic realization failure. 
An alternative, is to attempt to explain realization failures in 
the domestic economyr in terms of the international role of capital. In 
this argument international capital pursues a policy of global cost 
minimization viewing the whole world as the stage of its operations. 
Investment is undertaken where and when it is more profitable# with 
primary considerations being a lower cost of production achieved through 
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the choice of places characterised with a lower wage rate and/or 
material costs: but perhaps more importantly,, the achievement of a 
reduction in the militancy of labour and thus an increase in the share 
of profits at a global level. see, e. g. Cowlingr (1984). This largely 
conscious strategy of transnational capital results in deindustrializing 
parts of the formerly highly industrialized world, Britain being but one 
manifestation of these tendencies. 
In a sense the above argument is the exact opposite of the 'anarchy' 
idea: in that it can provide an explanation for underconsumption on the 
domestic level, in terms of neo-imperialist policies pursued from the 
internationally oriented capital, at the global level. Transnational 
capitali, that isp needs to finance, somehow# its worldwide operations. 
The obvious way to do that is by socializing the 'ownership' of the means 
of production through diluted shareholding and compulsory pension funds 
schemes. The thus raised capital can then be used for capital's own 
purposes, with its associated damaging effects on the home economy and 
needless to say, the very people who provided the capital for expansion: 
wage earners and small scale shareholders. 
13/ 
The formerly industrialized 
countries, such as Britain in our example, are the obvious candidates for 
the raising of finance: as two decades of continuous expansion and growth 
have ensured its existence. 
One potential problem in the neo-imperialism argument is that it 
concentrates exclusively on differences between international capitalp on 
the one handF and labour, on the other# thus failing to examine potential 
intercapitalist differences. A variation of the above argument, however, 
that emphasises such differences results in basically similar conclusions. 
Minns (1981t 1981a, 1982) is a prominent representative of this 
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line of thought. In a number of articles, Minns has advanced the 
argument that the concept of 'finance' capital, intended to denote a 
fusion between industrial and financial capital, is for the case of the 
U. K. unproven empirically to say the least: it is not theoretically 
indispensable either. Proponents of the fusion idea for the U. K. j see 
e. g. Aaronovitchr (1961), Thomsonj (1977), and Mandels (1978)p base 
their belief on 'finance' capital, on the idea that financial or banking 
capital cannot in any real sense of the term, be independent of industrial 
capital; as it relies on the latter, for the production of surplus value 
of which a part it shares. This viewp however, disregards according to 
Minns the possibility that the whole of financial capital in a country 
may be independent from the industrial capital of its own countryl as it 
can rely on profits generated outside its nation base. For the U. K. 
in particular, the idea that financial capital dominates over industrial 
capital, is both conceivable and has some evidence to back it up. The 
international orientation of the City of London, Minns suggests, has 
resulted in the financial institutions taking a short run view of 
investment, see also coakley and Harris, (10-82), that explains the failure 
of British industrial capital to compete internationally, and the 
relatively poorer performance of the U. K. as a whole during the recent 
recession. The use and control of other people's money, on the part of 
the City eventually results in those people being unemployed. 
Although Minns' arguments appear convincing# there is an important 
question we think that is difficult to answer in the framework of his 
reasoning: why other people's money# in particular pension funds money, 
have been handed to the financial institutions in the first case ? 
Pension funds money are ori2inally generated in the firms. It is up to 
the latter to pass them over to the financial institutions or choose to 
manage them themselves. Minns'(1981) data suggest that in the U. K. 
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only one third of the pension funds assets were managed internally by 
the financial institutions. According to Minns cost considerations is 
not the reason for that: as the cost differences between external or 
in-house management appears negligible. Rather, control considerations 
appear to have been the prime motive for the choice to manage in-house. 
See Minns (1981, p. 32). But given that, one may find it difficult to 
explain why in-house management was not chosen by all firms: especially 
when control of the funds investment was at stake. 
Minns' arguments are important in that they put in perspective the 
very important issue of intercapitalist differences. His arguments however 
detract little from the implications of the neo-imperialism arguments: 
in that,, quite independently of conflicts between fractions of capital 
the end result is the same. That is,, deflationary tendencies at the 
domestic level. 
The other important aspect of Minns' argument is that it indicates 
that one cannot disregard the international nature of the capitalist 
system without a cost. In particularp as he recognizes, carrying his 
arguments to their logical endso it is possible to suggest that one 
particular, or even many, state(s) can withdraw into being Irentier' 
capitalists and rely on foreign workers for the production of surplus 
value. This would questicnwidely held beliefs on the working of the 
capitalist economy,, often based on an analysis at the level of the 
nation state. 
It is not easy to conjecture on the end result of the above 
tendencies. The possibility of a tendency to a global stagnation, 
as flexible capital tends to reduce the wage share at the global level, 
see Cowling (1984)f could be an interesting working hypothesis. However, 
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it is not an easy one to substantiate. 
The conclusion of the above discussion is that, given the inter- 
national nature of modern capitalism, neo-imperialism may provide a 
better explanation as to the underconsumptionist tendencies of formerly 
industrialized countries, than either 'irrationality' and/or the 'anarchy' 
of the capitalist system. Crucial in the above argument is that it 
inverses the conventional wisdom that causality runs from underconsumption 
to imperialism to its exact opposite. This, however, should not be taken 
to imply that the conventional wisdom is necessarily incorrect and/or 
that both views may not be operative in different circumstances: an 
issue,, howevert beyond the scope of this thesis. 
SUMMARY 
In this Chapter we considered the possibility that the corporate 
fcontrolling group's'policies on retentions and pension funds may result 
in a situation where potential corporate profits cannot be realized. 
The post war U. K. experience was found not to contradict this inter- 
pretation. Two alternative explanations were advanced to account for 
the apparently 'irrational' behaviour of the corporate controlling group. 
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NOTES 
As regards, in particular, retentionsp the decision to acquire 
shares, is in an. ex-ante sense voluntary. Ex-post, however, 
(part of) retentions represent contractual saving. See also 
Chapter 2. 
2/ Retained earnings are measured after profits due abroad have 
been subtracted: i. e. they represent profit retentions 'owned' 
by domestic shareholders. 
3/ This presupposes that increased savings do not reduce interest 
rates which in turn increase investment, or alternatively that if 
such a mechanism operates# it has a less strong effect than the 
one we described. This assumption, we think is plausible: as 
all existing empirical evidence, see Sawyer (1982) for survey, 
supports the idea that demand factors are most important in 
explaining investment; and given that the relation between saving 
and the interest rate is dubious. See Part II for discussion and 
evidence. 
4/ The original proponent of the argument that innovations and 
investment are independentp was Steindl (1952): a view that 
Kalecki (1971), for example# never shared. More recently 
Steindl (1979) too abandoned this idea. 
5/ Cowling (1982) surveys evidence that supports the existence of a 
lagged response between capacity utilization and investment. 
This assumption is supported by the fact that between 1968 and 
1978 fixed capital formation in the U. K. was less than undistributed 
profits for nearly every year. See Pearce and Thomas (1981). 
7/ Rowthorn (1981) analyzes the formal conditions under which this 
will be true. 
Indeed the profits curve could be falling and still an under- 
consumptionist tendency could exist, provided that the fall in 
the realization curve more than outweighs the fall in the profits 
curve. 
9/ Assumed to increase aggregate consumption either directly or via 
its effects on the propensity to consume. The evidence on the 
former effect is rather inconclusiver see e. g. Jacobson and 
Nicosial (1981), for a survey, while on the latter the little 
evidence available supports such an effect. See SturgesBand 
Wilson (1983) for a survey. Advertising expenditure may also 
increase effective demand directly: as it can be viewed as a 
form of investment. See Rothschild (1942). 
10/ Technological change may increase investment. See e. g. Kaldor 
and Mirrlees (1962). Stoneman (1984) has a survey of the 
existing evidence,? which appears to be consistent with this view. 
ii/ See e. g. Bleaney (1976). 
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12/ Advertising, for example, may redistribute income to profits# 
see Pitelis,, (1982) and therefore reduce consumption if the 
'propensity' to save profit income is higher than that of wage 
income. A similar effect may operate in the case of technological 
change. See Stoneman (1984) . 
13/ In that even if pension funds invested abroad result in a higher 
rate of return on investment, the ultimate'beneficiaries' are left 
unemployed at home. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Corporate Saving and the Macroeconomic Distribution 
of Income : The Saving Function Revisited* 
Some of the ideas expounded in this Chapter can be traced to 
Pitelis (1982a): a paper presented at an Industrial Economics 
Workshop at Warwick. An earlier version of its present form 




The socialization of the 'ownership' of the means of production 
and the retention policies of the joint stock companies have had a 
dramatic influence on strongly held beliefs with regard to the issue of 
saving: e question who abstains from consumption so that financial 
capital accumulation takes place. This influence has revived interest 
in what the appropriate form of the saving function should be under 
conditions of advanced capitalism. Without having recognized it, four 
schools of thought have actually converged to (variations of) the same 
saving function. This 'Managerialist Saving Function' (MSF) posits 
differential propensities to save between households on the one hand and 
corporations on the other# and is consistent with neo-post Keynesian, 
managerialist and radical theorising. 
In this Chapter we revisit this issue in the light of the analysis 
of the previous Chapters. In Section 1 we examine the historical process 
by which the convergence towards the MSF has been achieved, and the 
implications of the MSF for the neoclassical concern with the substitutab- 
ility of saving. 
In Section 2 we extend the MSF towards the incorporation of the 
Pension Funds Revolution. The extended MSF suggests that the corpora- 
tions' 'controlling group', saves for small scale shareholders and wage 
earners in the form of corporate retentions and pension funds. Households 
may also save via their personal incomes: disposable profit and disposable 
wage income. If the household propensity to save is zero, as suggested 
in the previous Chapter# in equilibrium saving will be only corporate 
saving: retentions and pension funds. Only disequilibrium household 
saving will exist. Imputing corporate retentions to profit income and 
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pension funds to wage income, may be a close approximation to obtaining 
the aggregate proportion of the income of each group, saved. Emphasis 
however, on 'propensities' appears misplaced: obtained proportions j 
rather# reflect thelcontrolling group'ssaving on behalf of each group, 
and each group's disequilibrium, saving. The result, we suggest, may 
better be described under the heading 'Monopoly Capitalism Saving Function' 
(MCSF),, to highlight the fact that the proposed function reflects the 
tendency towards the socialization of the 'ownership' of the means of 
production, associated with the monopolistic stage of capitalism. 
In Section 3 we examine the existing evidence on differential 
propensities to save in the light of the above. The limitations of 
the reliance on personal sector propensities only are also noted. 
1. THE SAVING FUNCTION 
1.1 The Intellectual Roots 
The idea that different types of income - classes of income 
recipients will have different patterns of consumption-saving behaviour, 
has assumed prominence among economic theorists throughout the years. 
This idea was reflected in the theory of the saving function. 




where S denotes savings, Ho profits and s,, is the propensity to save 
out of profits. In this 
form the 'Classical Saving Function' (CSF) 
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implies that all saving is made out of profits. It is particularly 
associated with 
, 11 Ricardo- and Marx. In Marx (1954) the driving force 
of capitalists is competition. See previous Chapter. For Ricardo 
the underlying force is the striving for power. See Lambrinides (1972) 
for a detailed exposition. Subsistence requirements ensure zero saving 
on the part of workers for both Ricardo and Marx. 
The advancement of capitalism with its entailed improvement in 
the absolute standards of living of both capitalists and workers has 
resulted in workers saving too. This empirical observation gave rise to 
the neo-Keynesian Saving Function (NKSF) according to which both capitalists 
and workers saver but the propensity to save of the former is higher than 
that of the latter. 








where W stands for Wage income and sw 
(2) 
denotes the propensity to save 
wage income. In Kaldor's writings, the higher propensity to save profits 
is justified in terms of the riskier character of profits-1/t and a 
presumed skewness of profit income in favour of the relatively wealthier-high 
income earning households. See Hacche (1979). Quite independently of 
the latter, however, Kaldor (1960) observed, corporate retention in 
itself is sufficient to justify the differential saving propensities 
assumption. This observation anticipated the MSF. 







w is profits accruing to workers and 
IT 
c, capitalist profits: 
sI now, denotes the propensity to save of the workers and sC, the 
propensity to save of the capitalists. That ist contrary to Kaldor's 
version that is based on differential propensities out of different 
types of income, Pasinettils version is based on differential propensities 
between income receivers. The observation that profit may also be 
earned by workers was proposed by Pasinettil as a 'correction' of Kaldor's 
form of the NKSF. The correction, howeverr becomes redundant, if due to 
retention ana risk workers profits are savea in the same proportion as 
capitalist profits. See Hacche (1979). 
In the neoclassical traditionj e. g. of Fisher (1965), savings are 
taken to be determined by the independent decisions of all households each 
making a deliberate and conscious allocation of current income - wealth 
between present and future consumption. In view of that all the CSF and 
the NKSF, but also the 'proportional saving function' (PSF) of the form: 
S= sy 
0< S <1 (4) 
derived from (2) by assuming sw=s 7T F 
have been dismissed by many neo- 
classicals: as they imply that a fixed part of income is saved. See e. g. 
Bliss# (1976),, and Dixitt (1976). 
4/ 
In (4) Y denotes total income 
and s the propensity to save Y. 
A second critique to the NYSF on the part of the neoclassicals 
arose from the presumption that implicit in the NKSF is the notion of 
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'permanent classes'. See Kregel, (1971). These criticisms have 
generated what we will call a concern for relevance: i. e. an attempt on 
the part of neo-Keynesians to provide a strong justification for the NKSF 
based on the realization of the increasing importance of the corporate 
sector for the issue of saving. 
1.2 The Concern for Relevance 
The best manifestation of this concern is Kaldor (1966). In this 
paper Kaldor repeats his earlier point on the role bf-business ret6ntion : 
but elevates it from a footnote to the cornerstone of his analysis. 
In an oft quoted statement# Kaldor suggested that he has 
'always regarded the high saving propensity out of profits 
as something which attaches to the nature of business 
income, and not to the wealth (or other peculiarities) of 
the individuals who own property. ... the high savings 
propensity attaches to profits as such, not to capitalists 
as such. ' (p. 310). j/. 
The justification of this view is given by Kaldor, in terms of the fact 
that unlike the 19th century tycoon who owned, and saved in, his firmp 
today's corporations are owned by rentier-capitalists (shareholders) whose 
propensity to save out of their personal income need bear little relation 
to that of the enterprises they own. To the extent shareholders consume 
all their dividends and/or their capital and capital gains, this helps to 
enhance 'the difference in savings propensities between business income 
and personal income'. (ibid. p. 311). 
Despite the fact that Kaldor still presents the above views as a 
justification for (2) his ideas effectively suggest a new form of the 
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where r is the retention ratio and s h- 
is the common propensity to save 
out of household income. In (5) the differential propensity between 
households on the one hand, and corporations# on the other, is introduced 
for the first time. 
In his more recent writings, Pasinetti (1983) also acknowledges 
the importance 
'of hypothesizing a world of corporate business and 
exploring the implications of the contrasting decisions 
of corporations and the public at large'. (p. 100) 
He observes that since Kaldor was thinking along these lines from the 
very beginning,? his analysis should have been explicitly framed in these 
terms and refers to Wood (1975), for a contribution along these lines. 
Wood's, howeverp belongs to just one of four parallel developments that 
have actually converged on (variations of) equation (5): neo-post 
Keynesians, managerialists and radicals. 
1.3 Convergence 
In the post Keynesian traditiont Wood (1975) and Kregel (1971) 
are the two basic representatives. Kregells basic aim was to demonstrate 
that the crucial aspect of neo-Keynesian writings on growth was not the 
way they defined thriftinessp but rather the idea that the investment and 
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saving decisions are independent from each other. To do that, Kregel 
employs the notion of a 'mythical property owning democracy'. (p. 195)t 
in which there are 'no wages class and profits class in the sense that 
every household draws income from both sources' (p. 180). This 
'democracy' further 'is divided into firms and households' (p. 181), and 
employs 'managers' to run the corporations, who 'are automata who have no 
life function except as corporate decision makers'. (p. 213). 
In such a worldt Kregel suggestst a differential propensities 
saving function can still be obtained without the need to assume 'permanent 
classes'. This function can take the form of equation (5). 
Wood (1975) shares the view too. Notable is that Wood proposes 
the original Kaldorian version (2) and the neo-Kaldorian version (5), as 
alternative forms of the saving function, in direct contrast to Kaldor 
who used (5) as a justification for (2). 
The managerialist and radical - in particular Marglin's - ideas 
on the saving function are contained in our analysis in Chapter 21 and 
we will not repeat them here. Suffice it to note that they are 
consistent with (5). The one notable modification-extension to the 
latter, is introduced by the Galbraith-Marglin idea of zero equilibrium 
household saving. Formally# this implies that we can write s0 in h 
(5),, and obtain: 
rIT 
O<r<1, (6) 
implying that in equilibrium all savingsare retained profits. Kregel 
too entertained such a possibility. 
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In the radical tradition* another variation of (5) is proposed 
by Cowling (1982) . Cowling considers the thrust of the Marglinian 
arguments convincing but observes that 
'it would seem to be flying in the face of empirical evidence 
to suggest that the equilibrium propensity to save out of 
property income will be the same as out of wage income. ' 
(p. 50-) . 
In this view (5); is modified to read: 
swW+s 
Tr 
((l-r)H) + rH 
(7) 
IT 
Evidently (7) reduces to (5) if sw=s 
7T 
and to (6), if sw=s 
7T 
=sh=0. 
The above, we think, highlight the remarkable convergence of neo- 
Keynesian, post-Keynesian, managerialist and radical ideas on this issue. 
The tendency towards this direction received early notice from Lambrinides 
(1973). He suggested that Kaldor's (1966) ideas should not be taken 
as a justification for his original version of the NKSF (2): rather, 
the latter should be replaced by 
'the managerial saving functiont which considers private 
savings to be a function inter alia, of the division of 
after tax private incomep between households, and privately 
owned corporations'* (p. 47); 
a view consistent with Pasinetti (1983) and Wood (1975). 
However,, the convergence in form, masks an important difference 
in perspective. What for Kregel is simply a mythical notion# or a 
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device to oppose the 'permanent classes' critique, for managerialists 
and Marglinp is the description of the real world. See chapter 2. 
Another difference arises from the implications of the MSF with regard 
to the issue of substitutability. 
1.4 Substitutability 
In its form (5)t the MSF has a most interesting implication: it 
posits independence between corporate saving (rH) on the one hand, and 
household saving, on the other. Alternatively it implies that house- 
holds do not wanto or are not able, to compensate for changes in corporate 
policies by appropriately manipulating their personal saving. -t/ 
The above becomes evident when one considers the alternative to 
the MSF: i. e. the neoclassical idea of perfect substitution. If house- 
holds are able to 'pierce the corporate veil' and behave accordinglyp 
then the ex-post observed existence of differential propensities, masks 
the fact that such differences simply reflect the ex-ante decision of 
households# as to the preferred# on their part, form of their savings. 
In this argument the Kaldorian. observation that the higher is consumption 
out of personal income# the higher is the differential propensity to save 
household and corporate income respectively, is just an illusion: which 
is based on the ex-post accounting identity that total saving equals 
corporate saving plus personal saving. It does not take us any further 
either. In principle the existence of ex-ante substitution can be 
tested empirically: e. g. by attaching a coefficient to the corporate 
retentions variable and testing whether it differs significantly from 
the one of household income. See e. g. Modigliani (1970). If it does 
not then substitution is perfect and reality is closer to the proportional 
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saving function: households view all private income as their income 
and base their intertemporal utility maximization plans on this homogenous 
aggregate. See also Chapter 2 and Part II. 
The issue of substitution marks a second division between the 
proponents of the MSF. Kaldor paid little attention to its importance: 
while Marris (1967) and particularly Marglin (1975,1975a) attempted 
explicitly to justify their views of imperfect substitution the former, 
and independence the latter. The debate and our views on this matter 
were examined in Chapter 2. 
The conclusion must be that any reliance on differential propensities 
to save out of household and corporate income that assumes away the issue 
of substitution may be subject to grave doubt. In particular, with 
perfect substitution all (versions of) the MSF break down and the PSF is 
correct. 
The only attempt to compare and contrast the MSF and the neo- 
classical implication of perfect substitution, is Lambrinides (1972), 
referred to in the second Chapter. Set out explicitly in the frame- 
work at the Life Cycle Hypothesis Lambrinides found in no case statistically 
equal coefficients between corporate retentions and household incomep by 
use of internatioral cross section and U. S. time series data: which 
contradicts the neoclassical views. 
Important, however, is that despite their different concerns# all 
studies on the effects of corporate retentions on personal savings# 
surveyed in Chapter 21 effectively constitute tests of the MSF versus 
its neoclassical alternative. As we saw in nearly all cases the latter's 
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implications were not accepted: giving support to the MSF. Further# 
they all give indirect support to the Kaldorian version of the NKSF: 
equation (2)p since by restricting personal wage and profit income to 
i. 
be equal and by obtaining a differential impact for the part of profits 
retained# they imply a higher propensity to save aggregate profits than 
aggregate wage income. -! 
/ 
None of the above studies found support for the zero propensity to 
save personal income suggested in the second Chapter. A reason for 
that, as well as the reason why the MSF is insufficient today,, is 




THE 'PENSION FUNDS REVOLUTION' AND THE MANAGERIALIST SAVING 
FUNCTION 
An Extension 
The thesis of the 'pension funds revolution' (PFR)O, was originally 
suggested as the workers counterrevolution to managers' revolution. Via 
their pension funds shareholding, it is argued, workers rather than 
managers today own and control the means of production. See Chapter 2. 
The introduction of the corporate pension funds schemes has this 
important implication for the saving function: as in the case of 
retentions, the net inflow into the funds is,, strictly- speaking, unavailable 
for consumption. Further, it represents a net addition to corporate 
sector's savings. 
To demonstrate the above# assume a corporate sectort consisting of 
companies and financial institutions. 
1/t 
and a household sector, 
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consisting of wage income earners and profit income earners. Private 
income is equal to corporate income plus household income, and it is 
all ultimately 'owned' by the household sector. Thus private income can 
also be written as the sum of total wage income, W, and total profit 
income# IT. 
Out of the total income W# they own, workers receive only a part 
(1-p)W,, and save a part of it sw. The remaining pW is retained by 
the corporate sector in the form of the net inflow into the pension funds. 
Similarly# profit income earners receive a part (1-r)]T of profits# and 
save a proportion s, 7T out of 
itj while r1T is left in the corporate 
sector in the form of corporate retentions. 
In the light of the above, we can write the wage earners saving 
function as: 
s (1-P) +W 
s 
(8) 
where p denotes the net inflow into the pension funds ratio. Similarly, 





where r denotes the retention ratio. From (8) and (9) , the house- 




The corporate saving functionp on the other hand, will be: 
s pW + rll B 
> 
0<pr<1 (11) 
where SB denotes business saving. Adding (8) to (9) or (10) to (11), 
we can obtain the aggregate saving function: 
S=sw (1-P) W+s 
it 
(1-r) 11 + pW + rlT 
sw l< s 7T 
In the case ss 01 as argued in Chapter 2, the aggregate w IT 
saving function reduces to the corporate saving function, implying 
that all saving is corporate saving. 
Writing sw=s 7T =Sh' 
the MSF,, that is: 
(12) 
we can write (12) in a form similar to 
Ssh( (1-p) W+ (1-r) IT + pW + rR 
0sh<pr< 
the difference from (5) being that wage earners are allowed to save only 
out of their disposable income (1-p)Wt while pW represents a net 
addition to saving, as rll . 
128. 
The extended form of the MSF* (13) suffers from the sa problem 
as (5): it is always true only in an ex-post accounting sense. 
However,, if perfect substitutability exists between pension funds and 
wage earners personal saving on the one hand, and corporate retention 
and shareholders personal savings# on the other; (13) is invalid and 
the PSF obtains again. 
Although,? there is no direct evidence on (13) the studies on 
the impact of pension funds on other personal saving, examined in the 
previous Chapter, acquire importance here. As these studies find 
support for a differential propensity to save household income on the 
one hand. and pension funds on the othert they provide indirect support 
for (13): this is strengthened when the evidence on retentions is 
also considered. Direct evidence we have in Chapters 5 and 6. These 
too, support the above propositions. 
2.2 Aggregate 'Pr22enpities' to Save 
An important implication of the Pension Funds Revolution and 
the extended MSFI (13), is that the latter is no longer in itself 
sufficient to justify Kaldor's contention for a higher propensity to 
save profit income: since for a sufficiently high p, the aggregate 
proportion of wage income saved may be equal to, or higher than the 
aggregate proportion of profit income saved. The only way to test if 
a differential proportion of each group's income is savedt is by 
appropriately imputing pension funds and corporate retentions to wage 
and profit income. If a differential 'propensity' is found, this 
should be then explained in terms other than the retention policies 
of the firms. 
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Most important is perhaps the fact that the thus obtained 
proportions of income saved cannoto by any stretch of imagination, be 
named propensities. Rather, they represent the respective sums of 
each group's propensity to saver plus the proportion of their income 
that the 'controlling group' of the corporate sector saves for them. 
Alternatively,, if the equilibrium propensity to save disposab-le 
shares is zerop obtained proportions reflect the sum of each group's 
disequilibrium saving plus what the corporate controlling group saves 
for them. The term propensities is misleading to say the least. 
10/ 
Two more issues are worth stressing. The first regards 
terminology. According to the analysis of Chaptersl and 2, the 
extended MSF simply reflects the extension of the socialization of the 
'ownership' of the means of production to include wage earners too. 
This extension, and for this matter the very introduction of share 
ownership via the joint stock company, are specifically associated with 
the monopolistic stage of advanced capitalism. In this sense, we 
suggest,, the extended MSF may better be described under the heading 
'Monopoly Capitalism Saving Function' (MCSF). 
The second issue regards the idea that the net inflow into 
pension funds can be considered as distinct oft and a net addition to, 
corporate retentions. The alternative is to suggest that if (or 
since)the net inflow to pension funds is used for the purchase of 
shares, pension funds cannot be separately identified but they 
represent in each period part of dividends income accruing to house- 
holds and part of retentions left in the firms. In other words, 
(1-r)IT in (5) includes the part of the pension funds income paid-out 
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while rJI includes the part of pension funds income retained in the 
corporate sector. 
Although there is a grain of truth in the above argument,, it is 
wrong as a matter of fact or convention. To understand that, consider 
the following scenario. In every period t-1 the net inflow into 
pension funds is pW. Assume for simplicity that it is all spent 
to buy shares. 
ll/ 
In period t, a part of last years PW will 
take the form of dividends: the rest of retentions. The crucial 
point here, however, is that the dividends part never actually goes 
to wage earners. Rather it is left with those controlling the funds, 
to give rise to this year's net inflow: along with the excess of 
this year's contributions of employees and employers to the funds# 
to the benefits paid back to employees. The importance of the above 
is that it demonstrates that for the corporate sector as a whole, part 
of reported dividends is no less than retentions; or a net addition 
to reported retentions. Similarly the excess of contributions 
over benefits is part of corporate income, and for this purpose a 
net addition to retentions too. 
The above we think,, justify our use of the net inflow into the 
funds, as a net addition to retentions. Evidently# if one is 
prepared to redefine the relevant variables (i. e. W, 7 and rF ), 
along the lines suggested above, in (5), then one can obtain the MCSF 
as the MSF: in which case our suggested extension becomes simply an 
exercise in the appropriate definitions of variables. 
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THE EXISTING*EVIDENCE'ON'DIFFERENTIAL'PROPENSITIES 
The history of the direct evidence on differential propensities 
is intriguing. And asl unfortunately, is often the case, the 
further back one goes, the more interesting the existing studies are: 
reflecting perhaps the hazards of 'specialization. 
The first empirical work on the issue is Kalecki (1971), first 
published in 1933. Kalecki estimated a profits equation using U. S. 
time series (1929-1940). Assuming zero propensity to save by workerso, 
he deduced the capitalists propensity to save from an early version 
of the 'multiplier' ! His definition of capitalist income included 
corporate retentions (gross of depreciation) along with dividends, 
rent, interest and withdrawals from the unincorporated sector. The 
proportion of capitalist income saved - the term propensity is not 
used by Kalecki - was found to be 75%. 
Kalecki's lead was followed by Klein (1950). Klein estimated 
a simultaneous equations model for the U. S. (1921-1941)p consisting 
of a consumptionp an investment and a demand for labour equations. 
This, he suggested could be 'called a marxian theory of effective 
demand' (p. 63) model. In the consumption equation Klein distinguished 
between two types of income: wage income, consisting of employee 
compensation plus contributions from the central government, and 
profit income,, defined as in Kalecki. For lack of data income 
shares were measured before tax. Klein obtained short run 'propensities' 
to save of the order of 75% and 20%, for profit income and wage income 
respectively. The use of the functional shares was suggested as a 
proxy for the size distribution of income. 
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Klein's work was the first to explicitly introduce the idea of 
differential propensities out of both wage and profit income and it 
preceeds Kaldor's own formulation by six years ! Both Klein 
and Kaldorr relied on a definition of profits including retentions, 
as did,, Kalecki. Subsequent workr however, including Klein's own, 
disregarded retentionsp focusing on disposable shares out of personal 
sector income only. 
The first study along these lines is the well known work by 
Brown (1952) on habit persistence. Brown used Canadian time series 
and based his formulation explicitly on Klein's suggestions. However, 
he focused on after tax disposable shares, and excluded retentions 
from profit income. Despite that, his implied short run marginal 
'propensities' to save wage and profit income were 40% and 70% 
respectively. 
The studies of Klein and Coldberger (1955) and Klein et. al. 
(1961),, by use of U. S. and U. K. time series respectively relied on 
personal sector income shares only, and found support for the differential 
propensities to save idea but of a lower magnitude than any of the 
previous studies: in the case of Klein et. al. for example, the long 
run marginal propensities to save wage and property income,, were 0.56 
and 0.83 respectively. Similar results were obtained by Houthakker 
(1960) in an international cross section. More support for the 
'Kaldorian' idea was given by Ando and Modigliani (1963) ! The 
authors attributed this finding to the idea that property income 
stands as a (poor) proxy for wealth. 
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More recently, Burmeister and Taubman (1969) used U. S. time 
series and adopted a safe versus risky distinction of personal sector 
income: i. e. wage income, rent and interest on the one hand# and 
dividends plus income from self employment on the other. Corporate 
retentions were included as an additional explanatory variable. The 
'propensity'to save personal sector risky income was higher than that of 
personal sector safe incomej but never significantly so. The retentions 
variable (see Chapter 2) was found to add-on on other personal saving, 
which supports the idea that the aggregate proportion of risky income 
saved,, is higher than that of safe income. 
In the 1970's, Surrey (1970) used U. K. time series and found 
equilibrium 'propensities' to save personal sector wage income and profit 
incomer of the order of 0.25 and 0.40 respectively. As Surrey identifies 
current grants from the central government separately from (the rest of) 
wage income and given the fact that he obtained lower 'propensities' to 
save out of this type of income, one is led to infer an even lower 
1propensity' to save wage income. This is still in line with the 
differential 'propensitiest presumption. Holbrook and Stafford (1971)p 
however, used U. S. cross section and found no difference between the 
'propensities' to save labour income (excluding transfers) and profit 
income. Taylor (1971) has similar findings by use of U. S. time series. 
The propensity to save labour income is in fact higher than that of 
property income but not significantly so. Transfer income is separately 
identified and its coefficient is as high as 0.88 suggesting an even 
higher propensity to save wage income ! Blinder (1975), used U. S. time 
series, (1947-1972) and found no evidence for differential 'propensities' 
out of personal sector shares only, either. 
In the 1980's Arestis and Driver (1980) use U. K. time series 
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(1957-1977) and find a small difference between the 'propensity' to 
save labour and property income. The 'propensity' to save labour income 
in the short run is 0.60 while that of property income is 0.75. Transfer 
income is separately identified and has a 'propensity' to save close to 
that of property income, thus suggesting an even smaller difference 
between aggregate personal sector wage and property incomesl than the 
already 'tentative' statistically existing one. These results are 
challenged by Murfin (1980) who by use of quarterly U. K. time series 
(1963-1976),, obtains long run 'propensities' to save wage and property 
income, of the order of 0.16 and 0.70 respectively. Ko. skela and Viren 
(1984) use panel data for the 1963-1980 period. Various types of income 
are identified with transfer income identified separately from labour 
income: and entrepreneurial income and corporate retentions, (see also 
chapter 2), from property income. Small difference is found between the 
labour and property income 'propensities'. 
From the above it seems prudent to conclude that the evidence on 
differential 'propensities' to save out of personal sector shares only, is 
not inconsistent with the idea that the 'propensities' to save wage and 
property income are equal. All recent (in the last fifteen years) studies, 
but Murfin's are consistent with this view. 
The above, however, does not imply that wage and property income 
are saved in the same proportions: rather it reflects the tendency in 
recent work to disregard corporate retentions. As the proportion of 
income saved within the corporations increasep this focus on personal 
sector shares only, is bound to lead to an apparent equalization of the 
income distribution statistics# (see Brittain, 1966, and Dobb, 1958), and 
also an equalization of the 'propensities' to save. For obvious reasons 
this has clearly manifested itself in the last fifteen years. 
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Although from the early work of Kleinj (see also Klein et. al. 
1956), one could be led to infer that the abandonment of the gross 
measure of profit income for the personal sector one, was made under 
the implicit assumption that corporate retentions will add-on on other 
personal savings and as a result the aggregate 'propensity' to save 
profits could thus be obtained arithmetically, this is never made explicit 
in Klein and Coldberger and Klein et. al. Further, the non-substitution 
of savings cannot be just assumed but it needs to be demonstrated as e. g. 
in Burmeister and Taubman, (see also Chapter 2). Even in this case, 
thought a differential 'propensity' is just implied but not actually 
shown: the only way to do the latter being to impute retentions to 
profit income as in Klein (1950). 
More important is the fact that following the lead of Klein and 
Coldberger, all subsequent studies do not impute retentions to profit 
income, without appearing to realize that in so doing they fail to test 
what is often supposed to be under examination: the 'Kaldorian' 
hypothesis. 
The only recent attempts to impute retentions to profit income 
are Modigliani and Tarantelli (1975)p and Pitelis (1982a). Modigliani 
and Tarantellip obtained a'propensity'to save profit income thus defined, 
four times as high as that of wage income (0.60 and 0.15 respectively) 
by use of Italian time series. As in Ando, and Modiglianip the authors 
questioned their finding: which they attributed to special characteristics 
of the Italian economy and the idea that profit income is a proxy for 
wealth. Quite apart from that, it is perhaps worth noting this sad state 
of affairs: the only consistent test of the 'Kaldorian' hypothesis comes 
from Modiglianij, the most prominent critic of the hypothesis ! 
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Pitelis (1982a) tested the sensitivity of the 'propensity' to 
save profit income to the inclusion or exclusion in itt of retentions. 
By use of U. K. time series the results obtained were in line with the 
ideas suggested above: i. e. the exclusion of retentions resulted in 
the short run 'propensities' to save personal sector profit and wage 
income being very close to each other (around 0.40 and 0.30 respectively), 
while their inclusion in profit income resulted in a 'propensity' to save 
profit income as high as 0.75, with the wage income 'propensity' the 
same as before. 
Taking into account the evidence on retentions and pension funds 
surveyed in Chapter 2,, which,, as already emphasized constitute indirect 
evidence on differential 'propensities', the general picture can be 
summarized as follows: there is substantial evidence that retentions 
do not substitute perfectly with personal sector income, implying a 
higher 'propensity' to save aggregate profit income than wage income: 
there is substantial evidence to suggest that the net inflow into the 
pension funds does not substitute perfectly with personal sector, or net 
personal, income, implying a higher 'propensity' to save aggregate wage 
income, than personal sector profit income. There is also substantial 
direct evidence to suggest that the 'propensity' to save personal sector 
profit income is not substantially higher than that of personal sector 
wage income, (often including pension funds 
12/ 
. There is also evidence 
to suggest that despite this latter observation, retentions are saved in 
a higher proportion than both personal sector wage and profit income: 
implying a higher 'propensity' to save aggregate profit income. There 
is also evidence to suggest that the 'propensity' to save aggregate profit 
income is higher than that of aggregate wage income. There is finally 
evidence to suggest that the actual propensity of households to save (i. e. 
out of their net personal disposable income) is zero. 
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There is no direct evidence to suggest that pension funds 
income is saved in a higher proportion than other wage income: or that 
the propensity to save out of both net personal disposable shares, is 
zero. In brieff there is no direct evidence on the MCSF as proposed 
in (13). Furthert there is no attempt to integrate all the above 
hypotheses and test them in a common framework. These tasks are under- 
taken in the second part of this thesis. Suffice it to note here that 
they largely support the hypotheses advanced in the previous and the 
present Chapter. 
SUMMARY 
We examined the impact of the process of the socialization of the 
'ownership' of the means of production# on the form of the saving function. 
We saw the convergence towards the 'Managerialist Saving Function' and 
examined a potential extension to account for the Pension Funds Revolution. 
The 'Monopoly Capitalism Saving Function' proposed was found to receive 
support from the existing direct and indirect evidence. 
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NOTES 
The CSF was also used by Kalecki (1971)? as well as some 
contemporary neo-Marxists. See e. g. Rowthorn (1981). 
Post-Kaleckians? however, have adopted (versions of) the 
neo-Keynesian Saving Function (see below)j, perhaps 
reflecting the concern for relevance to which we refer in 
Section 1.2. See e. g. Sawyer (1982). 
2/ Negative propensity to save wage income is allowed in Kaldor 
(1966). 
3/ It has been observed that this argument of Kaldor's is self 
contradictory, in that if profit is defined to include all 
types of property incomep the relatively safer rent and 
interest do not coexist comfortably with riskier types of 
income such as dividends and income from self employment. 
See e. g. Hacche (1979). 
4/ Criticisms to the neoclassical hypothesis abound too. Bliss 
(1976) e. g. argued that it is by construction unable to account 
of the uncertainties of the future, and assumes implicitly that 
all households are perfectly creditworthy. Other criticisms 
refer to its operational form: the idea that in their estimated 
forms, the Life Cycle Hypothesis of Ando and Modigliani (1963), or 
the Permanent Income Hypothesis of Friedman (1957) hardly differ 
from more naive models of consumption such as the Habit Persistence 
Hypothesis of Brown (1952). See e. g. Marglin (1975), Green (1979) 
and the second part of this thesis. Finally critics have referred 
to its ideological functionst see e. g. Green (1979)t and in 
particular its implicatons on the effectiveness of interventionist 
policy. 
5/ Kregel (1971) traces this idea back to the mid fifties, in the 
writings of Robinson. 
6/ Which also implies that according to (5), the conventional wisdom 
to exclude retentions from the definition of disposable income in 
empirical work on the consumption-saving function, is correct. 
See also Sawyer (1982). It is worth notingp however, that far 
from being a conscious decision on the part of empirical 
economistsp this treatment often reflects the uncritical use of 
the offical statistics. See Part IIof the thesis. 
7/ In this sense trying to justify (2) in terms of (5) implies, in 
econometric terminology, the imposing of the invalid (ex-post) 
restriction# sh (1-r) IT=l=s IT . 
8/ The extension we suggest can be traced back to the empirical 
aspects of the work of Kaldor (1966) and Marglin (1975): i. e. 
the fact that the former refers to pension funds saving on the 
part of the workers to justify (2), while the latter excludes 
pension funds from his definition of disposable incomer in his 
attempt to show that the equilibrium Marginal Propensity to 
Save net personal disposable income is zero. 
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This treatment is in line with our suggestions in Chapter 
and it is also followed in the National Accounts. 
10/ It has ideological connotations too: as it implies that 
households do as they feelt or act according to their 
'psychological' urges. 
In practice a far smaller proportion is devoted to that purpose. 
Bank managed pension funds, in 1981, for example, invested in 
U. K. equities 51.7% of their incomep 13% overseas, and 23.7% to 
U. K. gilts. 8.6% was invested to U. K. property, and the rest 
to other activities. See Minns (1982). 
12/ Again this treatment is often the result of an uncritical use 
of the offical statistics,, rather than of conscious choice. 
See note 6 and PartIIof the thesis. 
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PART II 
CORPORATE CONTROLp SOCIAL CHOICE AND FINANCIAL 
CAPITAL ACCUMULATION : EVIDENCE 
141. 
CHAPTER 5 
The Effects of Corporate Retentions on Personal Savings : 
A Test of the Managerialist Saving Function and the Life 
Cycle Hypothesis* 
This Chapter relies on and extends ideas and findings that first 
appeared in Pitelis (1983b). An earlier version of this paper 
was presented at an Industrial Economics Workshop at Warwick. 
An earlier version of its present form was presented at the 
Association of University Teachers of Economics/Royal Economic 
Society Conference,, Bath,, 1984. 
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INTRODUCTION 
As we have shown in Chapter 2p the issue of the effects of 
corporate retentions on personal savings has recently been the subject 
of thorough examination purporting: to test the impact of retentions 
on capital formation: to 'test' the 'constancy' of the private saving 
ratio,, and/or to test the effects of 'contractual' saving on 'discretionary' 
saving, i. e. the implication of the Life Cycle Hypothesis on substituta- 
bility. Further,, the aim in one study was to test for differences in the 
propensities to saver while in another, to test the Managerialist Saving 
Function. 
Given the above interrelated# overlapping and complementary aims, 
as well as the evident importance of the saving function for neo-Keynesian 
growth theories (see Chapter 4),, one cannot fail to realize the importance 
of undertaking empirical work in the area. This is even more important 
for the U. K. where# as seen in Chapter 2, there is only one study: by 
Feldstein and Fane (1973). 
An important consideration arising herej is that the Managerial 
Saving Functionj as well as the neo-Keynesian Saving Function in all its 
versions#, are pure theoretical constructs: that is,, they have never 
been brought in forms appropriate for testing with empirical data. The 
implications of these constructs# instead, have been tested either in 
simplistic estimated forms as e. g. in Klein (1950) or in 'ad-hoc' 
specified equations such as the Koyck transformationp e. g. in Klein 
et. al. (1961)p or finally in the very framework of the Life Cycle 
Hypothesist e. g. in Lambrinides (1974). 
To account for these problems we undertakep as a first step in 
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this Chapter, to show that regarding at least their estimated formt a 
Simple Linear (SL), a Koyck transformation Distributed Lag (DL), the 
Life Cycle Hypothesis (LCH) and the Houthakker-Taylor (T-T) models of 
savingr can lead to the same general estimated form, in which they can 
be nested as special cases. The implications of alternative saving 
functions can then be tested in this common framework. It is worth 
stressing that as a whole the above models are consistent with most 
consumption-saving specifications proposed to date. The usefulness of 
the above procedure also arises from the fact that most empirical studies 
examined in Chapter 2, were cast into versions of the LCH. 
1/ 
In Section 1 we propose and test the four models by use of the 
less explored U. K. data. We attempt to provide conclusive evidence by 
examining a longer period of time than Feldstein and Fane (1973) and 
any of the previous studies, (ii) adopting a fairly comprehensive range of 
models - specifications, explanatory variables, and alternative definitions 
of the dependent variable. Section 2, has discussion and conclusions. 
1. TESTSOF THE MANAGERIALIST SAVING FUNCTION AND THE LIFE CYCLE 
HYPOTHESIS 
In its simplest form the hypothesis under examination can be 
written as: 
PRSAt =s (PSDItj COREtj IRt) 0 
(1) 
where s denotes a linear functional form, PSDI is personal sector 
disposable income, CORE is corporate retentionsl PRS. A is private savings 
(i. e. personal sector savings, PSS-3p plus corporate retentions), and IR 
is the interest rate 
2/ 
:t is a time subscript. For estimation 
Purposes and including a constant term, the stochastic version of 
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can be written as: 
PRSAt =a0+ ct I PSDI t+a2 CORE t+a3 IR t+ut 
Ut = NID (0j, a2). 
In terms of (2) the implications of the rival hypotheses 
analysed in Chapter 2# can be written as: 
Perfect substitution a0 2 
Imperfect substitution 0<a2 
Independence or Add-on a2 ý- 1. 
1.1 The Simple Linear Model 
This involves estimating versions of (2) with one or more lags 
in (some of) the explanatory variables. It avoids problems of dynamic 
specification but also provides useful information on the dynamic 
specification to be adopted. In Table 1 we report four estimated equations. 
In 1.1 PSDI is included both concurrently and lagged by one period. The 
negative sign of the coefficient of the lagged PSDI suggests that the 
change of this variable plays an important role in explaining the 
dependent variable. 
2-/ 
To test if it is only the change of PSDI that 
affects PRSA (implying a marginal propensity to save PSDI equal to zero), 
in 1.2 we restrict the coefficients of PSDI t and PSDI t-l to be equal. 
An F test rejects this restriction at the 5% level. Thus, in 1.3 both 
the level and change of PSDI are included as explanatory variables. 
Equationl. 3 exactly reproduces equation 1.1. The marginallpropensitylto 
save PSDI is 0.19. The last equation in Table 1, is 1.4. It is as 1.1 
(and 1.3) but also includes the lagged CORE variable. This is positive 
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of explanatory power and the sum of squared errors (SSE). 
was the best obtained by the SL model. -i/ 
Equation 1.4 
Originally we estimated equations 1.1 to 1.4 with Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS),, but first order serial correlation (ARl) was found. To 
remove it a Maximum Likelihood (ML) technique was used; although we 
recognize that such a finding may be a sign of deficient specification due 
to the simplistic nature of the SL model. In terms of the rival 
hypotheses under examinationp the SL model gives support to limited 
substitution of the order of 13%p with the exception of equation 1.2 which 
supports the add-on. The results of 1.4t however# suggest that the impact 
of CORE on PRSA is not exhausted in one period. 
In summary, the findings of the SL model support the ideas that: 
the impact of PSDI on PRSA is exhausted in one period: the change of PSDI 
has a significant impact on PRSA: CORE affect PRSA with a lagged distribu- 
tiont its one period impact supporting limited (imperfect) substitution: 
a more dynamic specification might#, therefore,, be a better means of 
examining our hypothesis. 
5/ 
1.2 The Distributed Lag Model-7-' 
Given the findings of the SL model,, and disregarding at the 










ut = NID(OF(j 
2 
effectively introduces an infinite number of lags in the CORE 
(3) 
variable and assumes its effects to be geometrically declining. 
6/ 
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Performing the Koyck transformation in (3) gives (in estimating form) : 
PRSAt =y0+y1 PSDI t+ -Y 2 
PSDIt_l +y3 CORE t 
y PRSA t-1 




0,, Yl =e VY2 ý- -1X? y3 -ý 
ý2 i and Y4 ýX* 
The two well known features of (4) are: the appearance of the 
one period lagged dependent variable (LDV) in the right hand sidep and 
the fact that the error term is now a first order moving average (M-Al) 
of the original errors. If A in (4) is significant, OLS estimates will 
be biased and inconsistent. To account for that we follow Townend (1976) 
and approximate the MAl process by a first order autoregressive (ARl) 
Markov process of the form ut = pu t-l +Et where Et 
is a serially 
independent disturbance with zero mean. An ML Iterative Technique is 
7/ 
applied to obtain values of the p's. When significant P's are found; -ý 
ML estimates are reported. When p's are insigificant equations are re- 
estimated with OLS and these re-estimates are reported along with the 
values of the p's and their It' statistics obtained from the ML equation. 
It should be also noted that since there is no a priori reason to assume 
'white noise' errors (see e. g. Malinvaud, 1970)t the Koyck transform may 
also result in removing autocorrelation: if the latter is present in the 
original errors. 
8/ 
On estimationr (4) gave: 





(-5.61) (6.57) (-4.51) (13.26) 
+ 0.42* PRSA t-1 + 
0.06 u t-1 +Et 
(7.75) (0.29) 
-2 lo R 0.9959 DW = 1.8793 SSE = 493xlO 
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Imposing the restriction yj =- Y2 in (4) we obtain equation 2.1 in 
Table 2,, where the other results from estimating the DL model are also 
reported. An F test respected the restriction at the 5% level, so 
in 2.2 we include both the level of PSDI and its change. As it can be 
seen#, the obtained equation exactly reproduces (4). Including the 
interest rate variable in (3) in a fashion similar to the PSDI variable 
(as it is implied by the SL model), results in equation 2.3. The 
latter is inferior to 2.1 and 2.2 in that it exhibits autocorrelated 
residuals. In all equations, however, the coefficient of the CORE 
variable fails to be insignificantly different from one at the 5% level 
of a one tailed 't' testr thus giving support to limited substitution, 
and, therefore, to the implications of the MSF. 
As it will be seen in the next Subsection, implicit in the LCH is 
the idea that the change of CORE rather than its level best explains PRSA. 
This we can test by introducing the lagged CORE variable in 2.3. The 
obtained equation is 2.4. An F test rejects the idea that the co- 
efficients of CORE t and 
CORE 
t-l are equal. 
The equation is markedly 
improved, in terms of both explanatory power and SSE. No autocorrelation 
is Present either. The new feature of 2.4 is the insignificant coefficient 
of the PSDI variable, which implies a zero marginal propensity to save. 
When PSDI is dropped equation 2.5 is obtained, and an F test accepts the 
restriction at the 5% level. 
If we assume that the function f( PSDI t) 
is homomorphic, we can 




result is equation 5# which is given below in its estimated form. 
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PRSAt = -2264.34* + 0.31* PSDI t-0.27* 
PSDI 
t-1 
+ 0.88* CORE 
t (-2.93) (6.64) (-4.43) (16.41) 
- 0.29* coRE + 215.22* IRC 119.60 x IR + 0.57* PRSA 
(-2.14) t-1 (4.26) t (-1.79) t-1 (5.48) t-1 
(5) 
- 0.08u t-1 +E (-0.39) 
i2 = 0.9979 DW 2.0652 SSE = 215xlO 
lo 
In the way derived,, (5) makes clear that the high coefficient of the 
PSDI variable should not be viewed as a marginal propensity: as (5) is 
the exact replica of 2.4. Besides its obvious good econometric 
performance (5) satisfies a most interesting property. Namely it 
constitutes an unrestricted version of the Life Cycle Hypothesis if 
the constant is supressed. 
9/ 
In (5) the coefficients of the lagged PSDI and CORE variables 
are very close to each other. When restricted to be equal equation 2.6 
in Table 2 obtains. The resulting variable is the lagged private 
income. 
1-01 
The restriction is easily accepted at the 5% level of an F 
test and the explanatory power of the equation is improved. Equation 
2.5 supports the add-on hypothesis, but all 2.4, (5) and 2.6 support 
limited substitution of the order of 12% and this may be the principal 
conclusion of the DL model in face of the superiority of these last 
equations. 
1.3 The Life Sycle Hypothesis 




(6 -r) At i (6) 
where Ct denotes consumers expenditure in period t and PRI is private 
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income. ll/ At is end of period wealth, r is the rate of return on 
assets and a and 6 are constants. This is a steady state form of the 
LCH. Out of steady state a and 6 may vary with the rate of interest#, 
the life profile of income and the expected productivity growth. From 
(6) and the identity 
At =A t-1 
+ PRI 
t-1 -c t-1 1 
Spiro (1962) and more recently Davidson et. al. (1978) derive the 
equation: 
Ct = CL PRI t+ 
(6-r-«) PRI 
t-1 
+ (1-6+r) C 
t-1 
+Et 
ct=ut- Xu t-1 0 
Substituting in (8) the definition PRSAt = PRI t-ct 
(9) 
we obtain (in estimating form): 
PRSAt =61 PRI t+a2 





where 6, =6 (1-a) and 2 
Equation (10) is equivalent to a model of the DL form and very 
similar in spirit to (5). Its estimated version is 3.1 in Table 3. As 
it stands (10) provides no means by which rival hypotheses can be 
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where k1=k2=-k3=-k4 ý-- (1-a) and k. = (1+r-6). We can then 
test these restrictions and the substitution hypothesis in the LCH's 
own framework. 
Results from testing the LCH are reported in Table 3. Equation 
3.2 is (11) but with a constant term. 3.3 restricts the constant to be 
zero as required by (11). An F test rejects this restriction at the 
5% level. 3.4 is 3.3 but allows for a differential impact of the 
interest rate on PRSA. 3.5 also includes the lagged interest rate. In 
generall 3.1 is rejected against 3.3,, and 3.3 against 3.4,, while 3.4 is 
rejected against (5) - its equivalent with a constant - at the 5% level 
of an F test. F tests were also used to test the equality of the co- 
efficients of PSDI t and CORE t restriction of the LCH model. 
In all 
cases it was rejected. In all 3.2,3.31 3.4 and 3.5 a one tailed 't' test 
gave support to the add-on hypothesis. 
Given the very poor performance of the simple LCHp we alsc 
estimated an extended LCH. This involves imposing all the implied 
restrictions in 10 (or 11) and then allowing CORE to affect PRSA 
differentially,, by including it as an additional explanatory variable in 
(10). This follows Feldstein (1976) and on estimation gave: 
PRSAt = -1285.96* + 0.37* A(PRI t+0.56* CORE t+ 
213.04* IR 
t 
(-7.54) (10.14) (8.64) (4.36) 
+ 0.62* PRSA t-1 
+ 0.19ut-1 +ct (12) 
(13.97) (0.93) 
i2 = 0.9979 Dw = 1.5768 SSE = 254xlO 
lo 
We have also added a constant term in (12) and allowed the IR t 
to have a differential impact on PRSA. The lagged IR was tried but it was 
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insignificant and an F test accepted the restriction that it is equal 
to zero. We can see that (12) performs very well, which suggests that 
there is much scope in extending the LCH: albeit in doing so one could 
question the extent to which we have also kept the spirit and the under- 
lying philosophy of this hypothesis. 
1.4 The Houthakker-Taylor Model 
The theory of saving developed by the Houthakker and Taylor (1970),, 
starts from the proposition that desired wealthl A*,, is a function of 
income, PSDI; 
A*t = S(PSDI t 
). (13) 
It is then assumed that saving is proportional to the difference between 
desired and actual wealth: i. e. 
PSSt =ý (A* t- 
At_ 
1) 4 (14) 
Differencing (14) and substituting (13) for A* gives an estimated equation 
of the form: 
Psst =c1 Psst-l +c2A (PSDI t)+ut 
ut = NID (0,, Cr 
2)I (15) 
where PSS denotes personal sector savings. More recently (15) has been 
extended to allow: for different types of incomet in Taylor (1971), 
advertising, in Taylor and Weiserbs (1972), and other explantory variables 
such as inflation, retentions and the interest rate# in Howrey and Hymans 
(1978). 
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It has been observed for some timer see e. g. Swamy (1968),, 
that in its form (15) the H-T model is equivalent to the LCH. The 
'equivalence' of the two models suggested by Swamyp was accepted by both 
Houthakker and Taylor (1970) and Modigliani (1975). The latter in 
particular considered Swamy's international cross section estimates 
obtained by use of (15), a 'direct test' of the LCH. 
The importance of our result in equation (10) is that it proves 
the exact equivalence of the estimated forms of the two models# if one is 
prepared to disregard the difference in the definition of saving and 
income. Alternatively,? starting from (15) it is possible to obtain (10) 
if the change of CORE is added to (15) and its coefficient is constrained 
to be equal to that of A(PSDI)t see e. g. Howrey and Hymans (1978). A 
third method is described below. 
Results from estimating (15) with a constant term are given in 
Table 4. (Equation 4.1). In this form no test of the substitution 
hypothesis is possible but adding CORE in both sides we obtain 4.2p which 
gives support to the add-on hypothesis. 4.1 and 4.2 were also estimated 
without the constant but an F test rejected this restriction at the 5% 
level and these results are not reported. Both 4.1 and 4.2 appear well 
specified and 4.2 outperforms its respective 2.1 of the DL model,, despite 
its apparent simplicity. Moreover it is simple to go from 4.2 to the DL 
and the LCH: by substituting the lagged PSS in 4.2 for its definition 
(i. e. PRSA minus CORE t-l 
); and relaxing the restriction that the co- 
efficients of PSDI and PSDIt_l are equal, we obtain equation 3.1 in Table 
3. Adding the IR concurrently and lagged by one period results in (5) of the 
DL model. Dropping the lagged IR gives equation 4.3 
12/ 
in Table 4, that is, 
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rejects the exclusion of the constantp at the 5% level. 4.3 supports 
the idea of limited substitution. 
The general conclusions of this section are: that corporate 
retentions substitute to a very limited degree with personal sector 
savings: that this finding varies little depending on the model- 
specification adopted# and finally: that when extended to include 
corporate retentions all models can be shown to lead to the same estimated 
form. When the most general form (5) is tested downp it is seen that all 
other equations (but 2.5 and 2.6) are rejected against it. The simple LCH 
has the worst performance of any of the other models. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The data used for the purposes of this Chapter, as well as the 
three empirical Chapters to follow, are described in the Appendix, at 
the end of Part II of the thesis. In this Section we concentrate on some 
of the results that present some interest and/or on potential limitations 
of our results. 
First the interest rate. Throughout, it was found to have a 
positive and significant impact on PRSA. This supports the substitution 
effect of interest on consumption and it is in accord with earlier U. K. 
findings by Peel (1975). The choice of the appropriate IR series# however, 
is a very sensitive matter, surrounded by controversy, (see e. g. Howrey 
and Hymans,, 1978). To partly account for the problem we also used three 
different series: the treasury bill yield (1955-1981, Blue Book) and the 
short run and long run government bond yields (ImF). Finally we created 
and used (see data Appendix) a real interest rate series. In all cases, 
although small variations were observed, the results were largely the same. 
158. 
The 'gross' measure of CORE was used in this work: i. e. 
retentions plus depreciation. This was motivated by the fact that 
depreciation allowances are usually used for tax avoidance or for invest- 
ment when opportunities arise. Also# since earlier studies that used 
both the 'gross' and 'net' measures did not observe significant differences 
(see e. g. Feldstein, 1973t Lambrinidesp 1974). Finally# if an upwards 
bias is present due to the use of this measure,, it will tend to be 
countered by a downwards bias arising from the fact that 'quasi' 
retentions (i. e. retentions of the unincorporated sector) are treated in 
the official statistics as PSDI instead of CORE, which they are. This bias 
might have been strong in recent years. . 
13/ 
We seer therefore# that our findings were robust too: four 
alternative models of savings and two alternative definitions of savings 
as well as to five different IR series. We also estimated consumption 
functions and used first differences specifications of the equations 
reported. In all cases similar results were found. More results along 
these lines are presented in the next three Chapters. Suffice it to 
note here that the same findings are supported. 
A potential problem with the findings may arise from the fact that 
we made use of the official definition of income: i. e. PSDIp as all the 
other studies on this issue. Since PSDI includes the net inflow into 
pension fundsp the obtained coefficients of the PSDI variable might be 
biased upwards in case the 'propensity' to save pension funds is higher 
than that of the other components of PSDI. This issue is taken up again 
in the next Chapter where the necessary corrections of the variables are 
also undertaken. Suffice it to say here that our treatment was necessita- 
ted by the need to test the MSFI which does require such a treatment, 
(see also Chapter 
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Serious econometric problems were not present in the context of 
this work. Autocorrelation was rarely present and never in the more 
general specifications. When multicollinearity seemed to turn up,, it was 
found that it was rather the result of omitted variables biasp solved by 
increasing (rather than decreasing) the dimensionality of the parameter 
space: an observation previously emphasised by Davidson et. al. (1978). 
The danger of simultaneous equation bias is very real in our framework, in 
which case OLS estimates will be (asymptotically) biased and inconsistent. 
Still ML estimates were never significantly different, which would suggest 
that we might not need to worry unduly. See also Chapter 8. 
We conclude from the results of this Chapter that: the Managerial 
Saving Function is supported against the Life Cycle Hypothesis: or, what 
amounts to the same thing# there is no perfect substitution between corporate 
and personal sector savings. 
14/ 
The decisions of the 'controlling group' 
on retentions do have a positive impact on financial capital accumulation. 
SUMMARY 
We tested the Managerial Saving Function and the Life Cycle 
Hypothesis, by use of postwar U. K. time series. We found no support for 
the perfect substitution hypothesis implied by the LCH,, by use of: four 
different models of savings, two different definitions of the savings 
variable, and a host of explanatory variables. It was also shown that 
all four models can lead to a general form in which they can be nested 
as special cases. Such tests cast doubt on the validity of the simple 
Life Cycle model, and support the Managerialist Saving Function. 
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NOTES 
Albeit,, they often disregard the latter's emphasis on the use 
of private income and savings as the appropriate variables. See 
e. g. Modigliani (197or 1975). Spiro (1962) and Lambrinides 
(1972p 1974) are notable exceptions. 
For the role of the interest rate in consumption-saving functions 
see e. g. King (1984). Also Section 2 of this Chapter. 
If instead PSDI had a lag distribution on PRSA the coefficient 
of its one period lagged value should be positive. 
4/ More complicated versions of (2) to 1.4 were tried but they did 
not improve the results. The lagged IR t variable reduced the 
explanatory power of the equations. The lagged change of the 
PSDI variable as well as the two period lagged CORE variable 
failed to be significant at the 5% significance level. 
5/ The adoption of a Distributed Lag (DL) model, was motivated by 
the findings of the SL model. A potential problem arising by 
the use of a DL model in the saving function is that, in general, 
a DL model implies coefficients higher in the long run than in 
the short run. This would imply a lower propensity to consume in 
the long run, in case the level of the disposable income variable 
is included in the regression: a property in stark contrast with 
widely held views and normal practice. It should be notedl 
however# that: this disturbing property does not hold if the 
change rather than the level of the disposable income variable 
is included in the regression: the idea that the impact of CORE 
and pension funds (see next Chapter)on PRSA will be higher in the longer 
run, is not inconsistent with the existing evidence (see Chapter 2): 
further the DL model was also adopted here in order to show that 
under assumptions, it can lead to an equation equivalent to the 
Life Cycle Hypothesis. See also Chapter 6,, note 11. 
6/ Given the findings of the SL model, the change of PSDI could also 
be included in (3); in two ways: as the PSDII implying a concurrent 
impact of APSDI on PRSAI or as CORE,, implying a geometrically 
declining effect of APSDI on PRSA. In the latter case the 
resulting specification gives rise to equation 2.2 (Table 2). In 
the former case the lagged APSDI should also appear in the 
regression. Equations along these lines were estimated, but 
the lagged APSDI was never significantly different from zero, so 
these results are not reported. Specification (3) was chosen 
here because it gives rise to 2.2, without the need to rely on 
the findings of the SL model. 
7/ For the detection of autocorrelation we use the 10% significance 
level. 
8/ In face of the LDV# the DW is not a useful detector of autocorrela- 
tion, but it is reported since, if significant, it is still a 
valuable indicator of misspecification. See Harvey, (1981). and 
Granger and Newbouldp (1974). 
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9/ And similarly the IR variables: or alternatively# if it is 
assumed that their effects operate via the coefficient of the 
relevant explanatory variables. See next Subsection. 
10/ Literally private disposable income (PRI) is defined as the sum 
of (after tax) corporate income plus personal sector disposable 
income. However, the national accounts define PSDI to include 
dividends, so to obtain PRI we simply have to add CORE to PSDI. 
But it also includes capital gains: which will not be expected 
to bias our results as the empirical studies available suggest. 
See Arena, (1964) and Bhatia, (1972). The definition used here 
is also adopted by Modiglianit (see note 2). 
12/ We report ML estimates for this equation despite the insignificant, 
at the 10% level# coefficient of the p, to ensure comparability 
with its equivalent 3.4 of the LCH. The OLS results were similar. 
The lack of autocorrelation in this equation further highlights the 
inappropriateness of restricting the constant term to zero. 
13/ We approximate the income of the unincorporated sector with the 
self employment income provided by the official statistics: and 
the retentions made by itt by assuming that it is the same 
proportion to the corporate sector's. The self employment 
income increased from 10.4% of PSDI in the 1963-1970 period, to 
11.9% in the 1971-1981 period. For the same periods the increase 
of the CORE/PSDI ratio was more dramatic. 
14/ Not that this would worry Modigliani and Ando (1957) a lot: as in 
their viewt 'it is one of the merits of our model that it gives a 
person with the right kind of data so many opportunities to refute 
it'. (p. 123). 
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CHAPTER 6 
The Effects of Life Assurance and Pension Funds on 
Other Savings :A Test of the Extended Managerialist 
Saving Function and the Galbraith-Marglin Hypothesis* 
This Chapter relies on, and extends ideas that first appeared 
in Pitelis (1984). An earlier version of this paper was 
presented at an Industrial Economics Workshop at Warwick. 
A version of the present Chapter was presented at the 
Econometric Society European Meetings,, Madrid,, 1964. 
JC' I. 
INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter 2 we discussed the recent interest on the pension 
funds question# and the outflow of empirical work in the area purporting 
to test: the Life Cycle Hypothesis# and/or the effects of contractual 
savings on personal savings and aggregate capital formation. These 
are also the aims of this Chapter, but we also test: the extended MSF 
proposed in Chapter 4,, and the Galbraith-Marglin hypothesis discussed in 
Chapter 2. To do that we need: to appropriately redefine our income 
and saving variables, as well as to appropriately extend the specifica- 
tions used in the previous Chapter. In this Chapter we only focus on 
the SL,, DL and LCH models, sincer as was shown in Chapter 5j, the LCH 
and the H-T models are derivable from each other with no further 
assumptions or loss of generality. 
As we saw in Chapter 2, earlier U. K. findings rejected the 
substitution hypothesis. Most# in particular time series, studies 
though, are subject to various limitations: they focused on a very short 
period of time: made an uncritical use of the official datal that may 
cast doubt on their results: estimated consumption functionsl which do 
not explicitly allow the testing of the effects of pension funds on other 
than personal savingst such as corporate retentions-L/: finally# confined 
their attention to - in most cases - one specification of the consumption 
function. 
The adjustments to the data undertaken in this Chapter,, as well 
as the fact that we specify private (personal plus corporate) saving 
functions, and our coverage of the whole 1951-1981 U. K. period, results 
in solving all the above problems. Further, we test the sensitivity of 
the marginal 'propensity' to save to alternative definitions of disposable 
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income I (see also Taubman, 1968) . and derive a general estimated saving 
function which is tested down to give us the equation that most 
parsimoniously describes our data. Against that, alternative hypotheses- 
specifications are tested. 
In Section 1.1 we discuss the adjustments we undertake to the 
official statistics as well as the potential problems arising by failing 
to make these adjustments. In 1.2 we provide new empirical results. In 
Section 2 we have discussion and conclusions. The Appendix has a 
specification search. 
TESTS OF THE LIFE CYCLE HYPOTHESISp THE EXTENDED 14ANAGFRIALIST 
SAVING FUNCTION AND THE GALBRAITH-MARGLIN HYPOTHESIS 
The Treatment of Life Assurance and Pension Funds in the 
official Statistics 
The first issue to tackle before estimation is undertaken is to 
decide on the most appropriate definition of saving and disposable 
income. Although problems with the use of offical statistics are too 
well, and for too long (see e, g. Friend and Schor, 1959) known to need 
reiterating here,, data availability or inertia has resulted in an 
uncritical use of the offical statistics by many studies. This, howeverg, 
as recent discussion has shown (see Chapter 2) may entail serious costs. 
At least quantitatively the most serious problem arises from the treatment 
of Life Assurance and Pension Funds (TLAPF) . Thus,, contribution to TLAPF 
are included in the official definition of PSDI and since savings are 
estimated as a residual category# the official definition of personal 
sector savings (PSS) also includes such contributions. 
For the purposes of the official compilers - i. e. to estimate 
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the net amount available for lending from one sector to the other, 
this treatment is correct. If one, however, is interested in estimating 
say, the propensity to save income actually in the disposal of the house- 
holds orf for our purposes, the net effect of TLAPF,, (see note 20) on 
private saving2/ one needs to define income and saving net of contribu- 
tions to TLAPF but inclusive of benefits paid by TLAPF to households, 
i/ 
as only the latter are disposable to the consumers. 
4/ 
The resulting 
series we name net personal disposable income (NPDI) and net personal 
savings (NPS) : the net inflow to TLAPF we name LAPF. 
All time series studies surveyed in Chapter 2 explicitly 
recognise this problem. Browning-(1982) makes no attempt to account 
for it. Feldstein (1978) suggests that his estimates refer to the 'net 
effect' of pension funds on PRSA. Threadgold (1978) goes further. He 
justifies the use of the uncorrected series in terms of the fact that - 
under plausible assumptions - it allows for distinguishing between 
employers and employees' degree of substitution. In the last paragraph 
of his paper he also estimates one regression with the corrected series. 
The result of this 'alternative approach' lends support to the add-on 
hypothesis. 
In principle Feldstein's and Threadgold's claims are not un- 
justified. Their treatment# howeverp of PSDI and pension funds as two 
different and concurrent explanatory variables in the same equation may 
entail serious problems. For one the use of PSDI - i. e. NPDI plus LAPF - 
in itself is equivalent to restricting the coefficients of these two 
variables to be equal: which is the hypothesis under examination ! 
Further, one could question the importance one should attach to the 
estimated coefficients and their standard errors, since collinearity in 
high. 5/ such a case will be expected to be 
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The above, we think, raise some concern over the findings of 
all previous time series studies, except for Threadgold's 'alternative 
approach'. We pursue extensively this approach here but also make use 
of the uncorrected series in some regressions so as to assess the empirical 
validity of previous theorizing in our data framework. 
L2 The EMirical Results 
In its simplest and most general form the hypothesis under 
examination can be written as: 





where s is assumed to be a linear functional form, and IR t 
is the 
interest ratel t is a time subscript. For estimation purposes and 
including a constant terml the stochastic version of (1) can be written 
as: 
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The Simple Linear Model 
The specification tested is a Simple Linear (SL). It involves 
estimating linear versions of (2) obtained by lagging in turn one or more 
of the explanatory variables by one period. 
2-/ 
Its basic purpose is to 
avoid problems of dynamic specification inherent in more complicated models, 
but also to provide useful information as to the dynamic specification one 
should adopt. The simplest version that is econometrically acceptable is 
one that includes the lagged value of CORE in (2), and this equation is our 
starting point. Results from estimating the SL model are reported in 
Table 1. A total of 12 equations are reported which were considered 
to be useful for the hypotheses we examine. Other results are available 
from the author on request. Suffice it to say here that they support 
the same findings as the ones reported. All equations were originally 
estimated with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) but they were found to suffer 
from first order autocorrelation and we used a Maximum Likelihood (ML) 
technique to remove it. -a/ These ML estimates are reported. Below we 
summarise the underlying logic of the reported regressions and their 
results. 
In Table le equation 1.1 is first estimated. This was obtained 
by imposing the restrictions a1=a2 in (2). It results in an equation 
which involves the official definition of disposable income (PSDI) but not 
LAPF. It gives a Marginal'Propensity 
I to Save (MPS) of 0.16 which is 
close to usually reported coefficients for this variable. It implies that 
the coefficient of LAPF is also 0.16. Equation 1.2 tests this restriction 
by simply splitting PSDI to NPDI and LAPF. This way the MPS net personal 
disposable income can also be tested. An F test rejects the restriction 
at the 10% level. The coefficient of NPDI is insignificant irplying a 
MPS equal to zero. The coefficient of LAPF is insignificantly different 
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from one# in a one tailed It' test and supports the add-on hypothesis. 
The explanatory power of the equation is improved. 
Equation 1.3 follows the 'orthodox' approach of including both 
PSDI and LAPF as concurrent explanatory variables. The result is that 
equation 1.3 reproduces exactly 1.2. The coefficient of PSDI drops 
and stands now as a perfect proxy to NPDI in 1.2: similarly the co- 
efficient of LAPF falls. Since 1.1,1.2 and 1.3 together can be viewed 
as a version of Frisch's Confluence Analysis, 
2/ 
these findings can be 
fairly safely attributed to multicollinearity. In view of the latter's 
effects on the coefficients estimates and standard errors# 1.3 can be 
dismissed and along with it perhaps the validity of the 'orthodox' approach 
can be questionede at least in our data framework. Equation 1.4 is 
equation 1.2 but NPDI is now set to zero. This restriction is not 
rejected. 
With a MPS net personal disposable income equal to zero we can 
now test whether the change of NPDI affects PRSA. To do that we simply 
need to add the one period lagged NPDI as an additional explanatory 
variable to 1.3: a coefficient of NPDI t equal 
to minus the coefficient 
of NPDIt_,, implying a marginal propensity to save NPDI equal to zero. 
The obtained equation is 1.5. The restriction is imposed in 1.6. An F 
test does not reject it at the 5% level. In 1.5 the coefficient of LAPF 
is significantly different from zero at the 10% level and insignificantly 
different from one at the 5% level. This supports the add-on. In 1.6 
the relevant coefficient is highly significant and still supports the add- 
on at the 5% level. 
In 1.7 the lagged value of IAPF is included. It is insignificantly 
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different from zero. Still it improves the explanatory power of the 
regression and lowers the sum of squared errors. When it is included 
to replace LAPF, in equation I. Bp it is strongly significant and also 
significantly higher than one at the 10% level of a one tailed 't' 
test. This suggests that the finding of 1.7 may simply be due to multi- 
collinearity. 
In equations lf2p 1.3f 1.4f 1.5,1.6 and 1.7 the coefficients 
of LAPF and CORE are very close to each other. It might be argued that 
a better explanation of the dependent variable could be obtained if they 
were restricted to be equal. Thus, in 1.9 we impose this restriction to 
1.6. The resulting variable we call Contractual Saving (COSA). The 
restriction is accepted but the explanatory power of the equation is 
lowered. In face of the findings of 1.8 we impose to 1.7 two res- 
trictions. That the coefficient of LAPF is equal to that of CORE and 
that the coefficient of LAPF t-l 
is equal to that of CORE t-1, 
This results 
in 1.10. This equations' explanatory power is an improvement over 1.9 
and 1.6 and is as high as in 1.7: the restriction is accepted at the 
5% level. lo/ 
Equation 1.11 is equation 1.10 but also includes the lagged interest 
rate variable. This fails to be significantly different from zero, and 
leads to a reduction of the explanatory power of the equation. If in view 
of that we restrict it to be zero 1.10 obtains again. An F test supports 
the restriction at the 5% level. The final equation of the SL model is 
1.12. In this equation the restriction that the coefficient NPDI t 
is 
equal to minus the coefficient of NPDI t-1 
is relaxedf in order to be 
subjected to a test in the preferred equationt 1.10. As it can be seen 
the restriction is now accepted at the 5% level of an F test, implying 
again a marginal propensity to save NPDI equal to zero: 1.12p has a 
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higher explanatory powerl than 1.10. 
In all equations 1.9,1.10,1.11 and 1.12 COSA have very high 
coefficients but fail to be equal to one, supporting some imperfect 
substitution (of the order of 15%) in one period. Whent however, the 
effects of the lagged COSA are also added to those of COSA t, 
this 
ceases to be the case and the add-on hypothesis is again supported. 
In brief# the central findings of the SL model are that: the MPS 
net personal disposable income is zero: the change of NPDI plays a 
significant role in explaining PRSA, and similarly the interest rate, IR t *. 
that LAPF add-on to PRSA, and finally that the idea that LAPF and CORE 
have the same lag distribution cannot be rejected. 
1.2.2 The Distributed Lag_Model 
Given the findings of the SL model and disregarding at the moment 
the interest rate, we can rewrite (1) as: 
PRSAt =s (LAPFt,, COREt) . 
(11) 
Then the equation# 
PRSAt =ý0+e1 LAPF t+ý2 
CORE 
t+ý3 
PRSAt_l +Et (2') 
F- t=ut- Äu t-1 , 
will be consistent with a geommetrically declining lag/Koyck transformation 
type of model. See Chapter 5. 
Ll-/ 
Equation (2') is also consistent with 
a simple lag model of savings. The difference in the last case is thatj 
in contrast to (2') where the error term is first order moving average 
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(MAl) Of the original (white noise) errors, the error term will now be 
uncorrelated. Since significant X's in (21) will render Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) estimatesp biased and inconsistent, we will follow in this 
Chapter too,, the procedure described in Chapter 5. 
On estimation (21) gave: 
PRSAt = -1263.59* + 1.20* LAPF t+0.90* CORE t+0.27* 
PRSA 
t-1 (-4.26) (4.98) (12.00) (4.90) 
+ 0.06u t-1 +Ct 
i2 0.9933 DW = 1.8061 SSE = 860xlOlo 
(o. 31) 
In terms of explanatory power (2') is an improvement over the SL 
model. Including the NPDI variable concurrently in the DL model, as 
implied by our finding in the SL model, results in an equation that 
includes both NPDI and lagged by one period NPDIt as explanatory variables. 
See Chapter 5. On estimation this equation resulted in the coefficients 
of the NPDI t and 
NPDI 
t-l variables 
being very close to each other. This 
finding would suggest that A(NPDI) may be the appropriate explanatory 
variable implying a MPS equal to zero. This is in line with the earlier 
findings by use of the SL model. Imposing the restriction we obtain 
2.1 in Table 2. 
L2-/ 
An F test accepts the restriction at the 5% level. 
The explanatory power of the equation improves and the SSE is reduced. 
The coefficient of LAPF is positive and significant, and gives support 
to the add-on. 
In equations(21) and (2.1) the coefficients of CORE and LAPF are 
very close to each other. In 2.2, therefore, we restrict them to be 
equal. The restriction is accepted. 2.3 is 2.1 but also includes the 
interest rate. Similarly 2.4 is 2.2 with the interest rate added. In 
here too, the restriction that the coefficients of LAPF and CORE are equal 
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is accepted. 2.5 allows a different lag distribution for the IR 
variable, a treatment consistent with the Koyck transformation modelp 
which results in the lagged IR variable being introduced in the equation. 
2.6 results from a same treatment of 2.4. In 2.5 and 2.6 the lagged IR 
variables are insignificantly different from zero. When dropped 2.3 and 
2.4 result again, and the restriction that they are equal to zero is 
accepted, at the 5% level of an F test. 
In 2.3 and 2.5 the coefficients of LAPF support the imperfect 
substitution hypothesis. When their coefficients are restricted to be 
equal to the coefficients of COREj the restrictions are accepted. The 
resulting contractual saving (COSA) variable always gives support to 
limited substitution. 
The last two equations in Table 2, are 2.7 and 2.8. They are as 
2.6 and 2.4 respectively* but allow a different lag distribution for the 
COSA variable. The results support all earlier considerations. 
Important, however, is that 2.8 is effectively a restricted version, and 
constitutes a test of# the Life Cycle Hypothesis, (LCH) . subject to the 
exclusion of the IR variables. 
1.2.3- The Life Cycle Hypothesis 
As it has been shown in the last Chapter, the LCH can be written 
as: 
PRSAt = yjA (PRI t)+y2 
PRSA 
t-1 +Et 
Et =ut- Xut-l #I 
where the effects of the interest rate are taken to operate via the LDV 
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and where PRI represents private income: i. e. NPDI plus COSA. 
(3) can also be written as: 










implying that 61 = -6 2=6 3=- 
6 
4=yl and 6 S=Y2* By estimating 
W) with 
a constant term 
13/ 
we obtain equation 3.1 in Table 3. In 3.2 we restrict 
61 and 62 to be equal and the restriction is accepted. Lagged COSA, 
however,, is always very small quantitatively and insignificantly different 
from zero. As a result when in 3.3 we restrict 63 and 64 to be equal 
the restriction is rejected easily. This is also the case when the most 
restricted version of the LCH, i. e. (3) is estimated in 3.4. 
The conclusion from the above is that the simple LCH is easily 
rejected by the data. As in the SL and DL models the restriction that 
the coefficients of NPDI t and 
NPDI 
t-l are equal, 
is accepted, but this is 
not the case for COSA t and 
COSA 
t-l* 
This implies that COSA have a 
differential impact on PRSAI not captured via the coefficient of A(PRI) . 
This would suggest that an extension of (3) to include COSA might be an 
interesting attempt to rescue the simple version of the LCH. This 
extended LCHt which follows Feldstein (1978), on estimation gave: 
PRSAt = -1118.93* + 0.29* A(PRI t+0.56* 
COSA 








R20.9961 DW = 1.7533 SSE = 488xlO 
177. 
Important about (4) is that it performs slightly better in 
terms of explanatory power than its respective 2.2 of the DL model and 
3.2 of the unrestricted LCH model. 
14/ 
The problem, however, is that in 
so doing we obtain an equation hardly different from the unrestricted 
simple LCH,, and the DL model. To see that one simply has to split 
A(PRI) in (4) as in (P), and obtain: 




t+C5 PRSA t-l I 
where the differences from (3') is that 61 =-6 2 ý- ýl 
(following the 
findings of 3.1) and 63 in (31 ) is equal to 2 + C4 in (5) . In 
(5) 
view of the findings of 3.2. (5) can also be written as 2.2. That isp 
for estimation purposes the extended LCH is hardly different to the un- 
restricted simple LCH or to the DL model. 
15/ 
It follows that the 
findings of the DL model in Table 2 can also be viewed as tests of the 
simple and extended LCH, and imply that the simple LCH is rejected while 
the extended is not, but it also needs to be further extended to account 
for the differential impact of the interest rate on private savings. On 
balance, the coefficients of COSA in the LCH support limited substitution. 
Another interesting finding of the DL model and the LCH is the 
possibility of deriving Long Run MR) elasticities of the LAPFv CORE and 
COSA variables by dividing their coefficients by one minus the co- 
efficient of the LDVA61 These elasticities are summarised in Table 4. 
In general# long run elasticities are higher, and in many cases 
significantly higher than onep giving support to the complementarity 
178. 
TABLE 
Implied Long Run Elasticities in the DL and 
LCH Models 
Eguation Number LAPF CORE COSA 
(21) 1.56* 1.17 
2.1 1.24 1.39* 
2.2 - - 1. 35* 
2.3 0.83 1.24* - 
2.4 - - 1. 17* 
2.5 0.74 1.22 - 
2.6 - - 1. 15* 
2.7 - 1. 2o* 
2.8 - - 1. 12* 
3.1 - - 1. 45* 
3.2 - - 1. 73* 
(4) - - 1. 37* 
Denotes significance at the 5% level of a one tailed 't' 
test. 
hypothesis. This observation is in line with early U. S. and most U. K. 
cross section findings. This provides a potential means of reconciling 
the divergence between time series and cross section results in terms of 
the well known fact that the former are more appropriate for testing short 
and medium run substitution#, while the latter account for the longer run. 
17/ 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
18 
As regards our treatment of the IRL-/ and rORF. variables as well 
as econometric issues# the same considerations apply in this Chapter as 
in Chapter 5t and we do not repeat them here. 
An additional issue in this Chapter is raised by our treatment 
of TLAPF. In Chapter 2 the theoretical arguments were developed in terms 
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of corporate pension funds only: i. e. no reference was made to life 
assurance funds. Regarding the substitution issue and the identifica- 
tion of the true MPS of households, excluding all LAPF from income and 
saving is appropriate, since the net inflow to life assurance funds too is 
not available for consumption: i. e. truly disposable. For the purposes of our 
testing the extended MSFO however, it would be closer to our theoretical 
analysis, if life assurance funds and pension funds could be identified 
separate y. 
19/ 
This was not possible due to data availability. 
Observing the close similarity, howeverl between the two types of funds, 
we can think of no serious reason why, our treatment should bias our 
results in a direction unfavourable to the discussion of Chapter 2. 
Given the above, the conclusions that can be drawn from this 
Chapter are: we found support for the extended MSFF but not for the MSF 
or the simple LCH. Alternatively we supported the idea that pension 
funds too? as well as corporate retentions and consequently contractual 
savings as a whole, do not substitute perfectly with net personal saving, 
and may very well add-one on a one to one basis; on other saving. 
Further, we found support for the Galbraith-Marglin hypothesis2o/. Thus 
we can conclude that the 'controlling group Is 'policies on retentions and 
pension funds do induce a flexibility to the aggregate proportion of 
income saved. These conclusions are also verified from the specifica- 
tion search followed in the Appendix. 
SUMMARY 
We tested the extended MSF against the MSF and the LCH, by use 
of post-war U. K. data. We found support for the extended MSF. Alterna- 
tivelyl no support was found for the idea that pension funds and corporate 
retentions will substitute perfectly with net personal saving and between 
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each other. 
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 6 
SPECIFICATION SEARCH 
The purpose of this appendix is twofold. First to start from a 
general specification encompassing both the DL and LCH and test down to 
find the preferred equation. Second to test for the possibility that 
the often uncomfortably high j2, s in our previous results are due to 
trend rather than the explaining power of the models - regressors used. 
We can write the general equation as: 
PRSAt = eo +e1A (NPDI t)+02 LAPF t+e3 LAPF t-1 +e4 CORE t 
CORE t-1 +e6 IR t+67 IR t-1 +e8 PRSA t-1 + E: t 
ct= ut- Xu 
t-1 * 
(A. 1) 
(A. 1) is consistent with the DL model in its general form and 
encompasses the LCH as a special case. To account for trend and ensure 
stationarity of the series (A. 1) was subject to first differencing. To 
the obtained equation a constant term was added to mean correct the 
series. Given the resulting second differences in a few cases, these 
equations were estimated for the 1950-1981 period to ensure thirty 
effective observations. For the last two reasons the obtained results 
are not strictly comparable to the previous ones, but we think of no 
serious reason to suspect that such small differences would lead to any 
significant changes in our findings. 
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The estimated version of the general equation is 5.1 in Table 5. 
Both lagged LAPF and CORE in 5.1 are insignificantly different from zero. 
In 5.2 they are restricted to zero, which restrictions are easily accepted 
at the 5% level of an F test. The explanatory power of the equation 
improves. In 5.1 and 5.2 the coefficients of LAPF and CORE are very close 
to each other. In 5.3 we restrict them to be equal. The restriction is 
accepted and there is further improvement in the explanatory power of the 
equation. Equation 5.4 is the unrestricted version of the simple LCHj 
(3') or alternatively version (5) of the extended LCH. It arises by 
imposing equality restrictions to 5.1 for both current and lagged LAPF and 
CORE. It can be seen that although the restrictions are accepted and the 
explanatory power of the equation is higher as compared to 5.1, the 
coefficient of the lagged COSA variable is insignificant. When set equal to 
zero we obtain 5.3 again. The restriction is accepted and the explanatory 
power is higher. 
It can be seen that 5.3 is the best equation. It is consistent 
with the DL model, but rejects the simple LCH implications. The 
contractual saving coefficient is equal to one supporting the add-on 
hypothesis. similarly in 5.1 and 5.2 the coefficientsof LAPF are equal 
to one. As compared to our previous findings the only important 
difference is the significant lagged IR variable. This would suggest 
some collinearity problems in the levels specifications. It is also 
important to note that none of the equations up to this point suffered 
from first order autocorrelation while the explanatory power of the 
equations is surprisingly high# despite the de-trending via differencing. 
From the last four equations reported 5.5 and 5.6 are as 5.3 and 
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zero. Obviously these restrictions are rejected but the task was 
undertaken in order to test the various more restricted versions of the 
pure simple LCH or DL models against the more general version of the LCHP 
It can be seen that lagged COSA is still not significantly 
different from zero, and setting it to zero results in 5.5: the 
restriction is still not rejected at the 5% level although the 
explanatory power of the equation is now lower. Setting* however, 
6=-63 in (31) results in 5.7 and this restriction is clearly 
rejected. When the most restricted versions of the simple LCH (3) is 
estimated, it results in 5.6. The implied restrictions are profoundly 
rejected, and the equation exhibits significant (at the 10% level) first 
order autocorrelation. The explanatory power of the equation falls too. 
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NOTES 
I/ A notable exception is Feldstein (1978),, for the U. S. 
For other purposes too, like th 
Chapter 2) , or our expectations 
recovery. See Rose, (1963). 
tpersonal saving paradox', (see 
on the effects of saving on 
Which is also the official treatment in the case of Social 
Security. See Pearce and Thomas, (1981). 
4/ This would have no effect on our series if contributions were 
equal to benefits# i. e. if LAPF was zero. This, 
howeverp was never the case in the postwar U. K.; the net inflow 
being always positive and close to around 50% of the total 
contributions to the funds: which makes the correction 
indispensable. 
5/ This is also recognized by Threadgold (1978). 
And/or on a if one wants to test the effects of CORE on PRSA 
too: i. e. 
;L 
MCSF. 
7/ More lags were tested but they 
significantly from zero at the 
8/ Equation 1.8 marginally failed 
correlation at the 10% level. 
to ensure consistency with the 
estimates were essentially the 
were found not to differ 
5% significance level. 
to exhibit significant auto- 
Still we report ML estimates 
other equations. The OLS 
same. 
9/ A method proposed by Koutsoylannis (1977). 
10/ The same findings were obtained when PRSA were simply regressed 
-11 _1 . 
and then the relevant to LAPFt,, LAPFt -COREt and COREt 
restrictions were imposed. These equationst moreover, did not 
exhibit autocorrelated residuals. These results are available 
on request. 
As explained in Chapter 5, note 5 
is also consistent with the exist 
when augmented to include ANPDI 
interesting property: a zero lon 
NPDI along with a higher long run 
for CORE and LAPF. This solves 
DL model noted in Chapter 5. note 
with the existing evidence. See 
,, a DL model on LAPF and CORE 
ing empirical evidence. Furthert 
the DL model satisfies this 
g run propensity to save 
than base yeart elasticity 
the potential problem of the 
5, and it is also consistent 
also note 17. 
12/ (2.1) could also be obtained if ANPDI was assumed to have a 
geometrically declining lag distribution as PRSA similar to that 
of LAPF and CORE. If, instead, ANPDI was allowed to affect PRSA 
concurrently# its lagged value would appear in the regression. 
Equations along these lines never gave rise to significant co- 
efficients of the lagged ANPDI variable, so these results are not 
reported. See also note 6f Chapter 5. 
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13/ The LCH requires estimation without the constant, which we 
include for statistical purposes: i. e. to mean correct our 
series. Estimation of the equations in Table 3 without the 
constant resulted in inferior equations in terms of auto- 
correlation and misspecification as judged by the DW. An F 
test accepted the exclusion only cnce, (in 3.4). 
14/ It also performs better than its respective extended version 
which includes CORE only; in Chapter 5. 
15/ Which supports earlier theorizing by Marglin (1975) and 
Green (1979). 
16/ In case the lagged value of the relevant variable is included in 
the equation, this is modified to read: the coefficient 
of the relevant variable plus or minus the coefficient of its 
lagged value, by one minus the coefficient of the LDV. 
17/ The important difference between the DL and the LCH models arises 
from the fact that the former implies a higher LR elasticity for 
CORE and LAPF than its respective SR. In contrast the LCH implies 
a: LR elasticity for CORE and LAPF equal to zero. In that sense 
the LCH is in stark contrast to the existing evidence, and 
especially so, the cross section one. 
18/ Different results to ours for the U. S. are reported in Weber (1970). 
Other U. S. studies are surveyed in Howrey and Hymans (1978). Some 
U. K. studies are surveyed in Arestis and Driver (1980). The general 
picture appears to be one of inconclusiveness. In this Chapter as 
in the previous one, we reestimated our regressions by using a real 
interest rate (RIR) series, (see Data Appendix). Qualitatively 
the same results were obtained. When, for example, equation 2.3 
(Table 2) was estimated with a real interest rate series, it gave: 
PRSAt=-2493.33* + 0.26* A(NPDI t)+0.81* 
LAPF 
t 
(-6.80) (4.82) (4.28) 
0.80* CORE t+0.83*RIR t+0.42* 
PRSA 
(15.36) (3.39) (8.82) 
0.09 u t-1 
+ E: t 
(0.44) 
R2 = 0.9971 DW = 1.8201 SSE = 333*1010 
19/ In fact it can be argued that the life assurance funds bear a 
close similarity to retentions arising from direct (voluntary) 
shareownershi. p: as ex-ante they are both voluntary. 
20/ Together these observations imply that an increase of LAPF by 
say El will increase private savings by exactly El. While a 
Marginal Propensity to Save net personal disposable income of, 




Saving out of Profit and Wage Income : Tests of 
the neo-Keynesian Saving Function and Related 
Hypotheses* 
This Chapter relies on and extends ideas and findings 
first appeared in Pitelis (1983). 
187. 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this Chapter is to test the neo-Keynesian Saving 
Function and in particular the 'Kaldorian' hypothesis, in the light of 
the analysis and results of Chapters 4 and 6. This involves identifying 
appropriate income shares out of net personal disposable income, and then 
imputing pension funds to wage income and corporate retentions to profit 
income. All the other versions of the saving function examined and/or 
proposed in Chapter 4j are also tested in this Chapter. 
Three issues are worth being reminded of: (i) the Kaldorian 
argument that retention of profit justifies a higher 'propensity' to save 
profit income is no longer necessarily true, in the face of compulsory 
pension funds schemes, even assuming zero substitution between retentions 
and personal savings: (ii) obtained coefficients are not propensities 
but corporate saving on behalf of each group plus each group's true 
propensities, and/or disequilibrium savings: (iii) from the host of 
existing empirical studies on this issue, only Klein (1950)0 Modigliani 
and Tarantelli (1975) and Pitelis (1982a) can claim to have tested the 
'Kaldorian' hypothesis consistently: -! 
' 
all other studies have focused 
on 'propensities' out of personal sector income only. The evidence of 
these three studies for U. S. # Italy and U. K., suggests that around one 
third of wage income and three fourths of profit income is saved. 
In Section 1 we expound our views cn the 'appropriate' definition 
of disposable profit and wage shares. Section 2 has empirical results. 
In Section 3 we discuss and conclude. 
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1. ON THE DEFINITION OF DISPOSABLE SHARES 
Defining disposable income shares is a difficult task, both 
theoretically and in terms of data availability. In Chapter 4 we argued 
that from the point of view of the ultimate beneficiaries, pension funds 
could be viewed as wage income while corporate retentions as profit 
income. Thisi, should be noted, appears to be closer to the Pasinettian 
viewpoint rather than to a Kaldorian. In practicet howeverf the very 
fact that pension funds earn profit income# and the existing state of 
data availability blurs the distinction and makes anything short of rough 
approximations next to impossible. 
As we have seen in Chapter 4# most existing studies have focused 
on personal sector income shares only. The normal practice was to define 
disposable wage income as after tax employment income: i. e. employers 
contributionsp wages plus salaries, and forces pay. Disposable profit 
income was defined as income from dividends, rent, interest and self 
employment,, after tax. This treatment, howeverl involves the problem 
that personal sector disposable income is not exhausted, as contributions 
from the central government are left unclassified. As we saw in Chapter 
4, some studies have chosen to identify such contributions as a separate 
income category, (e. g. Surreyr 1970). 
2/ 
In principle# none of these practices is wrong or correct on a 
priori grounds. To say that, one needs to have firstly specified one's 
aims. In case one is interested to test in what proportion different 
types of income are saved, any possible subdivision will do. In case, 
however? one is interested in testing the idea that two different types 
of income are saved in a different proportion, then one needs to identify 
189. 
contributions from central government with one type of income, or 
income receiver. For the purposes of this Chapter it appears prudent 
to impute contributions from central government to wage income, as it 
is largely to wage earners that such contributions are paid,, 
3/ 
constituting what is often called the 'social wage'. 
The most serious problem# however, in the usual definitions of 
personal sector wage income arises from the fact that wages and salaries 
are defined in the official statistics gross of contributions of employees 
to life assurance and pension funds. Further, employers contributions 
are also defined to include contributions to these funds. Thus wage 
income includes all contributions to TLAPF,, instead of the benefits only. 
With less than perfect substitution between contributions minus benefits 
toTLAPF and the rest of wage income, such treatment is bound to inflate 
the proportion of wage income 'saved'. More importantly# however, such 
a treatment blurs the distinction between income type or income receiver: 
as by imputing all contributions to TLAPF to wage income p the implicit 
classification is one of the ultimate beneficiaries, that is income 
receivers. Howevere by imputing at the same time the profit income 
earned by the funds (i. e. dividends# rentp interest and the ownership 
claims of the funds to retained income) to profit income, the distinction 
becomes one of type of income. 
In order to satisfy our suggestion that pension fund income 
could be imputed to wage earners income# what we would need, for the 
purposes of this Chapterr is to impute all property income (received or 
retained) by the TLAPF to wage income. The data, however, on dividendst 
rent and interest received byTLAPF are only confined to the 1971 onwards 
period, while the identification of the part of retentions 'owned' by the 
190. 
TLAPF,, is not possible as data on that do not exist. As a result# in 
this Chapter too, we impute all contributions to TLAPF to wage income, 
but profit income earned by the TLAPF is imputed to the rest of profit 
income, and similarly corporate retentions are left with the rest of 
corporate retentions. 
As notedr the problem with the above treatment will be that it 
will test a hybrid of the Pasinettian and Kaldorian versions of the 
NKSF,, but neither of them exactly. With regard to our suggestions in 
Chapter 4, this treatment will have no effect on the 'propensitiesto 
save out of net personal disposable income sharest if the latter are zero, 
but it will bias downwards the proportion of income saved out of the 
aggregate wage share as corporate retentions of TLAPF will not be imputed 
with (the rest of ) wage income. This bias will tend to strengthen and/ 
or offset other biases to which we will soon refer. 
The outcome of the above discussion is the following: wage 
income (WI) is defined as: 
±/ 
WI = (W+S) + F? + EC + CSG - WTAX - WCSS, 
where (W+S) = Wages and salaries, including contributions to TLAPF 
FP = Forces PaY, 
EC = Employers contributicnsi including contributions tom)IAPF,, 
CSG = Contributions from central government, 
WTAX = Taxes paid out of wage income, and 
WCSS = Contributions to social security out of wage income. 
Net wage Income (NWI) is defined as: 
NWI = WI - LAPF p, 
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where LAPF = Net inflow in Life Assurance and Pension Funds - 
Profit income (ITI) is defined as: 
III = DIV + CORE + RE + INT + SEY - 11TAX -ITCSS , 
where DIV = dividends, 
COPE = retentions, 
RE = rent 
INT = interest 
SEY = income from self employment# 
HTAX = taxes paid out of profit income, and 
ITCSS = contributions to social security out of profit income. 
Net profit income (NIII) is: 
NTII = III - CORE . 
On aggregate RI plus WI exhaust disposable private income (PRI)o 
while NHI plus NWI exhaust net personal disposable income (NPDI)j leaving 
LAPF plus CORE to the corporate sector. 
The above definitions are not free of criticisms other than the 
ones already discussed. First, TýI is overestimatedl since it includes 
all SEY. In practice# only a part of SEY is profit income, the rest being 
an imputed wage of e. g. owners of unincorporated businesses, and other self 
employed persons. Second, WI is overestimated too, since it includes in 
it all salaries. In practice, it might be argued that a proportion of. 
or even all salariest are in fact profit income. See e. g. Cowling (1982) 
5/ 
Minor quantitative problems arise also from our classification of all 
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CCG, as wage income. In practice some parts of CCG such as rebates to 
employers from redunancy funds and/or grants to universities are not as easily 
classifiable as the rest of CCG. Further, a problem related to the issue 
of salaries above, arises from the fact that the contributions to and/or 
benefits from TLAPF of the salariat are also included to WI or NWI respectively. 
In principle it is possible to approximate the wage income part 
of SEY. See e. g. Modigliani, (1970) and Hacche, (1979). The assumptions 
involvedl however, would make the result of such an attempt suspect. On 
the other hand, to find the part of salaries that it is actually profits 
is impossible since data on that are not readily available. 
The above problems are of no significance if as suggested in 
Chapter 41 and as implied by most existing evidence 0 the proportions 
of personal sector income shares saved are equal or close to each other. 
In such a case the remaining biases are just two. The part of TLAPF that 
belongs to the profits part of salariesp and the part of retentions that 
belongs toTLAPF and ultimately to wage income. Fortunatelyp these two 
biases are of opposite direction# and they will tend to cancel out. 
It is evidentp we thinkp frcm the above, that the problems 
involved are sufficient to defy any claim that the 'true' proportions of 
income shares saved can be obtained. We believel howeverl that given 
the existing problems# the distinctions suggested above are perhaps the 
best we can get. Subject to these qualifications# we examine in the 
next Section the econometric evidence. 
TESM OF THE NEOKEYNESIAN SAVING FUNCTION AND RELATED HYPOTHESES 
The econometric framework adopted in this Chapterp is the same 
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as thie one in Chapter 6: since as we have explained, testing Our 
suggestions on the proportions of disposable income shares saved, simply 
involves imposing and/or relaxing relevant restrictions in the models - 
equations of Chapter 6. Thus, in Table 1 we summarize the results 
obtained from following the above procedure in the SL modelp while 
Table 2 has results obtained from the DL and LCH models. 
In Table 11 equations 1.1.1.2,1.3 and 1.4 test our proposed 
extended version of the MSF or what we alternatively called the MCSF, in 
the exact form (13) in Chapter 4. Evidently at the same time we test 
again the effects of LAPF# COPE and COSA on PRSA. We observe that all 
previous suggestions are supported from these equations. In 1.2 the 
'true' propensity to save both NnI and NWI is zero, implying that wage 
earners save only through pension funds, and profit income earners 
through retentions. The last two add-on and substitute imperfectly 
respectively with PRSA. Equation 1.2 is imposing on 1.1 the restriction 
that the coefficients of IAPF and CORE are equal. The restriction is 
accepted. The COSA variable supports imperfect substitution. Regarding 
propensitieso all previous considerations apply. Equations 1.3 and 1.4 
are as 1.1 and 1.2 respectively, but include the interest rate, which is 
positive and significant. All previous considerations are the same. 
Equation 1.5 allows for disequilibrium saving on the part of Nwi 
and NITI: by introducing their one period lagged values in 1.4, an 
equation that constitutes an unrestricted version of 1.12 in Chapter 6. 
Similar results are found. The implicit restriction in 1.12 Chapter 6, 
that disequilibrium saving proportions out of NHI and NWI are equal, is 
accepted. 
Equations 1.6 and 1.7 test Cowling's version of the MSF, by 
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imputing LAPF to NWI but allowing NJII and CORE to differ. The 
restriction that the coefficients of lagged NHI and NWI in 1.5 are 
equal, is also imposed. The restriction is accepted. In both 1.6 and 
1.7 the coefficient of NflI is higher than that of WI but not significantly 
SO. 
Equations 1.8 and 1.9 finally, test the NKSF: by imputing LAPF 
to net wage income and CORE to profit income. In both cases the proportion 
of ITI saved is found to be much higher than that of WI saved, supporting 
the earlier findings of the studies referred to in Section 1. This is 
in line with the neo-Keynesian proposition but note that it casts doubt 
both on the Kaldorian. proposition that retention can justify a higher 
proportion to save profit, and the interpretation of the coefficients as 
propensities. 
In Table 2 we have more results on the NKSF, in the framework 
of the DL and LCH models, as expounded in the last two Chapters. 
Equations 2.1 and 2.2 result from 2.1 and 2.3 respectively in Chapter 6: 
by relaxing the restriction that the coefficients of NPDI t and 
NPDI 
t-l 
are equal, obtaining NWI and NH. I from NPDI along the lines described 
earlier in this Chaptert and then imputing LAPF and CORE to NWI and 
NIII respectively to obtain WI and IT. I. 2.2 is 2.1 but also includes 
the interest rate. Equations 2.3 and 2.4 are obtained from 3.1 in 
Chapter 6: by splitting NPDI to NWI and NII. I# imputing the LAPF part of 
COSA to NWI and the CORE part of COSA to NITI to obtain WI and RI 
respectively, and then following the same procedure for NPDI t-l and 
COSA 
t-10 
2.5 and 2.6 are 2.3 and 2.4 respectively but involve imposing 
on the latter the restriction of equal coefficients to KI t-l and 
wi 
t-1 
to obtain PRI t-l' 
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and 2.9 are 2.2,2.4 and 2.6 respectively, but include an inflation 
variable, both to check the robustness of the results in its presence and 
because of recent concern on the effects of inflation on savings, (see e. g. 
Deatonj 1977p Davidson, et. al. 1978). In all cases this is negative and 
in two out of three, significantly so. 
6/ 
Regarding our main concern, the findings in Table 2 support all 
previous conclusions. In all equations the coefficient of the RI variable 
are significantly higher than the coefficient of the WI variable. On 
average around one third of wage income is shown to be saved and approxima- 
tely 70% of profit income. This is in line with Kalecki's original 
results,, (see Chapter 4), and the other studies outlined in the introduction 
of this Chapter. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Regarding the IR and the usual econometric problems all previous 
considerations apply in this Chapter too. A potential econometric problem 
arises from the fact that in an ex-post sense the equations reported in 
this Chapter result from imposing invalid restrictions to the equations 
of Chapter 6. This is true both when, following Kaldor, we impute 
retentions to profit income and also when following our suggestions we 
impute pension funds to wage income. As it turned out this did not 
appear to create any statistical problems with the results,, but it 
obviously bears heavily on the economic interpretation of the coefficientst 
which we stress once more, far from being propensitiesl are an amalgam 
of true propensities and/or disequilibrium savings# along with corporate 
savings. 
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As in the previous Chapters we also estimated our equations in 
their first difference form. Similar results were found. When, for 
example# we estimated 2.2, we obtained: 
A(PRSA 
t 
161.44 + 0.37* A(WI 
t+0.68* AOTI t)-0.24* 
A(NPDI 
t-1 (-1.05) (5.87) (15.97) (-2.94) 
177.35* A(IR 
(2.29) 
R2 = 0.9279 




SSE = 517xlO 
10 
- 0.11 u t-1 
+Et 
(-0.52) 
DW = 2.1037 . 
(2.2') 
We also obtained similar results when we tested in more complicated 
models the idea that proportions of income saved may differ even only if 
personal sector shares are considered. In all cases the proportion of 
profit income saved was higher than that of wage income, but in no case 
significantly so,, supporting similar findings by other studies in recent 
years, but exposing their limitations too. 
Our suggestion that compulsory pension funds schemes cast doubt 
on the theoretical validity of the Kaldorian idea that corporate retention 
policies per se are sufficient to justify a higher 'propensity' to save 
profit income than wage income, combined with our ex-post empirical 
observation that the 'Kaldorian' idea on differential 'propensities' is 
after all true, reposes the question. 
higher proportion that wage income ? 
Why profit income is saved in a 
It appears to us that an answer to this question can be obtained 
by, going back to the wealth and other 'peculiarities' of property income 
owners, cr at least the most wealthy of them. That isp the idea that a 
higher proportion of their income is saved by them, or on their behalf by 
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the corporate 'controlling group', simply because a higher proportion 
of income is there , available to be saved: which takes us back to 
Pasinetti's world. 
SUMMARY 
We tested the neo-Keynesian Saving Function and related 
hypotheses by use of post-war U. K. data. Support was given to the idea 
that profit income is saved in a higher proportion than wage income but 
doubt was cast both to the interpretation of the coefficients as 
'propensities' and the Kaldorian idea that corporate retention per se can 
justify this finding. 
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NOTES 
Burmeister and Taubman's (1969) work too, provides indirect but 
clear cut evidence for the 'Kaldorian' hypothesis. Some problems 
arising, in particular with the treatment of pension funds are 
analyzed in the next Section. 
2/ This approach is also followed in the Bank of England consumption 
equation (see e. g. Davis, 1982) and some macroeconometric models 
such as the Liverpool model. This indirect acceptance of Kaleckian 
essentially ideas highlights the indispensability of using the 
Kaleckian tools of analysis,, in particular for policy oriented 
issues# even by their critics. See also Sawyer, (1-982). 
3/ See e. g. the Blue Book (various issues) for details. Evidently 
this treatment fails to consider wider normative issues such as 
the argument that while the employers should solely be responsible 
for the payment of wagest the 'social wage' is rather financed by 
taxes levied on the whole population: i. e. workers too. It could 
also be argued that the 'social wage' is a subsidy to employers: 
as, by ensuring the existence of a physically capable working 
force, it tends to reduce lost hours of work due, e. g. to illness, 
and thus it tends to increase productivity and profits. Such 
problems highlight the inadequacy of using the existing data to test 
theoretical concepts such as the ones considered in this thesis. 
See also Aaronovitch and Smith (1981). 
4/ To facilitate the reading of the econometric results from the 
tables, we adopt a slight change in the notation. 
5/ See also our treatment in Chapter 3. 
6/ This result, howevert was not robust. From the equations estimated 
with an inflation variable only a small proportion resulted in a 
significant coefficient. More often than not the coefficient was 
negative but insignificant. Our findings contrast the currently 
widely accepted idea that inflation increases saving (see also 
Hendry and von Ungern Sternberg# 198O)j, but it is not against 
economic theorising and/or other empirical evidence on the issue. 
See e. g. Branson and Klevorickp (1969), for a result similar to 
the one reported here, and Steindl (1983), for a different 
theoretical view. Cuthberston (1983) have shown that the impact 




An Estimated Saving Function for the 
Household Sector : Synthesis* 
An earlier version of this Chapter was presented at an 
Economic Theory Workshop at Warwick. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A central point arising, we think, from the analysis and empirical 
evidence of the preceding Chapters,, is that non-controlling households 
pay little - if any - attention to their ownership claims on income that 
they do not actually control, and 'prefer' to pursue their consumption- 
saving plans based on what they have at their disposal: their net 
personal disposable income. 
From the above this very important implication follows: doubt is 
cast on the neoclassical reliance on the presumably homogeneous aggregater 
i. e. private income* for the specification of household saving function. 
A better alternative would appear to be to use net personal disposable 
income for this purpose and then appropriately augment the resulting 
specification to account for potential substitutability between contractual 
saving on the one hand, and net personal saving, on the other. This 
alternative is followed in this Chapter. 
In Chapter 5 we rederived the Swamy (1968) result regarding the 
equivalence of the Life Cycle Hypothesis and the Houthakker-Taylor model, 
in a different way to Swamy's. We have also shown that a Distributed 
Lag model of saving may lead to the same specification. 
In the first Section of this Chapter, we extend this result to 
include versions of: the partial adjustment hypothesis of consumption, 
the simple lag-habit persistence, and the adaptive expectations-permanent 
income hypotheses of consumption. More simple alternative ways of 
obtaining the same estimated form are also entertained. In Section 2 we 
proceed to repeat in the framework of this 'generalized' saving function 
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for the household sectoro all the econometric exercises involved in 
the second part of this thesis. 
conclusions. 
In Section 3 we have discussion and 
1. A 'GENERALIZED' SAVING FUNCTION FOR THE HOUSEHOLD SECTOR 
We have seen that the equation: 
st =a1 AY t+a2s t-I I 
(1) 
where S stands for saving and Y for income# is consistent with the 
LCH and the H-T models of consumption-saving: their difference being 
that the LCH is specified in terms of private saving (PRSA) and private 
income (PRI)j, while the H-T model is specified in terms of personal 
sector saving (PSS) and personal sector disposable income (PSDI). 
2/ 
Equation (1) is also consistent with a partial adjustment model of 
consumption, which equates the desired or equilibrium value of consumption 




Then from Act =6 (y t- ct-1) 0 
(3) 
obtain ct = (1-6) c t- 1+6yt* 




Furtheroequation (1) is consistent with: the simple lag-habit 
persistence, and the adaptive expectations - permanent income hypotheses 
of consumptionY All the above models give rise to an estimated 
equation of the form: 
ct =ý1yt+ý2c t-1 * 
See e. g. Ferber (1973). Substituting in (5) for 
st = (1-a 1)yt-a2y t-1 +ý2s t-1 I 
which is an unrestricted version of (1). 
(5) 
(6) 
Evidently (1) can also be derived directly; f rom a geometrically 
declining distributed lag - Koyck transformation model of St on AY t 
as well as from the identity St =S t-1 + 
ASt I if the simple 




From the above it follows thatt in its estimated form (1) appears 
to be consistent with most consumption-saving models proposed to date. 
In this sense it provides a generally accepted econometric framework in 
which any hypotheses of our interest can be tested. It also highlights 
the validity of the oft advanced criticism against the LCH and the 
Permanent Income Hypothesis (PIH), that they are operationally 
indistinguishable from more 'simplistic' hypotheses. See e. g. Marglin 
(1975) and Green (1979) . 
Equation (1) does not provide, however, a ccmmon ground as regards 
the appropriate definition of savings-income to be adopted: whichr as 
St, obtain 
we will see, also bears on the issue of the appropriate way of testing 
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the substitutability of saving. This apparently simplistic difference 
however, should not be underestimated. Indeed, it is not far-fetched to 
argue that the choice of the data per se, reflects ideology. Thus, the 
choice of private income as the appropriate variable for consumption- 
saving decisions is the result of, and reflects, an ideclogy of consumers 
sovereigntyr perfectly competitive firms and perfect capital markets. 
In contrast the choice of net personal disposable income appears closer 
to implying a world of the corporate controlling group's sovereignty 
and imperfect capital markets. From our analysis in Chapter 2, and the 
empirical findings in Chapters 5 and 61 it would appear that the choice 
of net personal saving and disposable income for the specification of 
the saving function# is closer to reality than its alternatives. 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
In Table 1 and 2 we summarize the results obtained from estimating 
(versions of) equation (1). Starting from Table 1. equation 1.1 tests 





A constant term is also included in 1.1 and 
all other equations to mean correct the series. (1) is estimated in 
1.2. The restriction is accepted at the 5% level of an F testj implying 
a MPS net personal disposable income equal to zero: i. e. only dis- 
equilibrium saving on the part of the household sector as a whole. 
Equations 1.3 to 1.8 account for potential substitutability, by 
extending 1.2 appropriately. This can be done in two equivalent ways. 
That is, CCRE and/or IAPF can be included either only in the right hand 
side of 1.2 as additional explanatory variables, or they can be both 
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difference will be in the interpretation of the coefficients; in the 
former case a coefficient of zero will imply independence while in the 
latter case a coefficient of one will imply this hypothesis. 
4/ 
In 1.3 both LAPF and CORE are included as explanatory variables 
in the right hand side of 1.2. The add-on hypothesis is supported. In 
1.4 LAPF is added in both sides of 1.2. The add-on is again supported. 
In 1.3 CORE is added in both sides of 1.2. The same hypothesis is 
supported as before. 1.6 is 1.3 but also includes LAPF and CORE in the 
left hand side. It can be seen that the results of 1.3 are exactly 
reproduced. In 1.7 the coefficients of LAPF and CORE are restricted 
to be equal. The restriction is accepted at the 5% level of an F test. 
1.8 is 1.7 but includes the NPDI 
t as an additional explanatory variable. 
.w 
Again, it is insignificant suggesting a zero 'true' MPS. 
Evidently the common framework provided by equation (2) can also 
be used in order to test the impact of other potential explanatory 
variables on saving, as well as some of our concerns of Chapters 6 and 7. 
Equation 2.1 (Table 2), tests for the true propensities to save net wag 
and net profit income: by splitting NPDI in 1.8 to these two variables. 
Zero propensities are found. 2.2 allows for disequilibrium saving by 
'relaxing' all relevant restrictions in 1.7 along the lines described in 
Chapter 7. The results are similar to the ones of Chapter 7. Going 
back from 2.2 to its restricted version 1.7, we see by performing an F 
test that all restrictions implied in the latter are accepted: implying 
that an equal part of both A (NITI) and ý (NWI) is saved. 
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'propensities' out of personal sector income shares only may still differ. 
As in Chapter 7, the coefficient of the NJTI variable is higher than that 
of the WI variable, but not significantly so. Equation 2.4 tests for 
aggregate income shares 'propensities' by imposing On 2.3 the relevant 
restrictions. Similar results as in Chapter 7 are obtained. The 
coefficient of the lagged NPS variable, however, is insignificantly 
different from zero, a result perhaps of the imposition of invalid 
restrictions in 2.3. An F test rejected the restrictions at the 5% 
level. 
The last two equationst 2.5 and 2.6 are as 2.2 but also include 
the interest rate, and both the interest rate and an inflation variable,, 
respectively. The results are in line with those of Chapter 7. 
Regarding the substitutability of saving, in all equations the co- 
efficient of the COSA variable supports the add-on hypothesis. 
3. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Few new issues are raised from the results of this Chapter. The 
first regards the observation that in all equations the add-on hypothesis 
was supported. This diverges slightly from our finding, in the previous 
Chapters. It does not fully support our theoretical analysis in the 
first part of this thesis either. An interpretation of the findings 
of the previous Chapters in the light of this Chapter's results 
could be that the small degree of imperfect substitution found in the 
previous Chapters was simply reflecting substitution between LAPF and 
5 
CORE,, rather than between LAPF and CORE-5/ on the one hand, and NPS on 
the other. The substitution between contractual and net personal saving 
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that is, is zero, or bouseholds take no account whatever of their 
ownership claims on corporate saving. 
suggestions. 
This would be in line with Marglin's 
A second issue concerns the relation between the saving function 
estimated in this Chapter# and the ones estimated in Chapters 5 to 7. The 
basic difference evidently arises from the fact that the latter include a 
lagged PRSA variabler while the estimated function in this Chapter 
includes the lagged NPS variable instead. Despite this apparent difference 
it is fairly straightforward to go from the latter form to the former. 
Thus, observing that COSA may be affected by its past period valuer including 
the latter as an additional explanatory variable in e. g. 1.7 and 
restricting its coefficient to be equal to that of NPSt_lo, we can obtain 
an equation similar to the ones estimated in Chapter 7. 
L/ 
In this light 
the aggregate f unctiom of Chapter 7 may be seen as early attempts to 
account for the determinants of corporate savings. but incomplete 
attempts, as many other variables than their past value only may be 
affecting COSA. 
The last observation has this important connotation. 
write: 
where c 
COSAt = (7) 
represents a functional form and (-) the set of explanatory 
variables that affect COSA t. then under 
the plausible assumption that 
PRSA do not enter the set (-), (1) and (7) form a recursive model that 
can be estimated with OLS and without the problem of Simultaneous 
If we 
Equation Bias. This, along with the lack of any other serious 
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econometric problems and the generality of the estimated form of (1), 
might suggest that our results are of some value. 
SUMMARY 
We derived a 'general' saving function for the household sector 
and specified it in terms of what we considered to be the most 
appropriate definition of the variables. We then extended it to account 
for potential substitutability of saving and tested in its framework the 
hypotheses advanced-tested in the previous Chapters of this thesis. 
Largely similar results were found as before. 
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NOTES 
Previous attempts along these lines include Marglin (1975) and 
Pearce and Thomas (1981). No account has been given, howeverl 
to contractual saving. Howrey and Hymans' (1978) work appears 
to be closer to our approach. Their reliance on an augmented 
version of the H-T modelp thoughp turns cut to imply a long run 
elasticity of the retentions coefficient equal to zero, a fact 
that submits too much to the LCH viewt to which their adoption 
of the definition of net personal saving, essentially contrasts. 
2/ They also differ in the error term. See Chapter 5. 
3/ For differences between these models see e. g. Wallis (1979). 
It should be noted that the equivalence between consumption-saving 
functions to which we refer regards only the mathematical form of 
the deterministic part of the models. In case explicit modelling 
of the error term is undertaken this equivalence may no longer 
hold true and thus apparently equivalent specifications may lead to 
dif ferent results. 
4/ An important advantage, however, of using this approach is that it 
accounts for Feldstein's (1978a) critique to Howrey and Hymans (1978), 
that aggregate variables are better for the specification of the 
saving function. 
5/ See also Chapter 2 for a rationale for this possibility. 
6/ Our preliminary empirical findings along these lines supported such 
an interpretation. Howeverp we believe that much more evidence 
would be needed to fully justify this proposition. 
7/ Work on the determination of corporate retentions in particular goes 
back to Lintner (1956). See also Dobrovolsky (1951). More 
recently,, Hart (1968) has surveys and new evidence. We know of no 
work on the determinants of pension funds. As the issue is also 
controversial and not the subject matter of this thesis we chose 
to leave the determinants of COSA in (7) unspecified rather than 
engage ourselves with plausible, at bestr speculation. A move 
in this directionr though, would represent a 'natural' extension 
of this thesis. 
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DATA APPENDIX TO PART II 
The basic series adopted for the purposes of the second part of 
this thesis were: PSDI, C, COPEf LAPF, IRr RIR and INFL. The first 
three were taken from the U. K. National Income Accounts: i. e. Economic 
Trends, 1982 Annual Supplement, (ETAS) and the National Income and 
Expenditure (Blue Book). LAPF was provided to the author by M. Sherring 
of the Central Statistical Office. They are all defined after tax and 
before providing for depreciation, stock appreciation and additions to 
tax reserves. The IR series basically used was the treasury bill rate, 
obtained from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Financial Statistics, 
1983. Whenever different series were used, these were referred to in 
the text. The real interest rate (RIR) series was constructed by 
dividing the nominal interest rate (IR) by the retail price index (RPI). 





/RPIt_,, itself obtained from the ETAS 1982. The PSS, NPSf 
PRSAp NPDIj, COSAp WI, NWIj HIp NRI and NHI series were constructed as 
described in the text. All (but the IR-RIR) series were measured in 
constant prices, by use of the Implied Consumers Expenditure Deflator 
(ICED),, obtained from the ETAS,, 1982. Thirty-one annual observations 
were used covering the postwar U. K. period (1951-1981). Problems with 
postwar readjustments and the rationing of durables determined the starting 
period and data availability the end period. An exception was made in 
the Appendix to Chapter 6, where the 1950-1981 period was coveredt in 
order to ensure thirty effective observations. 
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POSTSCRIPT 
The central theme of this thesis z-uns as follows. The emergence 
and growth of the joint stock company has led, through the socialization 
of the 'ownership' of the means of production to a higher level of 
aggregate saving being available for investment purposes, than could 
have been the case in its absence. This outcome has been achieved 
because of the unwillingness and/or inability of non-controlling house- 
holds to substitute for increases in contractual (corporate) savings: 
i. e. corporate retentions and pension funds, by sufficiently reducing 
their discretionary savings. Competition among capitals as to who has 
control over a larger part of surplus value establishes a preference 
for a high retention ratio and/or the net inflow into pension funds 
ratio, on the part of the tontrolling group. The realization of the 
difficulty or futility of attempting to achieve substitution and/or the 
induced preference for consumption achieved through the advertising and 
other selling efforts of the corporate sector, establishes the preference 
for a low retention and/or net inflow into pension funds ratio, on the 
part of the non-controlling groups. Tax and other advantagest and/or 
sheer compulsion ensure the buying of shares and/or the participation 
in corporate pension funds schemesp of the non-controlling households. 
Historical consistency, the existing evidence and/or the dynamics of 
the system suggest that it is a more plausible hypothesis to interpret 
the above as the result of capitalist control of today's corporations, 
rather than managerial and/or all shareholders' control. The achieve- 
ment of a higher level of financial capital available for investmentr 
does not necessarily have a beneficial impact on the domestic economy as 
a whole: asp by tending to reduce the part of private income devoted to 
consumption# it contains the seeds of a realization failure. The inter- 
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nationalization of production and the distinct possibility that some 
'national' capitals transform themselves into 'rentiers', based on their 
share in surplus value to production abroad, may tend to strengthen the 
realization failures of the previously industrialized world: by giving to 
the rentier capitalists a further incentive to continue and expand the 
process of the socialization of the 'ownership' of the means of production 
at their domestic bases. An important implication of the socialization 
of the 'ownership' of the means of production and the finance policies of 
the 'controlling group', arises from their impact cn the celebrated theme 
of the form of the saving function: an extended Managerialist Saving 
Function, or alternatively, the Monopoly Capitalism Saving Function appears 
to be close to describing saving 'propensities' to date. Most of the 
above propositions were found not to contrast with the post war U. K. 
evidence. Support was also found for the MCSF and the Galbraith-Marglin 
idea of zero propensity to save net household income. Doubt was cast on 
the interpretation of the proportions to save private income shares, as 
propensities. Most models of the saving function were found to lead to 
a general estimated form. This 'generalized' household saving function 
was specified in terms of actually disposable income and saving only, and 
when estimated it supported previous theorising-findings. 
The above analysis - findings are subject to various limitations 
and can be extended in various directions. Many of the problems 
encounterede in particular those of a technical nature# were explicitly 
acknowledged in the textr and they will not be repeated here. Instead, 
we will focus on issues of a more general nature on which less than full 
treatment was given in the previous pages. 
The state, is one such issue. Evidently our previous discussions 
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were not conducted under the assumption of 'no public sectcr'. In 
particular the role of the state was always present: in our explanation 
for a differential tax treatment of retained earnings, the definitions 
of after tax private or (net) personal income shares and/or the role of 
the contributions of the central government to the households. still, 
no attempt was made to fully integrate the role of the state in our 
previous analysis. 
Such an integration would require an attempt to identify the role of 
the s tate in the class struggle,, as well as in the process of the 
accumulation of capital. Important contributions along these lines in 
recent years are Miliband (1973) and Poulantzas (1968): as the work of 
Jessop (1977) and Holloway and Piccioto (1978) however, suggests, these 
issues are far from being fully resolved. 
A more specific aspect of the role of the state, closely related 
to the analysis of the previous pages, regards the role of the public 
debt, and in particular of compulsory contributions to Social Securityp 
for aggregate capital accumulation. This issue, which goes back to 
Ricardo, was recently revived in the work of the proponents of the 
'Rational Expectations Revolution', and particularly so, in the work of 
Barro (1974). In essence what Barro suggested was that increased e. g. 
benefits on the part of the state, will nct increase consumption: as 
rational agents will realize that they need to save sufficiently so as 
to finance the associated stream of the social security taxes that they 
anticipate . Surely this argument is little more than the replica for 
the public sector of the Ando and Modigliani (1963) ideas for the 
private sector. Not surprisingly therefore, the same protagonists are 
starring in these debates as in the ones examined in the previous pages. 
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James Tobin's (1980) criticisms of the 'neo-Ricardians' are worth our 
close attention: as they represent an attempt to see our world as it is* 
even if for the purpose only of explaining itt and constitute an attack 
by the establishment to the extremists of this same establishment. 
Another aspect of the state relates to our analysis of realization 
failures. Important issues here are evidently, the role of government 
expenditures in raising effective demand (see e. g. Baran and Sweezy, 19671 
and the discussion in Bleaney, 1976), and in particular the role of 
military expenditures on this regard: an issue going back to Luxembourg 
(1951). See also Kalecki, (1971), and Rowthorni, (1980). Our less than 
sufficient treatment of such issues evidently limits the scope of (parts 
of) our analysis,, and represents an obvious area towards which future 
work should be directed. 
Similarlyr more emphasis should be paid to the international role 
of capital, in particular given that increasing internalization may tend 
to shift the required unit of investigation from the nation state, to the 
mode of production. See for example, the debate in Radice (1975). 
The determinants of corporate saving, is another important issue 
addressedt but not pursue4 in this thesis and represents another area 
in which work is required. 
Although the above limitations restrict the scope of our findings- 
suggestions, we do not think that they seriously undermine the analysis of 
the previous pages. The state as well as the existing internationalization 
of productiont represent the institutional setting whose impact may be 
reflectedf in an ex-post sense, in the observed data: which were not 
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found to contradict to our views. Further, on the purely theoretical 
level, the question whether the fuller account of the state and the 
international setting will cast doubt or strengthen our results, cannot 
be answered on a priori grounds. In this sense it leaves our analysis 
intact until otherwise proven. We hope that our future work will 
resolve these issues and that the present work will motivate others to 
approach these important questions. 
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